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### Humanitarian multi-track diplomacy

Clark, Michael David

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# Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy

Conceptualizing the Definitive, Particular, and Critical Role of Diplomatic  
Function in Humanitarian Action

## PhD Thesis

to obtain the degree of PhD at the  
University of Groningen  
on the authority of the  
Rector Magnificus Prof. E. Sterken  
and in accordance with the  
decision by the College of Deans.

This thesis will be defended in public on

Monday 2 July 2018 at 11.00 hours

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# Abstract

Publications and best practice suggest that humanitarian effectiveness depends on humanitarian actors' use of diplomacy. The practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain is often implied but rarely explicitly stated. Until now, a robust theoretical framework of humanitarian diplomacy has not existed. This research determines how diplomacy in the humanitarian sector is best conceptualized and operationalized. The study begins with the most exhaustive state of the art of humanitarian diplomacy, which includes a systematic literature review, chronology of humanitarian diplomacy's *Ideengeschichte*, and quantitative text analysis. A case study examined the role of diplomacy in the disaster responses of an international non-governmental organization (INGO) and a local non-governmental organization (NGO) in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake. In-depth interviews with representatives from both organizations have been conducted to understand how these two counterparts practiced diplomacy during partner negotiations. According to most humanitarian practitioners interviewed, to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat. The results of this research suggest that humanitarian effectiveness can be best improved when humanitarian diplomacy is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy (HMTD). There are three key findings: Firstly, humanitarian practitioners incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities in order to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. Secondly, humanitarian actors adjust their diplomatic strategy depending on the proximity of parameters (D-I-P-L-O) between them and their counterparts. Thirdly, those involved in humanitarian action believe that a consensus-based diplomatic strategy has a positive effect on humanitarian effectiveness.



# Keywords

2010 Haiti Earthquake, Advocacy, Collaboration, Dialogue, Diplomatic Function, Diplomatic Strategy, Diplomatic Tools, Disaster Response, Humanitarian Action, Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Diplomacy, Humanitarian Effectiveness, Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy (HMTD), International Relations, Localization, Multi-Track Diplomacy (MTD), Negotiation, NGO Diplomacy, Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O), Partner Negotiations, Persuasion, Relief, Track I Diplomacy, Track II Diplomacy, Tracks of Diplomacy

# Dedication

To Laura and Ella,  
Every day you warm my heart.

# Acknowledgments

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I recognize that my supervisors and colleagues not only supported my research in word, but also in deed as they shouldered some of my duties in critical times during the process. They took time to discuss this project and offered many helpful suggestions that have notably improved this work. Lastly, I wish to thank the leadership of Convoy of Hope and Mission of Hope who provided me with the access to the case study participants.

## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ALNAP</b>	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
<b>CHS</b>	Core Humanitarian Standard
<b>COH</b>	Convoy of Hope
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
<b>DFID</b>	Department for International Development (UK)
<b>D-I-P-L-O</b>	Domain, Identity, Publicity, Localization, Objective (Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy)
<b>D-N-A-P</b>	Dialogue, Negotiation, Advocacy, Persuasion (Diplomatic Tools)
<b>ECHO</b>	European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FEMA</b>	Federal Emergency Management Administration (USA)
<b>FOME</b>	Fondation Mission de l'Espoir
<b>GA</b>	General Assembly (of the United Nations)
<b>GC</b>	Geneva Convention
<b>GIZ</b>	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany)
<b>HMTD</b>	Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IFRC</b>	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>IMTD</b>	Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy
<b>INGO</b>	International non-governmental organization
<b>IO</b>	International Organization
<b>MOH</b>	Mission of Hope (Haiti)
<b>MSF</b>	Médecins Sans Frontières
<b>MTD</b>	Multi-Track Diplomacy
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NOHA</b>	Network on Humanitarian Action
<b>OCHA</b>	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

<b>ODI</b>	Overseas Development Institute
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>SNA</b>	Social Network Analysis
<b>TOD</b>	Tracks of Diplomacy
<b>RC/RC</b>	Red Cross/Red Crescent
<b>RRB</b>	Research Review Board
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNHRC</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

# Introduction

## 1.1 RESEARCH STATEMENT

In the last few years there has been a growing recognition that diplomatic function is an essential element in humanitarian aid. Many agree humanitarian effectiveness depends on diplomacy.<sup>1</sup> Some would even argue that without the practice of diplomacy humanitarian action could not exist.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, *humanitarian diplomacy* has comfortably entered the humanitarian vocabulary. The problem is, however, diplomacy in the humanitarian domain lacks conceptualization.<sup>3</sup> Little is known about the diplomatic process in the humanitarian sector. Although there has been discussion on the role that diplomacy plays, a robust theoretical framework—the foundation to operationalize practice—does not yet exist. This research will theorize humanitarian action’s diplomacy framework and provide empirical evidence how such practice is best conceptualized and operationalized. The desired outcome of this research is to contribute to greater humanitarian effectiveness. The title of this

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<sup>1</sup> The ability to negotiate is a good indicator of humanitarian effectiveness. See Michele Acuto, *Negotiating Relief: The Politics of Humanitarian Space* (London: Hurst, 2012), 260.

<sup>2</sup> Jan Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy*, eds., Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, Ramesh Thakur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 352; “Policy Statement on Advocacy,” Australian Red Cross, February, 2011, [http://www.redcross.org.au/files/Policy\\_on\\_Advocacy.pdf](http://www.redcross.org.au/files/Policy_on_Advocacy.pdf).

<sup>3</sup> Régnier, Philippe, “The Emerging Concept of Humanitarian Diplomacy: Identification of a Community of Practice and Prospects for International Recognition,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (2011): 1211–37, doi:10.1017/S1816383112000574.

thesis describes the purpose of this research: Conceptualizing the Definitive, Particular and Critical Role of Diplomatic Function in Humanitarian Action.

### **Diplomacy in the Last Mile of Humanitarian Action**

As the sun rises over a seemingly endless desert road, a convoy of vehicles comes to a halt at a checkpoint manned by an armed group. The lead driver rolls down his window, takes a deep breath, and prepares himself for the unpredictable negotiation. Three days earlier, a few thousand kilometers away in Geneva, the opening of a humanitarian corridor had been negotiated. With no end in sight to this protracted conflict, several states, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had held direct and indirect talks with the parties to conflict to realize this humanitarian operation. Yet it is here, in the proverbial last mile of the humanitarian operation, that it is up to the driver to persuade this splinter group to respect the agreement brokered in Switzerland.

Halfway around the world, the sun has already set as a first response team steps off of the plane and into chaos. A few hours earlier, an earthquake caused massive destruction; there are mounting fears of mass casualties. The team has been asked to conduct a rapid assessment, and most importantly, formalize an agreement with a local organization they will partner with during the emergency response. The local NGO is determined not to be relegated to an implementing role, but to lead the assessment, own the response design, and limit the presence of expatriate staff. The effectiveness of this partnership will depend on the ability of both parties to practice diplomatic function.

In a time zone somewhere between the conflict and earthquake, a local volunteer is meeting with a group of mothers by the village water well. Her goal is to persuade them to have their children vaccinated to prevent a dangerous disease. Advocacy campaigns by the humanitarian community secured the funding to begin the vaccination drive. A working group of state actors, NGOs, and the United Nations successfully negotiated the terms of the immunization campaign with the host government's Ministry of Health. Now the operation's ultimate success or failure is up to the volunteer.

Text box 1. Three examples of diplomacy in humanitarian action highlight the interconnectedness of the practice.

By accurately and comprehensively introducing and analyzing what is known about diplomatic practice in humanitarian action, this research will contribute to the knowledge of the topic. It will provide other researchers a basis to initiate further and more specific study. Educators will have a resource to equip the next generation of aid and development professionals. This research will provide senior leaders and policymakers an evidence base of the role that diplomacy plays in humanitarian action. Further, this research seeks to move the needle in humanitarian effectiveness by understanding and explaining the essential role that diplomatic function plays in humanitarian action. This will

empower the driver at the checkpoint (see text box 1) to properly represent his or her organization and the humanitarian mission. It will ensure that the first responders and their NGO partners are equipped with the diplomatic knowledge, skills, and tools required to implement the most effective humanitarian response possible. It will highlight the volunteer's indispensable role in persuading mothers in the village to trust her organization with their children's health.

## **1.2 RESEARCH STRATEGY**

The practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is definitive, particular, and critical. These three assertions summarize what is known about the topic. Further, they also explain what the research variables in this thesis are and how they influence the organization of the research. In summary, the three variables are the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action (definitive), multi-track diplomacy (particular) and humanitarian effectiveness (critical). In the next three paragraphs these variables are summarized and their organization is explained.

### **1.2.1 Research Variables**

Firstly, diplomacy in the humanitarian domain is definitive because it is already operational; that is, diplomacy is actually practiced presently in humanitarian action. The three illustrations in text box 1 above highlight the diverse and numerous diplomatic activities that take place at any given time in a humanitarian emergency. Humanitarian action and diplomacy have always been inherently linked. New evidence places the origin of diplomacy in humanitarianism around the beginning of institutionalized humanitarian action. What is needed is a comprehensive review and analysis of what is known about this diplomatic practice. Understanding this variable begins with the state of the art of diplomacy in humanitarian action.

Secondly, diplomacy in the humanitarian domain is particular because it is an idiosyncratic practice of diplomacy. The practice, actors, and goals are unique from other types of diplomacy. State and non-state actors practice this form of diplomatic function on local, national, and global levels. In its 125-year history,



diplomacy in humanitarian action has organically evolved into a complex but uncategorized system of diverse communication strategies taking place formally and informally in different contexts and involving a variety of actors. In light of this embryonic understanding of a *humanitarian diplomacy* system, how is this practice best conceptualized? There is potential that recent advances in conceptualizing the diplomatic practice in the peace process could contribute to the humanitarian field. In conflict resolution, for example, there is growing consensus that peace agreements can no longer be exclusively on official levels. Sustainable peace depends on the engagement of different official and unofficial global, national, and local actors. The multi-track diplomacy (MTD) concept views all diplomatic activity as a living system in which different actors interactively share diplomatic space and responsibility for an effective outcome. This research seeks to establish whether or not the qualities of multi-track diplomacy could meet the demands of humanitarian action and have a positive influence on humanitarian effectiveness.

Thirdly, there is a critical link between diplomatic function and aid effectiveness. There are elements of humanitarian effectiveness that depend on the practice of diplomatic function; for example, strengthening partnership and expanding support bases of humanitarian actors through communication. Yet diplomatic function remains one of the gaps in achieving humanitarian effectiveness. Humanitarian effectiveness is an important component in this research as the goal of diplomatic practice in humanitarian action is to achieve a humanitarian goal in the most effective manner possible. Therefore, this study must first establish what is meant by aid effectiveness and what is already known about the relationship between diplomacy and humanitarian effectiveness.

### **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION, SUB-QUESTIONS, & HYPOTHESES**

As previously stated, the problem of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is its lack of a theoretical framework. The premise of this research is that diplomacy can improve humanitarian effectiveness when it is conceptualized and

operationalized by applying a modified MTD framework specific to the humanitarian sector. This study, therefore, sets out to answer the following research question:

**To what extent can humanitarian effectiveness be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy?**

In order to answer the research question—and to keep the research focused, five sub-questions addressing various elements of the research question will be answered step-by-step throughout the dissertation:

1. According to current discussions in humanitarian action, what elements of humanitarian effectiveness can be improved through the practice of diplomacy (Chapter 2)?
2. What is known about the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action (Chapter 2)?
3. What elements of the MTD concept can inform the conceptualization and operationalization of HMTD (Chapter 3)?
4. How should the HMTD concept be operationalized (Chapter 4)?
5. In the operational theater of humanitarian action, is the practice of diplomacy characteristic of the HMTD theory and conducive to improving humanitarian effectiveness (Chapter 5 & Chapter 6)?

Three hypotheses assist in answering the research question by identifying the definitive, particular, and critical roles of diplomacy in humanitarian action:

1. Humanitarian actors incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities during a humanitarian response to achieve humanitarian effectiveness.
2. Humanitarian actors adjust their diplomatic strategy depending on the proximity of parameters between them and their counterparts.<sup>4</sup>
3. Humanitarian actors' preference for applying a consensus-based diplomatic strategy positively affects humanitarian effectiveness.

---

<sup>4</sup> The assumption is that the further the parameters of humanitarian multi-track diplomacy are apart the greater the emphasis on coercive diplomatic strategy, which will likely have a negative effect on humanitarian effectiveness.

### 1.3.1 Research Organization

Hempel's Covering Law Model has informed the design structure of this research.<sup>5</sup> The theory's premise is that a set of empirical information (*Explanans*), and the relationship between its parts, can explain and further enhance the understanding of an event, phenomenon, or theory (*Explanandum*).<sup>6</sup> For example, to determine why ice cream tastes sweet (*Explanandum*), one could study two major ingredients (*Explanans*), sugar and fruit (see Figure 1.1). These might not be the only ingredients of ice cream, but much of its sweet taste can be explained by:

- The individual qualities of sugar and fruit
- The relationship between sugar and fruit
- The individual and combined effect sugar and fruit have on ice cream




Figure 1.1 Example of Covering Law Model. In this example Sugar and Fruit are the explanans. Their individual qualities, as well as their relationship, explain the qualities of the explanandum (Sweet Ice Cream).

This research submits that the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action and multi-track diplomacy (*the Explanans*), can improve, or at least influence, certain elements of humanitarian effectiveness (*the Explanandum*). It is probable that empirical evidence will identify and explain the relationship between MTD and the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, and offer conclusions on how

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<sup>5</sup> Carl G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science* 15, no. 2 (April 1, 1948): 135–75, doi:10.1086/286983.

<sup>6</sup> Curtis Brown, "Hempel's 'Covering-Law' Model" (Trinity University, n.d.), accessed August 23, 2016, 1; Sreedharan, *A Manual of Historical Research Methodology* (Trivandrum, India: Centre for South Indian Studies, 2007), 1.

they might influence humanitarian effectiveness (see Figure 1.2). An important step in answering the research question is to understand the individual qualities of the *explanans* (diplomacy in humanitarian action and MTD) and the *explanandum* (humanitarian effectiveness).




Figure 1.2 Research Theory Model. This research begins by examining the individual qualities of diplomatic practice in humanitarian action, humanitarian effectiveness, and MTD. The development of the HMTD concept is the result of considering the relationship between the two explanans and their individual and collective impact on the explanandum.

## 1.4 CHAPTER PREVIEW

Chapter 2 (Literature Review: The Practice of Diplomacy in Humanitarian Action) introduces two research variables, humanitarian effectiveness (explanandum) and the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action (explanan 1). The first part of Chapter 2 presents the research context; namely humanitarian effectiveness. This summary is especially helpful to those who are unfamiliar with the field of humanitarian action. It presents the particular environment essential to

the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Local ownership of humanitarian action, complemented by a global commitment to collaboration, leads to better decisions in program design, greater efficiency in project execution, and a shared responsibility to accountability.




Figure 1.3 Exlanandum: Humanitarian Effectiveness. The first part of Chapter 2 introduces the context of this research: humanitarian effectiveness.

These elements can be incorporated in a variety of humanitarian contexts (e.g. natural disasters, conflict, urban violence, etc.). Much of humanitarian effectiveness depends on diplomacy to facilitate various activities, coordinate with different stakeholders, and overcome challenges that threaten effectiveness. Diplomacy in humanitarian action must be multi-track in nature and viewed as a shared function by everyone in the humanitarian community to assist in achieving humanitarian effectiveness.

In the second part of Chapter 2, the state of the art of *humanitarian diplomacy* is presented. In the most comprehensive analysis of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action to date, the research combines a systematic literature review using the PRISMA Statement and quantitative text analysis of

key publications.<sup>7</sup> The chapter begins with an outline of the milestones in the 125-year history of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain. It offers new evidence on the origin of *humanitarian diplomacy* and presents the actors, tools, common challenges, and contexts of diplomatic practice in humanitarian action.




Figure 1.4 Explanan 1: The Practice of Diplomacy in Humanitarian Action. The second part of Chapter 2 presents the results of a comprehensive literature review on the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action.

Chapter 3 (New Conceptualization: Multi-Track Diplomacy for the Humanitarian Context) presents the researcher's conceptualization of diplomacy in humanitarian action. *Humanitarian diplomacy* remains the best way to refer to this particular diplomacy, but diplomatic practice in humanitarian action should be most accurately understood as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy. The chapter begins by presenting multi-track diplomacy, the second research variable. As a helpful guide for those unfamiliar with the evolving practice of diplomacy, it

<sup>7</sup> The PRISMA Statement is an evidence-based minimum standard for items of reporting in systematic reviews and meta-analysis (explained further in Chapter 2).

begins by considering the gradual development of diplomacy's typology in light of the changing environment in which it is practiced today. This context has set the stage for the development of multi-track diplomacy; a process that began gradually, first with the introduction of the Tracks of Diplomacy (TOD) theory. The premise of multi-track diplomacy is that the peace process is an intricate system in which diplomatic function and space are shared by a variety of actors.

After considering the relevance of the MTD concept to this research, humanitarian multi-track diplomacy introduced and defined as "a multidimensional approach to achieving humanitarian objectives through dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion." This chapter presents the building blocks for the research methodology (Chapter 4) and subsequent case studies (Chapter 5).<sup>8</sup>




Figure 1.5 Explanan 2: MTD. Chapter 3 begins by introducing the MTD concept before the HMTD concept is presented. Chapter 4 (Research Methodology) explains

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<sup>8</sup> See also addendum.

the methodology that was applied to operationalize the humanitarian multi-track diplomacy concept. It provides the required information for the study to be replicated. Firstly, the purpose of the study and the specific elements to be tested are presented. Secondly, the research methods, including the case study approach, case study selection, and research tools are detailed. Thirdly, the construction of the case study is outlined. In the last sections, the researcher details how the case study was implemented and how the data were collected and analyzed.

Chapter 5 (Results: The Role of Diplomacy in a Humanitarian Emergency) provides the results of the research case study that assess the role diplomacy played in a particular actor's response during a specific humanitarian emergency, namely Convoy of Hope's (COH) 2010 Haiti Earthquake response. The case study determines if, in the operational theater of humanitarian action, the practice of diplomacy is characteristic of the HMTD theory and if patterns of diplomatic strategy, conducive to improving humanitarian effectiveness, emerge.

Chapter 6 (Discussion) presents the interpretation of the results as they relate to the research question and provides key findings of this research. Chapter 7 (Conclusion) will first provide an overview of the research project. Lastly, it will discuss the implications, recommendations, original contributions and limitations.

## **1.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This research seeks to not only better understand the role that diplomacy plays in humanitarian action, but to examine how it is best conceptualized and then operationalized. This research will begin by presenting the three search variables; namely, humanitarian effectiveness, diplomacy in humanitarian action, and MTD. The possible critical link between diplomatic practice in humanitarian action and humanitarian effectiveness will be explored. As literature suggests the practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain involves a diverse set of actors and activities, this research seeks to determine to what extent conceptualizing and operationalizing the practice of diplomacy as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy can improve humanitarian effectiveness. Therefore, the multi-track diplomacy theory must be understood along with the characteristics that distinguish



diplomacy in the humanitarian context from other forms of diplomacy. Informed by the results of examining the research variables, this research will proceed by presenting the theory of HMTD, which then will be tested in the operational theater of humanitarian action.

Inasmuch as the illustrations in the beginning of this chapter (see text box 1) suggest actors involved in humanitarian action depend on the practice of diplomacy to accomplish their tasks, this research will reveal how humanitarians incorporate a unique type of diplomatic function into their day-to-day job responsibilities to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. To that end this research will establish the veracity of the following statement: To be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.

# Literature Review: The Practice of Diplomacy in Humanitarian Action

## 2.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

This research will determine to what extent humanitarian effectiveness can be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as HMTD. As the first building block in this investigation, this chapter presents an exhaustive state of the art of diplomatic function in the humanitarian domain. Diplomacy is, and has always been, an essential element of humanitarian action. Although the term *humanitarian diplomacy* has comfortably slipped into the vernacular of the humanitarian community, it “is not yet a solidly established concept generally recognized by the international community.”<sup>9</sup> This type of diplomacy requires a robust conceptualization and rigorous testing before it can play a greater role in the humanitarian context and systematically contribute to humanitarian effectiveness.

This chapter will begin by introducing the context of this research, namely, humanitarian effectiveness (2.2). The current debate on aid effectiveness will be summarized. Further, the empirical link between humanitarian effectiveness and the practice of diplomacy will be identified. In answering the first sub-question of this research, this section will highlight three essential elements in effective aid delivery that can be improved through the practice of diplomacy.

Next, having introduced humanitarian effectiveness, this chapter will

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<sup>9</sup> Régnier, “Emerging Concept,” 1213.

answer the second sub-question by providing a comprehensive literature review and analysis of what is known about the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action. Section 2.3 will introduce the methodology applied to the literature review. Then, the *Ideengeschichte* (history of idea) of diplomatic function in humanitarianism is presented chronologically (2.4). This provides a helpful perspective when considering the current discourse on the topic. Finally, after presenting various definitions of *humanitarian diplomacy* (2.5), the key actors who practice diplomacy in humanitarian action are introduced (2.6).

By the end of this chapter, the reader will have gained a solid understanding of humanitarian effectiveness and the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action. Since the early days of institutionalized humanitarian action, diplomacy has been a critical element in effectively achieving humanitarian objectives. Like the humanitarian sector, diplomatic function in humanitarian action has evolved, with its practice varying depending on actor and context. Further, the reader will note that the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action lacks conceptualization. Inasmuch as this problem has motivated this research, several of the findings presented in this chapter allude to the MTD concept, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

## **2.2 THE CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN EFFECTIVENESS**

As will become evident in this study, diplomacy in humanitarian action is often practiced to support humanitarian activities. As a tool, it ensures that humanitarian action can take place in the first place, and that it is properly implemented and sustained. Since this research seeks to determine how humanitarian diplomacy is best conceptualized and operationalized to improve humanitarian effectiveness, it is imperative to first explore humanitarian effectiveness. Relevant to this research are three elements emerging in the discussion on effective aid delivery: localization, collaboration, and diplomacy. When humanitarian actors incorporate these elements, aid will be more accountable, efficient, and have a greater impact

on people's lives.<sup>10</sup> In short, it will be more effective. Local ownership of humanitarian action, complemented by a global commitment to collaboration, leads to better decisions in program design, greater efficiency in project execution, and a shared responsibility to accountability. Further, humanitarian effectiveness also requires that diplomacy be practiced throughout the entire humanitarian system.<sup>11</sup> Before considering the elements of localization, collaboration, and diplomacy, it is important to briefly consider the state of humanitarian action and summarize the discussion on humanitarian effectiveness.

Humanitarian assistance is a subset of the broader humanitarian action field. Its activities can be referred to as humanitarian aid, humanitarian relief, and relief assistance.<sup>12</sup> The goal of humanitarian assistance is to alleviate suffering and to save lives.<sup>13</sup> It seeks to assist those affected by disaster and conflict by restoring their lives and communities back to normal.<sup>14</sup>

The humanitarian system is facing enormous challenges. In 2018, 135 million people will require humanitarian assistance.<sup>15</sup> Complex emergencies have introduced actors to new difficulties, as they are lasting longer, requiring more resources and prolonged engagement, and stretching the capacity of

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<sup>10</sup> Thomas W.D. Davis, Kate Macdonald, and Scott Brenton, "Reforming Accountability in International NGOs: Making Sense of Conflicting Feedback," *Development in Practice* 22, no. 7 (2012): 19-21, accessed March 14, 2017, [https://www.academia.edu/30158192/Reforming\\_accountability\\_in\\_international\\_NGOs\\_Making\\_sense\\_of\\_conflicting\\_feedback](https://www.academia.edu/30158192/Reforming_accountability_in_international_NGOs_Making_sense_of_conflicting_feedback).

<sup>11</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 204.

<sup>12</sup> See Heike Spieker, "The Right to Give and Receive Assistance," in Hans-Joachim Heintze and Andrej Zwitter, eds., *International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2011), 7.

<sup>13</sup> "Defining Humanitarian Assistance: Global Humanitarian Assistance," Global Initiatives, accessed July 12, 2016, <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/defining-humanitarian-aid/>.

<sup>14</sup> "Humanitarian Action," InterAction, accessed July 14, 2016, <https://www.interaction.org/work/humanitarian>.

<sup>15</sup> "Global Humanitarian Overview 2018," OCHA, <https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/GHO2018.PDF>.

organizations.<sup>16</sup> Today's humanitarian needs exceed the present capabilities of the humanitarian community.<sup>17</sup> Given these challenges and demands, how effective is the humanitarian community really in providing assistance? Some are confident that humanitarian aid is becoming increasingly effective. They point to increased coordination, improved processes, the introduction of new practices, and professionalization of the sector as examples.<sup>18</sup> Critics, on the other hand, describe the humanitarian community as in crisis or broken. One of the challenges to aid effectiveness is the decentralization of the humanitarian system that is made up of a myriad of independent, professional, and informal actors.<sup>19</sup> Adding to this dynamic is how humanitarian action is also highly dependent on volunteers. The ICRC, for example, estimates that for every employee there are 20 volunteers participating in humanitarian activities.<sup>20</sup> Convoy of Hope, the subject of this research's case study, for example, figures that there are four volunteer hours for every paid hour.<sup>21</sup>

Relief, by its nature, is implemented in complex and dynamic environments. Therefore, the humanitarian sector constantly must improve and

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<sup>16</sup> Consider the 44% increase in the number of people targeted by aid since the 2009-2010 time period. Abby Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System: 2015 Edition," (London: ALNAP/ODI, 2015), 10, <http://www.alnap.org/resource/21036.aspx>.

<sup>17</sup> Izumi Nakamitsu, "World Humanitarian Summit: With a Shared Agreement on What to Fix, We Can Save Lives and End Need," United Nations Development Programme, May 16, 2016, <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2016/5/16/World-Humanitarian-Summit-With-a-shared-agreement-on-what-to-fix-we-can-save-lives-and-end-need.html>. Izumi Nakamitsu is the UN Assistant Secretary-General, UNDP Assistant Administrator, and UNDP Crisis Response Unit Leader.

<sup>18</sup> "Humanitarian Effectiveness: An Introduction to the Collection of Essays," The Humanitarian Effectiveness Project, <http://humanitarianeffectivenessproject.com/2016/05/five-stories-on-humanitarian-effectiveness/>.

<sup>19</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 19.

<sup>20</sup> IFRC, "Protect. Promote. Recognize: Volunteering in Emergencies," International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2001), 7, [http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41321/Volunteering%20in%20emergency\\_EN-LR.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41321/Volunteering%20in%20emergency_EN-LR.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> Nathan Mallonee, "Program Effectiveness Report: Volunteer Hours in Central America."

adapt to these changing realities.<sup>22</sup> Humanitarian effectiveness is a popular topic at conferences and forums. Organizations are engaging in transparent debates and seeking new means and measures of humanitarian effectiveness. In these conversations, several themes emerge.

Local, national, regional, and international actors share the responsibility for effective humanitarian action. They represent a variety of state and non-state actors, including donor nations, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), local NGOs, civil societies, and members of IOs, such as the UN and ICRC.<sup>23</sup> These actors, along with the communities they serve, place a high value on humanitarian effectiveness, but each uses different criteria to evaluate whether aid delivery accomplished its objectives.<sup>24</sup>

No uniform definition of humanitarian effectiveness exists.<sup>25</sup> Further, there lacks a robust and broadly accepted framework to measure humanitarian effectiveness (i.e. evaluation criteria, determining outcomes).<sup>26</sup> Much of the reform efforts in the humanitarian community are concentrated on addressing this deficiency. A key element to this is the movement to contextualize humanitarian responses, meaning every disaster is unique, requiring different interventions to meet the varying needs.

Attempts to create macro-level definitions of humanitarian effectiveness are challenged, and for good reason. These iterations often result in generalizations; they exclude key actors and often overlook particular local factors. Rather than adopting a definition, the humanitarian community is

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<sup>22</sup> Claudia McGoldrick, “The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective,” *International Review of the Red Cross* 93, no. 884 (December, 2011): 977, doi:10.1017/S1816383112000306.

<sup>23</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 19.

<sup>24</sup> Core Humanitarian Standard Alliance, The Sphere Project, and Groupe URD, “Core Humanitarian Standard: CHS Guidance Notes and Indicators,” 2015, 2, <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/CHS-Guidance-Notes-and-Indicators.pdf>.

<sup>25</sup> Kerry Maze, *Searching for Aid Effectiveness in Small Arms Assistance* (Geneva: United Nations, UNIDIR, 2010), 28.

<sup>26</sup> Andre M. N. Renzaho, *Measuring Effectiveness in Humanitarian and Development Aid: Conceptual Frameworks, Principles and Practice* (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 2007), 42.

considering a standard of humanitarian effectiveness. The focus of this standard is a localized approach to implementing and evaluating humanitarian assistance. Indicators of effectiveness are centered on needs met and developmental improvements that have a long-term impact on communities.<sup>27</sup> Organizations must balance a country-specific focus on effectiveness with a level of uniformed indicators to evaluate global humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>28</sup> With this shift away from a one-size-fits-all approach to humanitarian assistance, the humanitarian community is forced to develop a framework that can specifically measure “when, where, and why humanitarian interventions are effective.”<sup>29</sup>

The evaluation of humanitarian effectiveness is most commonly guided by the following benchmarks:

1. Aid is responsive, prepared, fast, and flexible
2. Aid is well coordinated
3. Aid includes mechanisms to learn from experience
4. Human resources are adequate<sup>30</sup>

Within humanitarian aid reform an acceptance is surfacing that specific systems to improve humanitarian effectiveness can in fact reduce effectiveness.<sup>31</sup> Meeting donor requirements, for example, is a common indicator of aid effectiveness, yet donor satisfaction does not mean that an intervention has been

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<sup>27</sup> M. L. Narasaiah, *NGOs and Education* (Darya Ganj: Discovery Publishing, 2007), 63.

<sup>28</sup> UNICEF, Evaluation Office, *A UNICEF Guide for Monitoring and Evaluation: Making a Difference?* (Geneva: UNICEF, 1991), 2-4.

<sup>29</sup> Rachel Scott, “Imagining More Effective Humanitarian Aid: A Donor Perspective,” (working paper, OECD, 2014), 25, [http://www.oecd.org/dac/Imagining%20More%20Effective%20Humanitarian%20Aid\\_October%202014.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/dac/Imagining%20More%20Effective%20Humanitarian%20Aid_October%202014.pdf).

<sup>30</sup> Ben Ramalingam, Bill Gray, and Giorgia Cerruti, “Missed Opportunities: The Case For Strengthening National And Local Partnership-Based Humanitarian Responses” (ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund, n.d.), 12, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/missed-opportunities-the-case-for-strengthening-national-and-local-partnership-302657>.

<sup>31</sup> Mary B. Anderson, Dayna Brown, and Isabella Jean, *Time To Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid* (Cambridge, MA: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2012), 50, <http://www.alnap.org/resource/8530>.

effective. Overemphasizing compliance can also result in improper execution.<sup>32</sup> Those implementing projects may concentrate their efforts more on short-term efficiency rather than long-term quality improvement. The donor community is leading the drive to incorporate other important components besides compliance. Much of the effort in aid reform has concentrated on diplomatic activities to increase and sustain the political will of donors and recipients. The reform agenda concentrated on making aid more transparent, accountable, and effective.<sup>33</sup> The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action exemplify diplomatic efforts directed at improving aid. States have committed to highlighting ownership, alignment, harmonization, results management, and mutual accountability in humanitarian assistance.<sup>34</sup>

As organizations are moving to program-based approaches, humanitarian effectiveness is measured by the outputs that flowed from intended goals. In this context effectiveness is understood as “arrangement for the planning, management, and deployment of aid that is efficient, reduces transaction costs, and is targeted towards development outcomes including poverty reduction.”<sup>35</sup> These activities should increase “macro-economic self-reliance, poverty

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<sup>32</sup> Viktor Jakupec and Max Kelly, eds., *Assessing the Impact of Foreign Aid: Value for Money and Aid for Trade* (Cambridge, MA: Academic Press, 2015), 190.

<sup>33</sup> See “Aid Effectiveness,” UK Aid Network, <http://www.ukan.org.uk/aid-quality/aid-effectiveness/>.

<sup>160</sup> This attempt may have been to create a universal understanding, but critics are quick to conclude that such efforts are insufficient—too narrow but also lacking depth. To them, these declarations and agreements were formalized without adequately involving and consulting civil society and beneficiaries in the *participatory* process. For more details on this discussion, see Cecille Wathne and Edward Hedger, “Aid Effectiveness Through the Recipient Lens: The Impact of Aid Depends on Donor Behaviour and Procedures Going Beyond Paris and Accra,” (briefing paper, ODI, 2009), 3, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3593.pdf>.

<sup>35</sup> Shannon Kindornay and Bill Morton, “Development Effectiveness: Towards New Understandings,” (North-South Institute, 2009), 1, <http://www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2009-Development-effectiveness-towards-new-understandings.pdf>.



alleviation, and the sustainability of project results.”<sup>36</sup>

Humanitarian effectiveness is often evaluated, both from donor and NGO perspectives, on whether the assistance met its objectives.<sup>37</sup> Besides compliance, there are criteria that help donors and actors analyze how objectives are met. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) developed five criteria that help evaluate emergency responses (see Table 2.1). These are considered complementary, meaning their achievement “does not necessarily mean that the objectives are appropriate for the entire affected population, or were met efficiently.”<sup>38</sup>

Criteria for the evaluation of humanitarian assistance are helpful, but the true potential in humanitarian effectiveness lies in developing a means to monitor, improve, and calibrate initiatives while they are still being implemented. Real-time evaluations can help humanitarian actors gauge effectiveness during an ongoing project.<sup>39</sup> Humanitarian effectiveness must center on “improving the management, delivery, and complementarity of development co-operation activities to ensure the highest development impact.”<sup>40</sup> At the level on which humanitarian activity takes place, managers and the communities they serve, most commonly evaluate operation effectiveness based on the joint ability to meet needs, build relationships and trust and improve a community’s safety and quality

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<sup>36</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Evaluation and Aid Effectiveness No 2 - Evaluating Country Programmes Vienna Workshop, 1999: Vienna Workshop, 1999* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2001), 53.

<sup>37</sup> CHS Alliance, Sphere Project, and Groupe URD, “CHS Guidance,” 2. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs uses ALNAP’s evaluation criteria, in which effectiveness is defined as “[t]he extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.” “Chapter 4 Evaluation Questions: Evaluation Criteria,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, <http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/7571/html/chapter05.htm>.

<sup>38</sup> Tony Beck, “Evaluating Humanitarian Action: An ALNAP Guidance Booklet,” (draft, ALNAP, 2003), 18, [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/watsan2005/annex\\_files/ALNAP/ALNAP1%20-%20Evaluating%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/evaluation/watsan2005/annex_files/ALNAP/ALNAP1%20-%20Evaluating%20Humanitarian%20Action.pdf).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 50.

<sup>40</sup> Maze, *Searching for Aid Effectiveness*, 28.

of life.<sup>41</sup> And that is where the trend, even during aid effectiveness reform, continues to revert to: an organic, collective, community-focused perspective on effectiveness that centers on properly meeting the affected population's needs.<sup>42</sup>

Table 2.1 OECD/DAC aid effectiveness criteria

Criterion	Definition
<b>Coherence</b>	The need to assess security, developmental, trade, and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations.
<b>Coverage</b>	The need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are.
<b>Efficiency</b>	Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.
<b>Effectiveness</b>	Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.
<b>Impact</b>	Impact considers the wider effects (social, economic, technical, environmental) of the project on individuals, gender- and age-specific groups, communities and institutions. Impacts can be intended and unintended, positive and negative, macro (sector) and micro (household).

*Note:* These criteria and definitions, useful in planning and evaluating aid and development interventions, are a part of the OECD Development Assistance Committee's (OECD/DAC) efforts to provide guidance on aid effectiveness.

*Source:* Beck, "Evaluating Humanitarian Action," 21.

### 2.2.1 Localization

Effective humanitarian aid is characterized by inclusive partnerships that emphasize the value of localization.<sup>43</sup> Humanitarian practice has all too often

<sup>41</sup> Christopher W. Zobel, Nezih Altay, and Mark P. Haselkorn, eds., *Advances in Managing Humanitarian Operations* (New York: Springer, 2015), 5, 179.

<sup>42</sup> Sophia Swithern, *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015*, Global Humanitarian Assistance (Bristol: Development Initiatives, 2015), 8, <http://devinit.org/post/gha-report-2015/>.

<sup>43</sup> Steven A Zyck and Hanna B. Krebs, "Localising Humanitarianism: Improving Effectiveness through Inclusive Action," (briefing paper, ODI, 2015), 6,

fallen short in establishing equitable and empowering systems that reflect the value local humanitarian actors bring.<sup>44</sup> Localization means that decisions and activities addressing local needs must take place on the local level. This “ensures that needs are defined more accurately, more user-friendly and tailor-made, and that local economies and structures are also utilized and reinforced”<sup>45</sup> Local ownership rather than local participation and capacity is the key driver of humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>46</sup> Local actors cannot be relegated to being middlemen, their networks serving as mere delivery systems through which global resources are channeled.<sup>47</sup> These critical actors must be actively engaged in designing programs, determining priorities, and influencing the work of international partners.<sup>48</sup> Partnership tensions quickly rise when aid is funded, staffed, and structured from a western-dominated perspective.<sup>49</sup>

While many IOs have every intention to work through local partners (i.e. to build local capacity and not duplicate efforts), intentionality is insufficient to achieve quality outcomes.<sup>50</sup> Empowerment was once defined as channeling resources through a local partner. Now there is growing recognition that this approach only leads to local partners feeling disempowered (e.g. in interviews, participants frequently described “feeling used”), having been excluded from the

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<https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9720.pdf>.

<sup>44</sup> Slim, “Innovation,” 3.

<sup>45</sup> Ulusoy, “Turkey Position Paper,” 4.

<sup>46</sup> START Network, “How Can Donor Requirements Be Reformed To Better Support Efforts To Strengthen Local Humanitarian Capacity?,” (Christian Aid, 2014), 2, <http://programme.christianaid.org.uk/programme-policy-practice/sites/default/files/2016-03/how-can-donor-requirements-be-reformed-discussion-paper-oct-2014.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> “Endorsement of Charter for Change Across the World,” Google My Maps, accessed July 15, 2016,

[https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=14p40LgLCszstlVoAgL3nwdBWU8&hl=en\\_US&ll=31.440905266578742%2C21.772187499999973&z=2](https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=14p40LgLCszstlVoAgL3nwdBWU8&hl=en_US&ll=31.440905266578742%2C21.772187499999973&z=2).

International organizations have made the pledge to adapt their work to having a greater local focus (e.g. Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Caritas, Oxfam, Care).

<sup>48</sup> START Network, “Donor Requirements,” 2.

<sup>49</sup> Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 352–68.

<sup>50</sup> Anderson, Brown, and Jean, *Time To Listen*, 45.

design phase and designated as mere custodians, not owners, of the projects. This widens the gap between global and local, leading to greater dependence, reduced capacity, trust and self-confidence.<sup>51</sup> Local partners express that they “have little power to shape assistance efforts when the system is organized to deliver goods, services, ideas, and models that originate from what providers have to offer.”<sup>52</sup> Partnerships require relationships and relationships require time to develop. In light of increased donor requirements and emergency frequency, international actors often do not have the time to build long-term partnerships. As a result, IOs are treated as donors, and local organizations are measured by their customer service abilities.<sup>53</sup>

The need for greater emphasis on localization will require the humanitarian system to change its approach.<sup>54</sup> Local actors must be empowered and trusted to make decisions. Local customs need to be considered in the program design and management phases. This will lead to increased sensitivity, even to the smallest details such as ensuring that documentation is translated into appropriate languages, that administrative requirements do not create unnecessary burdens, and that procedures and acronyms are properly explained. Inasmuch as international organizations depend on local partners, they must create an environment that builds the case for local ownership. To encourage national partners to want to commit to partnership, funding opportunities must be circulated publicly, timeframes adjusted to manageable levels, and administrative burdens must be reduced to a minimum.<sup>55</sup> These efforts to change the humanitarian system will create an environment of partnership.<sup>56</sup>

In an effort to foster a partnership environment, several leading IOs (e.g.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 18.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 45.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>54</sup> International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection, “Live Online Consultation: Localizing Preparedness and Response in South and Central Asia,” (PHAP, 2015), 6, <https://phap.org/sites/phap.org/files/civicrm/persist/contribute/files/150714-Localizing-preparedness-and-response-in-SC-Asia-event-report.pdf>.

<sup>55</sup> START Network, “Donor Requirements,” 4.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 6.

Christian Aid, Islamic Relief, Caritas, Oxfam, Care) made a pledge to focus their efforts on localization. Their goal is to channel at least 20% of funding directly to national NGOs, to emphasize the principle of partnership and to be accountable to the public for how much funding goes to localization. Further, these organizations commit to finding ways not to undermine local capacity, especially in terms of recruitment. Often during emergencies, local organizations find it difficult to retain key staff as IOs recruit them to manage their responses. IOs also will be working with their donors to ensure that localization plays a greater role in the evaluation criteria and calls for project proposals. Equitable partnerships require a shift from subcontractor relationships. Local actors will play a great role in designing interventions and determining themselves how they can improve implementation and evaluation processes. To build local infrastructure, these signees have also committed to investing financially, particularly in adequately covering administrative expenses. Lastly, and most importantly, the role of key local actors will be more prominently publicized in international and national media campaigns recognizing their contributions.<sup>57</sup>

Localization, however, cannot exclude state actors. A key to humanitarian effectiveness is for actors to engage states whose role, while not always a priority, is to ensure the provision of assistance and protection. Although there are very good reasons for organizations to emphasize their neutrality and independence, this should not give them the prerogative to circumvent state involvement. Organizations and donors have a distrust in states and often cite lack of competence and accountability in emergencies; however, these international actors have often the ability, as will be noted in the next section, to build capacity.<sup>58</sup> Those who measure effectiveness on efficiency have reason to invest in local capabilities, both in state and non-state contexts. “More than dollar values, is the social capitalization from volunteering. Volunteering creates good

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<sup>57</sup> “Endorsement of Charter for Change.”

<sup>58</sup> Paul Harvey, *Towards Good Humanitarian Government The Role of the Affected State in Disaster Response*, Humanitarian Policy Group Policy Brief 37 (London: ODI, 2009), 30, <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/5092.pdf>.

citizenship, fosters local ownership, and promotes the accountability of governments.”<sup>59</sup>

International state and non-state actors must encourage state involvement on the national level in times of crisis. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action comprise the most widely accepted framework for aid effectiveness, and were the result of diplomacy: negotiation between over 100 donor and partner countries. Much of effective aid delivery and management depends on partner countries owning humanitarian action. Developing countries are empowered to develop their own strategy and priorities.<sup>60</sup>

A driver in humanitarian effectiveness is the issue of acceptance, which is a fundamental necessity in aid delivery. The presence and activities of humanitarian actors, international and local alike, must be respected and not hindered by local communities, groups, and government. Active field presence requires key strategies of sustained diplomacy, visibility, encouragement and empowerment, convening and bridging, and public advocacy.<sup>61</sup>

The ICRC, Save the Children, and MSF’s approach is acceptance-based.<sup>62</sup> MSF, for example, places great importance on acceptance, which it considers a social contract between all parties involved. The organization depends on this acceptance to implement its humanitarian operations. Compared to international humanitarian organizations, local actors can manage the political, security, and social issues surrounding acceptance much easier.<sup>63</sup> Local actors gain trust within communities since they are often perceived to be more neutral and impartial. Evidence points to the fact that local humanitarian action effectively responds to and mitigates crises by understanding and collaborating with government and civil

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<sup>59</sup> Chatterjee, “Relief to Sustainable Development.”

<sup>60</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles For Smart Aid,” <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/45827300.pdf>.

<sup>61</sup> Ferris, *Politics of Protection*, 274.

<sup>62</sup> Larissa Fast and Michael O’Neil, “A Closer Look at Acceptance,” *Humanitarian Exchange* (June 2010): 4, <http://odihpn.org/magazine/a-closer-look-at-acceptance/>.

<sup>63</sup> Zyck and Krebs, “Localising Humanitarianism,” 3.

society.<sup>64</sup> The ICRC depends on national societies and local communities to implement acceptance-based activities.<sup>65</sup> The ICRC and ICRC have considerable volunteer bases that are mobilized through the National Societies enabling for truly local management. This helps in gaining access, managing relief efforts and ensuring protection.<sup>66</sup> For example, while the United Nations was still attempting to negotiate access to internally displaced people in Myanmar in 2011-2012, local actors had already successfully deployed in multiple areas.<sup>67</sup>

It is commonly accepted that local humanitarian action meets the needs of beneficiaries more effectively, but that does not mean they can go it alone.<sup>68</sup> International actors contribute to local operations by embedding an international staff, which helps build a reputation for being international and apolitical. This helps especially with protection issues that affect local actors more than others.<sup>69</sup> More attention will be brought to the complementary partnership between local and international humanitarian actors in the coming sections.

A sub-conclusion from this research so far is that local approach to humanitarian action, including ownership and implementation, is only as affective as it is successful in ensuring participation at the local level. People affected by crisis should be viewed not only as beneficiaries, but as key participants in defining what effectiveness looks like in their own contexts.<sup>70</sup> An ongoing weakness of the humanitarian system is the inability of international actors to

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>65</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross, "Safer Access for All National Societies: Acceptance of the Organization," ICRC Safer Access, 2015, <http://saferaccess.icrc.org/practical-toolbox/iii-acceptance-of-the-organization/>.

<sup>66</sup> Zyck and Krebs, "Localising Humanitarianism," 3.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> James Kisia, "Localising Humanitarian Response Can Help Better Meet the Needs of Crisis Affected People," *World Humanitarian Summit Blog*, September 4, 2015, <http://blog.worldhumanitarianissummit.org/entries/localising-humanitarian-response-2/>.

<sup>69</sup> Zyck and Krebs, "Localising Humanitarianism," 4.

<sup>70</sup> *On the Road to Istanbul: How Can the World Humanitarian Summit Make Humanitarian Response More Effective?* CHS Alliance (Geneva: CHS Alliance, 2015), 8, <http://www.chsalliance.org/files/files/CHS-Alliance-HAR-2015.pdf>.

properly interact with affected people.<sup>71</sup> Those affected by humanitarian emergencies want to be more involved in the evaluation of the response.<sup>72</sup> Research indicates that only 20% of beneficiaries involved in the assessment process feel that their feedback was taken into consideration. In an UN-initiated study leading up to the World Humanitarian Summit, humanitarian beneficiaries in the Middle East were interviewed regarding effectiveness. Their consensus was that “aid agencies are partial, unaccountable, and potentially corrupt, and they fail to meet refugees’ most pressing needs.”<sup>73</sup> Participants rated organizations poorly in valuing their opinions, preparing them for disaster, treating people with respect, being neutral/impartial and meeting most urgent needs.<sup>74</sup>

### **2.2.2 Collaboration**

The empowerment and equipment of local actors are central elements to humanitarian effectiveness. Here, practical challenges in localization models become most evident. Four out of five humanitarian actors are local, in-country NGOs.<sup>75</sup> Some of them have elevated humanitarian action as their primary mandate, whereas others treat it as a critical although not core role, especially in a response.<sup>76</sup> Local actors seek equitable partnership with international actors. Often, however, they are relegated to the role of subcontractors or implementers, responsible for the last mile of aid delivery. Local actors represent 80% of active humanitarian organizations, but receive on average only 0.2% of humanitarian assistance, according to the Financial Tracking Service.<sup>77</sup> UN agencies and Red Cross/Red Crescent societies receive 70% of humanitarian funding. Bypassing

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<sup>71</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 68.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 25.

<sup>73</sup> *Preparatory Stakeholder Analysis: World Humanitarian Summit Regional Consultation for the Middle East and North Africa*, World Humanitarian Summit, February, 2015, 19, <https://consultations2.worldhumanitariansummit.org/bitcache/74c1ffca02865353cbd83057f5c11e6deaccfe75?vid=524112&disposition=inline&op=view>.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>75</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 39.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>77</sup> Swithern, *Report 2015*, 49.



local NGOs, many official donors prefer to give few but large contracts to a select number of international partners, citing accountability and capacity as their chief concerns.<sup>78</sup> International actors must commit to institutional capacity building, processes, and systems that create transparent infrastructure conducive to equitable multi-lateral partnership with smaller and larger actors.<sup>79</sup>

INGO partners can contribute to building local capacity by introducing evidence-based program design, evaluation, research, and technical assistance; one option, as in the example of the UN agencies, is to vet potential local partners based on capacity and accountability prior to a disaster.<sup>80</sup> INGOs depend on established and effective local actors who are engaged in their communities before, during, and after an emergency.

IOs such as NGOS and UN agencies are worried they may lose funding as donors are focusing on directly funding local actors.<sup>81</sup> Yet there is a push from key donor governments in this direction. As a way to empower local aid, USAID seeks to channel 30% of its funding directly to local actors. The desire to see stronger partnership, capacity, and less long-term dependence has received a mixed response both from legislators and large NGOs.<sup>82</sup> The Paris and Accra agreements emphasize the importance that developing countries play in developing strategies, improving their infrastructure, and combating corruption. Donor countries and organizations align their strategy backing this ownership, by supporting and funding the local strategies and mechanism.<sup>83</sup>

In a localized partnership environment, international and national actors learn to view each other's contributions as complementary.<sup>84</sup> Aid is most effective when international and national actors (state and non-state) complement each

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<sup>78</sup> Zyck and Krebs, "Localising Humanitarianism," 6.

<sup>79</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 77.

<sup>80</sup> Zyck and Krebs, "Localising Humanitarianism," 8.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>82</sup> "USAID Releases First USAID Forward Progress Report," USAID, March 20, 2013, <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaaid-releases-first-usaid-forward-progress-report>.

<sup>83</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "The Paris Declaration."

<sup>84</sup> PHAP, "Live Online," 6.

other.<sup>85</sup> Learning to appreciate this interdependence will lead to lasting partnerships. Partnerships have reached a healthy state when strategic and operations decisions are shared.<sup>86</sup> Partnerships between international and local actors, however, often create challenges in the humanitarian sector. In fact, partnerships can be the greatest obstacle to overcome in a humanitarian emergency.<sup>87</sup> Rifts in partnership are often due to an unwillingness to share information, even though “reliable information is fundamental for improved accountability and effectiveness.”<sup>88</sup> Only trust can overcome these barriers, and such takes place when all stakeholders commit to communicate and determine that transparency and accountability are a shared responsibility.<sup>89</sup>

Global actors should primarily complement the work local actors are doing. This shift from leading to equipping will require understanding that a global, centralized, one-size-fits-all approach is ineffective.<sup>90</sup> One of the challenges is that “considerations must be made as to how a balance can be struck between empowering and funding local agencies, without losing sight of accountability and transparency.”<sup>91</sup>

International NGO partners can strengthen local capacity by meeting short-term human resources needs by contributing technical staff and to help with learning new process.<sup>92</sup> In their complementary role, they can also help local partners understand international standards.<sup>93</sup> International actors can build the infrastructure of local NGOs by promoting innovation, sharing best practices, and

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<sup>85</sup> START Network, “Donor Requirements,” 2.

<sup>86</sup> “The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 7.

<sup>87</sup> Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, “Missed Opportunities,” 7.

<sup>88</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance, “What We Do: Humanitarian,” <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/about-gha/>.

<sup>89</sup> PHAP, “Live Online,” 5.

<sup>90</sup> “Grand Bargain Helps Move Humanitarian System Away from One-System-Fits-All Approach,” World Vision International, May 23, 2016, <http://www.wvi.org/pressrelease/grand-bargain-helps-move-humanitarian-system-away-one-system-fits-all-approach>.

<sup>91</sup> PHAP, “Live Online,” 5.

<sup>92</sup> Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, “Missed Opportunities,” 15.

<sup>93</sup> PHAP, “Live Online,” 8.

introducing other actors, including non-traditional humanitarian actors, to provide services.<sup>94</sup> Universities are increasingly engaging the global humanitarian sector through thought leadership, policy influence, research, and education for global and local practitioners (e.g. the Network on Humanitarian Action).

Compliance requirements and complex reporting mechanisms create unnecessary burdens. These distract international actors from empowerment and capacity building activities that could have a direct impact on humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>95</sup> Duplicate and unessential monitoring, evaluation, and reporting requirements can eliminate smaller but qualified NGOs, who, had they been part of setting the agenda and priorities, could have successfully implemented projects. This also limits the diversity that the local level needs to meet the diverse needs of civil society.<sup>96</sup> In consulting with local partners and donors, international humanitarian actors must lead discussions on how the burden on local partners can be reduced while honoring necessary reporting requirements. In particular, during emergencies, funding flows and reporting requirements must be streamlined. Collaboration that becomes too centralized endangers the local ownership. Calls for efficiency and coordination could become overly centralized. In addition to reforming funding by investing in training and preparing local partners prior to a disaster, collective administrative and program oversight costs can be drastically reduced (e.g. sending in one team instead of four separate teams) so a higher percentage of funds reaches the field and beneficiaries.<sup>97</sup>

Local actors complement global actors in ways that are essential to humanitarian effectiveness. Local actors are the ones accountable to the people they serve. While there is often a transition of teams during different response cycles (moving from response to development), local actors often remain as the constant presence. Collaborative local partners are key in helping international partners to identify and manage the context and internal dynamics that affect the humanitarian response. They ensure that information is gathered and interpreted

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<sup>94</sup> START Network, “Donor Requirements,” 9.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

properly. Further, by locally involving participants in program design, they can ensure that the response is relevant and appropriate.<sup>98</sup>

IOs depend on local actors to foster the same collaborative partnership on the community and project level. Consulting, engaging, and ensuring accountability at the grass roots level are imperative because collaborative partnerships lead to greater resilience, preparedness, and response capabilities.<sup>99</sup> Humanitarian effectiveness, and the funding that follows such, is more likely when all stakeholders collaborate.<sup>100</sup>

Non-state actors on the global and local levels must commit to equipping state actors' role in humanitarian emergencies. Developing a system of global-local, state and non-state coordination will contribute to a healthy regulatory environment in humanitarian emergencies. This in return will increase humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>101</sup> Although bypassing a government inept in a disaster response may lead to short-term benefits, the environment of localization and collaboration conducive to humanitarian effectiveness hinges on state actors' inclusion, from the donor to global receiving and implementation. To summarize, "Where relations between governments and aid agencies are tense, governments as well as agencies have an interest in improving them, and should make time and space for greater dialogue and engagement."<sup>102</sup> This collaborative environment, as will be explained next, can only be created and maintained through a multi-track approach to diplomacy.

### **2.2.3 Diplomacy**

Diplomatic function in humanitarian action is a tool that often ensures that humanitarian action can take place in the first place, and that it is properly

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<sup>98</sup> Ramalingam, Gray, and Cerruti, "Missed Opportunities," 26.

<sup>99</sup> START Network, "Donor Requirements," 3.

<sup>100</sup> Ulusoy, "Turkey Position Paper," 3.

<sup>101</sup> Hans-Joachim Heintze and Andrej Zwitter, eds., *International Law and Humanitarian Assistance: A Crosscut Through Legal Issues Pertaining to Humanitarianism* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2011), 30.

<sup>102</sup> Harvey, *Towards Good Humanitarian Government*, 42.

implemented and sustained.<sup>103</sup> It can strengthen partnership and expand support bases of humanitarian actors. It reaches not just traditional actors, but every stakeholder involved, including beneficiaries, the public, and donors. Diplomacy can unite, and at times persuade, government and non-governmental decision-makers to change approaches and practices in the interest of vulnerable people.<sup>104</sup> In what is known as coordination diplomacy, humanitarian actors can best engage with national government actors by establishing a NGO association responsible for negotiating partnership between governments, IOs, and NGOs.<sup>105</sup> When humanitarian actors do not coordinate properly, parties to conflict can quickly play the different actors against each other.<sup>106</sup>

The practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is increasingly noted as a gap in humanitarian effectiveness, and while recognition of the importance of diplomacy and advocacy has slowly grown, the humanitarian system still lacks focus, strategy, and multi-agency coordination.<sup>107</sup> Coordination depends on diplomacy, that is, communication, representation, advocacy, dialogue, and negotiation. These enable humanitarian effectiveness by overcoming common hurdles, lobbying, and advocating with governments, organizations, and partners.<sup>108</sup>

Diplomacy is the approach to communicating positions, priorities, and requirements that, in the minds of donors, organizations, and beneficiaries, will lead to effective humanitarian assistance. Diplomacy creates the platform for dialogue; it does not ensure a diplomatic process of collaboration. Government

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<sup>103</sup> Rob Grace, "Humanitarian Negotiation: Key Challenges and Lessons Learned in an Emerging Field," Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action, accessed August 1, 2016, <http://atha.se/presentations/negotiation/index.html>.

<sup>104</sup> Chatterjee, "Relief to Sustainable Development."

<sup>105</sup> For coordination diplomacy, see Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 203. For a discussion of NGO associations as key to negotiation with state actors, see Sara E. Davies, "Review of 'Does Foreign Aid Really Work?' by Roger C. Riddell," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 83, no. 5 (2007): 990–91.

<sup>106</sup> Grace, "Key Challenges and Lessons."

<sup>107</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 12.

<sup>108</sup> CHS Alliance, Sphere Project, and Groupe URD, "CHS Guidance," 8.

agencies may have to approve the execution of a program or its evaluation. Donors may wish to ascertain certain compliance criteria. Civil society representatives may need to push back on a specific intervention implementation or demand greater involvement in the design process. The ability to negotiate a humanitarian response or specific intervention is as important as the technical skills to evaluate it.

Communication and negotiation are key in managing and evaluating humanitarian responses. Before effectiveness can be measured, actors must gather around the table and negotiate what elements of the response must be measured. This involves sitting at the table with all local, national, and global stakeholders (i.e. state and non state policymakers, managers, NGOs, IOs, staff, beneficiaries, and donors) to develop a mutually agreeable plan in how to supervise the interventions.<sup>109</sup> Donors should learn to appreciate the opportunities that investing in long-term capacity building and local strategic partnership development opportunities can bring.

The humanitarian system places greater importance on the key functions of diplomacy, such as negotiation, support building, persuasion, partnership agreement, and formal agreement facilitation and advocacy. There is a lack of research, policy, guidance, and will to develop a robust framework of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action function mostly in non-controversial settings. Negotiating disaster risk mitigation agreements is less difficult than advocating in high-risk conflict situations such as Syria. In humanitarian emergencies, humanitarian effectiveness is dependent on prompt diplomacy and advocacy. Humanitarian diplomatic function was not activated in the Syrian conflict until three years after it began. And there, as in other settings such as the Central African Republic, only one actor advocated alone.<sup>110</sup>

The need to contextualize humanitarian aid is evident on the local level, where access to humanitarian space must be more effectively negotiated through

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<sup>109</sup> For a general discussion, see UNICEF, *Guide for Monitoring and Evaluation*, 3.

<sup>110</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 90.

practical decisions.<sup>111</sup> While humanitarian actors perceive diplomacy and advocacy as key in ensuring their work can be implemented effectively, there have been few collective and strategic efforts to match the responsibility with actions. There are calls for greater coordination of diplomacy, but rarely are actors willing to concede autonomy and compromise, namely in the area of the humanitarian principles to push forward diplomacy.<sup>112</sup> Out of these forums, groups have emerged arguing for and against drastic changes to the humanitarian system, including questioning the relevance of the humanitarian principles especially in light of the complexities faced in contemporary armed conflicts.<sup>113</sup>

As aid becomes increasingly accountable and efficient, more people can be served. Although beneficiaries, donors, states, and humanitarian actors have differing opinions on how to measure humanitarian effectiveness, they acknowledge the need for effective aid delivery mechanisms. Several challenges hindering humanitarian effectiveness can be overcome through a systematic practice of diplomacy.<sup>114</sup> Having considered several relevant elements of humanitarian effectiveness as the context for this research, it is now time to present the methodology and the findings of the literature review on the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action.

## **2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW METHODOLOGY**

### **2.3.1 Approach: PRISMA Statement**

The quality of a systematic review depends on how the search was conducted, what results it returned, and how that information was collected, analyzed, and reported. Formalized measures are employed to improve transparency and replicability of research. The *PRISMA Statement* is an approach frequently used

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<sup>111</sup> Andrej Zwitter et al., eds., *Humanitarian Action: Global, Regional and Domestic Legal Responses* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 245.

<sup>112</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 85.

<sup>113</sup> Thomas G. Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action*, War and Conflict in the Modern World, no. 11 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007): 77-78.

<sup>114</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 209, 269.

for meta-analysis and systematic reviews in the medical field.<sup>115</sup> The PRISMA framework includes a 27-item questionnaire, which the researcher modified for use in the international relations field.<sup>116</sup> Lastly, the *PRISMA Flow Diagram* tool was used to present the different phases of information selection and screening throughout the systematic review process (see Figure 2.1).<sup>117</sup>

### 2.3.2 Review Protocol and Notes

Methods of the systematic review, along with inclusion parameters, were specified and documented in a protocol before commencing the search. In this international relations research field, it is not common to register a systematic review. The researcher is not aware of past or present research with a similar scope.<sup>118</sup> In terms of eligibility criteria, the research protocol did not impose restrictions on publication dates or publication types. The search was narrowed down to publications in the English language. To include various perspectives from state and non-state actors alike, the search was not limited to specific academic fields.

The preliminary keyword search contained only the phrase “humanitarian diplomacy.” On the matter of keyword selection, it must be noted that throughout the history of institutionalized humanitarian action, humanitarians have engaged in diplomatic function without referring to their activities as diplomacy. Reasons for this will be offered later in this book. For now, it is sufficed—indeed, imperative—to say that the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is often implied but rarely explicitly stated. To begin with a narrow focus, the preliminary search excluded works that referenced diplomatic activities such as humanitarian negotiations. Later in the research process, a secondary keyword search included

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<sup>115</sup> David Moher, et al., “Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement,” *British Medical Journal* 339 (August 8, 2009): 332–36, doi:10.1136/bmj.b2535.

<sup>116</sup> Alessandro Liberati et al., “The PRISMA Statement for Reporting Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses of Studies That Evaluate Health Care Interventions: Explanation and Elaboration,” *PLOS Med* 6, no. 7 (July 21, 2009): e1000100, doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000100.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>118</sup> Last search conducted August, 2016.



“humanitarian” and at least one of the following keywords, with several variations (i.e. nouns, verbs):

- Dialogue
- Negotiation
- Advocacy
- Persuasion
- Strategic Communication

### **2.3.3 Keyword Search: Humanitarian Diplomacy**

The preliminary keyword search for *humanitarian diplomacy* was conducted in the following catalogues: JSTOR, Open WorldCat, and the University of Groningen library. The search returned 156 records.<sup>119</sup> Consultations with other researchers and a desk review resulted in 12 documents being added. These additional records contained the keyword phrase “humanitarian diplomacy.” The researcher applied a pre-determined search criteria protocol (see Figure 2.1), which excluded abstracts, book reviews, duplicates, and non-English works.

After applying the exclusion criteria, 66 documents qualified to be included in the systematic review (see Table 2.2). These records were entered into an Excel spreadsheet and cross-referenced to ensure proper data capture. Then they were sorted by publication date in order to prepare the chronological review and timeline development. The documents were saved on a hard drive in PDF format and were also uploaded on a backup Cloud server. Periodically throughout the research period, the entire document folder or specific documents were subjected to keyword searches, which were recorded in the research journal.

The 66 documents included 47 journal articles, 13 books, and 6 other media, namely lectures in audio-format, videos, and web-based documents (i.e. institutional policies and memorandums). There was a noteworthy benefit to relying on a sundry set of literature sources (see Table 2.2) instead of only on

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<sup>119</sup> The first keyword search was conducted on February 15, 2014. A second search verified the results on January 10, 2015. A subsequent search in March 2015, included the International Review of the Red Cross, Ebrary, Google Scholar, and a general web-based search. Several works were included for review and analysis and are reflected in the body of this work.

literature produced within the humanitarian community.




Figure 2.1 Search results flow diagram. The flow diagram illustrates how search results were processed in the literature review. (Redrawn and modified for purpose from David Moher et al., "Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses: The PRISMA Statement," *PLoS Med* 6, no. 7: e1000097. doi:10.1371/journal.pmed1000097.)

The search results returned a diverse range of perspectives, including the earliest reference to *humanitarian diplomacy* by a state actor.<sup>120</sup> Indicative of the topic's popularity across academic fields and practices, the search resulted in a diverse collection of works from a variety of academic disciplines (e.g. law, international affairs, security studies, humanitarian aid, and international development).

Table 2.2 Database sources

Source	Count
Open World Cat	26
JSTOR	24
Additional records	12
Groningen Library Catalog	4

*Note:* The table lists the database sources of the documents that were included in the keyword search conducted in 2014.

### 2.3.4 Chronological Cataloguing

This research confirms what others have noted: *humanitarian diplomacy* is a growing trend in literature.<sup>121</sup> In fact, 66% of literature on the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action has been published since 2002 (see Figure 2.2). A secondary search, including other databases (The International Review of the Red Cross, Ebrary, and Google Scholar) showed a 167% growth in the frequency of the term in the last 20 years.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Oscar S. Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1907-1917)* 6 (April 25, 1912): 45–59, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25656434>.

<sup>121</sup> For example, see Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1211–37.

<sup>122</sup> The search was conducted on April 21, 2014.




Figure 2.2 Publications timeline. The timeline illustrates the increased frequency of publications on the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action since 1898. 66% of literature on the topic was published between 2002 and 2014.

### 2.3.5 Quantitative Text Analysis

Quantitative text analysis complements a systematic review by extracting, or inferring, information from texts. It is used in the linguistic, computer, and social science fields.<sup>123</sup> Quantitative text analysis tools assist researchers in processing and analyzing large quantities of data to identify concepts, ideas, and problems.<sup>124</sup> This approach helps to identify themes, words, and relationships within individual or several documents.

This systematic review conducted quantitative text analysis using KH Coder, a content analysis and data mining software used in over 500 scholarly publications.<sup>125</sup>

Given the literature review's population of 66 documents, the researcher determined that 4 cases would be an appropriate sample size. The selection procedure included the following criteria:

1. Topicality ("Humanitarian diplomacy" in title of publication to ensure targeted focus on topic)
2. Credibility and authority of author

<sup>123</sup> Carl W. Roberts, "A Conceptual Framework for Quantitative Text Analysis," *Quality and Quantity* 34, no. 3 (August 2000): 259–74, doi:10.1023/A:1004780007748.

<sup>124</sup> Qin He, "Knowledge Discovery Through Co-Word Analysis," *Library Trends* 48, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 133,

<https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/8267/librarytr?sequence=1>.

<sup>125</sup> See "Introduction," KH Coder, <http://khc.sourceforge.net/en/>.

3. Coverage (time span)
4. Breadth (perspectives from different actors, in different contexts)
5. Electronic resource (for content analysis)<sup>126</sup>

In consultation with his primary supervisor, the researcher identified 4 articles of the 66 documents that were best suited to be included in the quantitative text analysis (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Text analysis data (the 4 documents selected for the text analysis)

Year	Title & Author	Description
1912	<i>The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States</i> Straus <sup>127</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First mention of term in literature</li> <li>• State perspective</li> </ul>
1984	<i>Humanitarian Diplomacy</i> Gasser <sup>128</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First mention of term from a humanitarian perspective (academic literature)</li> <li>• ICRC perspective</li> </ul>
2006	<i>The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC</i> Harroff-Tavel <sup>129</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policy shift and attempt to define concept</li> <li>• ICRC/International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) perspective</li> </ul>
2012	<i>Humanitarian Diplomacy: Saving it when it is most Needed</i> Veuthey <sup>130</sup>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Call to reform Humanitarian Diplomacy and expanded mandate and actor map</li> <li>• Non-state actor perspective</li> </ul>

The selected documents are a representative sample of a 100-year period during which the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is discussed.<sup>131</sup> In 1912,

<sup>126</sup> Gasser's article had to be transcribed and converted into a searchable text file.

<sup>127</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 45-59.

<sup>128</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10-12.

<sup>129</sup> Marion Harroff-Tavel, "The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," *African Yearbook of International Law* 14, no. 1 (2006): 1-16, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/humanitarian-diplomacy-articles-040310.htm>. Originally published as "La diplomatie humanitaire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge," *Relations Internationales* 1, no. 121 (Spring 2005): 73-89.

<sup>130</sup> Michel Veuthey, "Humanitarian Diplomacy: Saving It When It Is Most Needed," in *Humanitarian Space*, Webster University Geneva 16th Humanitarian Conference (Geneva: Webster University, 2012), 195-208, <http://www.ungeneva.orderofmalta.int/docs/Humanitarian-Diplomacy-saving-it-when-it-is-most-needed.pdf>.

<sup>131</sup> Later references would date the first mention of the term humanitarian diplomacy to 1891 by Oscar S. Straus. See Oscar S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft* (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1922), 59.

Oscar Straus' work would make the first recorded mention of the term *humanitarian diplomacy*.<sup>132</sup> The speech was given to the American Society of International Law and presented a diplomat's perspective on the role of the state in practicing humanitarian diplomacy. In the post-Vietnam era, Hans-Peter Gasser wrote the first academic work on the topic from a humanitarian actor's perspective. His 1984 work gave outsiders a glimpse into the prevalent role of diplomacy within the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement.<sup>133</sup> In 2006, Harroff-Tavel presented the ICRC's *humanitarian diplomacy* policy, which signaled the increased role and expanded mandate the concept played in a variety of humanitarian contexts.<sup>134</sup> Lastly, Veuthey made a call to reform the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action in 2012, and by doing so, introduced a wide-ranging set of actors and diplomatic activities.<sup>135</sup>

Word frequency analysis was conducted to identify key words in the four documents selected for in-depth study. To avoid bias and oversights (i.e. data transfer, storage and processing), the researcher predetermined a set of parameters and instructions that governed the analysis process. In addition, several iterations were run during a twelve-month period, using both Apple and PC platforms. Using KH Coder, a word frequency count was run on each individual document. Common words, or stop words (e.g. the, is, at, which, on), were automatically filtered out before processing the searches. Once imported into an Excel file, the 4 word frequency counts were consolidated by word and frequency into a single master document. The records were also sanitized, meaning websites, special characters, numbers, and foreign language words were deleted. Finally, the key words were then grouped by theme. For example, the following terms were consolidated into one family: "ICRC," "International Committee," "Red Cross," and "Red Crescent." It must be noted that text analysis tools such as word frequency are helpful tools in identifying possible themes or critical elements, but these findings should not be overemphasized or deemed conclusive.

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<sup>132</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1211–37.

<sup>133</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10-12.

<sup>134</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 5.

<sup>135</sup> Veuthey, "Saving It," 195-208.

Table 2.3 presents the most commonly occurring words in all 4 documents. State actors and the ICRC are the most frequently occurring actors according to the frequency analysis. This observation is significant because it highlights the pivotal actors. The discussion on diplomacy in the humanitarian domain most commonly takes place in the context of armed conflict. In fact, “conflict” is the fourth most commonly occurring term.

Table 2.4 Word frequency analysis

Ranking	Word	Frequency
1	State(s)	266
2	Humanitarian	205
3	ICRC	171
4	Armed conflict	155
5	Geneva Convention	83
6	Right(s)	62
7	Humanitarian Diplomacy	89
8	Assistance (aid and relief)	42
9	Humanitarian Space	38
10	Security	36
11	Principle	34
12	Relief	29
13	United States	27
14	Military	26
15	Political	26
16	Protection	26
17	Intervention	24
18	Respect	24
19	Peace	21
20	Policy	21
21	NGO	20
22	Order of Malta	20
23	United Nations	20

*Note:* The table presents the most frequently occurring words and phrases in the four documents included in the text analysis (after systematic sanitation and consolidation of the data). “State(s),” “humanitarian,” and “ICRC” were the most frequently occurring words. Word and phrase frequency is a helpful first step in identifying patterns and relationships when analyzing texts and their relationship to a particular topic, in this case, diplomacy in humanitarian action.

Analysis of the word frequency helped in deducing how commonly used words can be categorized (see Table 2.4). There are three broad categories: aims, actors, and basis. These categories contribute to the presented concept in Chapter 3 (Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy).

Table 2.5 Keyword analysis categories

Category	Search Term	Straus	Gasser	Harrof-Tavel	Veuthey	Totals
n/a	Humanitarian Diplomacy	8	12	33	36	89
Aims	Protection	6	1	6	13	26
	Access	-	-	5	30	35
Actors	State	13	-	76	29	118
	NGO/non-state	-	-	13	20	33
	IFRC/ICRC	-	27	114	42	183
	UN	-	-	10	8	18
	Military	-	-	16	9	25
Basis	Moral	5	-	-	-	5
	Law	18	7	1	40	66
	Political	-	1	15	5	21
	Principle	12	6	5	5	28

*Note:* The research results of the word and phrase frequency analysis (see Table 2.4) were classified next into three categories (aims, actors, basis). In the four documents, two frequently occurring words described the reasons for diplomacy (aims). Five entities emerged as the most frequently mentioned actors in the discussion on diplomacy in humanitarian action (actors). Four keywords emerged that could help explain the foundation on which diplomacy is practiced (basis).

### 2.3.6 Social Network Analysis

Social network analysis tools extracted the data from the quantitative analysis to produce networks that illustrate the relationships and links between actors, ideas, and practices. The following explains the role and value of social network analysis:

Social network analysis (SNA) is the systematic study of collections of social relationships, which consist of social actors implicitly or explicitly connected to one another. Social network analysts characterize the world as composed of entities (e.g., people, organizations, artifacts, nodes, vertices) that are joined together by relationships (e.g., ties, associations, exchanges, memberships, links, edges). SNA focuses on relational data about what transpires between



entities in contrast to attribute data about individuals. Network analysts focus on the patterns generated within collections of many connections.<sup>136</sup>

Network diagrams are helpful tools in content analysis.<sup>137</sup> They tell a visual story of an idea or a concept by identifying the context in which a word, phrase, or an idea is discussed. When specific word units or phrases co-occur in literature, there is the possibility that they are functionally linked to one another. Co-occurrence networks, or linguistic networks, can help explain complex social systems by showing the interconnection of words as they are grouped within a text. Several of these network diagrams are included throughout this literature review (for example, see Figure 2.3).

A co-occurrence network diagram visualizes relationships between words, creating a picture of how people, institutions, and ideas are related or interact. By discovering connections through co-occurrence diagrams researchers can uncover individual themes, and their role and relationship with other themes within the body of research.<sup>138</sup> Using the word frequency list, the researcher developed certain themes to be included in the analysis (see Table 2.6). Theme selection is a way to suppress a large amount of information to focus on particular issues.

Table 2.6 Co-occurrence network themes

Theme	Words in Theme
Humanitarian diplomacy	humanitarian+diplomacy
State actor	state, government, nation, country
Non-state actor (NGO)	non-governmental+organization, NGO, non-state
Armed conflict	armed+conflict, war, armed
Humanitarian	humanitarian
ICRC	ICRC,International+Committee,

<sup>136</sup> Derek Hansen and Marc Smith. 2014. "Social Network Analysis in HCI." In *Ways of Knowing in HCI*, 421–47. Springer, New York, NY. [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-0378-8\\_17](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4939-0378-8_17).

<sup>137</sup> C. E. Osgood, *Trends in Content Analysis: The Representational Model and Relevant Research Methods*, ed. S. Pool (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1959), 33-38.

<sup>138</sup> Qin He, "Knowledge Discovery," 133.

Rights	Red+Cross, Red+Crescent Right
Geneva convention	Geneva+Convention
Security	Security
Principle	Principle, Humanitarian+Principles
Assistance	Aid, assistance, relief
Humanitarian access	Access, space
Political	Political
Protection	Protection
Intervention	Intervention, force
Respect	Respect
Party to conflict	Military, army, party+to+conflict, armed+party, armed+group
Order of Malta	Order+of+Malta
International Humanitarian Law	Humanitarian+Law, IHL
United Nations	United+Nations, UN

*Note:* The next step in analyzing the texts included grouping similar words into a theme (e.g. state actors are referred to differently in the texts: state, state actor, government, country). Creating themes suppresses irrelevant information and concentrates and enhances the results of co-occurrence network diagrams.

The KH Coder software produced the co-occurrence network diagrams for the literature that was analyzed, including Figure 2.3, which shows the network of themes when the 4 documents are consolidated and analyzed amongst each other. To gain insight into the diagrams, it is important to understand the two elements that make up a network:<sup>139</sup>

1. **Nodes** (also known as “ego” or “alter”) are individual themes or actors and are represented as circles. Nodes can represent organizations or individuals. The node sizes reflect frequency as follows:
  - a. Large node = high frequency
  - b. Small node = low frequency

<sup>139</sup> For a helpful explanation of network analysis, see Andrej Zwitter, *Humanitarian Intelligence: A Practitioner’s Guide to Crisis Analysis and Project Design* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 122-142. See also “Co-Occurrence Network: Overview,” KH Coder: Quantitative Content Analysis or Text Mining, accessed September 7, 2016, <https://sourceforge.net/p/khc/wiki/Co-Occurrence%20Network/>.

2. **Lines** (also known as “links” or “ties”) connect nodes and indicate the degree of co-occurrence. The more connections or “ties” means that the node has more power. Lines between nodes are more relevant than the proximity of nodes, as unconnected nodes may appear next to each other, but have no relationship.
  - a. Thick lines = stronger (positive or negative) relationship
  - b. Thin lines = weaker (positive or negative) relationship
3. **Centrality** exposes the popularity, influence and connection of nodes. Centrality speaks of the importance a node plays in a system. High centrality indicates that an actor or idea relates frequently and closely with others in the system and has significant influence. The node colors reflect the centrality levels:
  - a. Pink – high centrality
  - b. White – medium centrality
  - c. Blue – low centrality




Figure 2.3 Co-occurrence network (combined data). The network graph presents the occurrence of the themes found when combining the data from the 4 selected texts. In the 100-year history of *humanitarian diplomacy*’s development in publications, the “state” theme occurs most frequently (the larger the node, the more frequently it occurs). The “ICRC” theme has the greatest centrality (pink = high, white = medium, blue = low), meaning that the ICRC is the most connected ego in the network.

## 2.4 MILESTONES

### 2.4.1 Early Foundations (1820-1864)

The *Ideengeschichte* of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action began in earnest with the endeavors of two men in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. One was a private citizen, the other an official diplomat. Their names were Henri Dunant and Oscar S. Straus. Although there is no record that the two men ever met in person, they shared the conviction that the principle of humanity was a collective responsibility. Dunant and Straus lived in a time period when state and non-state actors intensified their efforts to address, alleviate and prevent suffering through the heightened application of diplomatic activities and attempts to govern the effects of war.<sup>140</sup> It was the dawn of early globalization.

As early as the 1820s, humanitarian affairs began to play a greater role in foreign policy. The international community began to recognize that regional security interests, and the responsibility to protect transcended geopolitical boundaries, superseded state sovereignty, and required a broad range of diplomatic measures.<sup>141</sup> At the same time, society's conscience was awakened to human suffering and the reality that people could, individually and collectively, locally and globally, help to alleviate it. As elements of foreign policy embraced a social conscience, civil society organized itself to address humanitarian issues, often caused by political action or the lack thereof. The following timeline highlights several of the key milestones of *humanitarian diplomacy* in the last 125 years (see Figure 2.4).

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<sup>140</sup> Paul Webster Hare, *Making Diplomacy Work: Intelligent Innovation for the Modern World* (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2015).

<sup>141</sup> Gary Bass, *Freedom's Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention* (New York: Knopf, 2008), 6. Straus viewed the increased contact (early globalization) as the formation of the "Family of Nations." States, through their increased contact with others, began to explore the legal and moral grounds justifying the role of protecting civilian populations in foreign policy development. Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 45.




Figure 2.4 Timeline of *humanitarian diplomacy*. The idea and practice of humanitarian diplomacy has been shaped over time. The phrase was first introduced by a state actor in 1891, but today most commonly occurs in non-state actor discussions. The basis for practicing humanitarian diplomacy were moral grounds, but since 1949 the practice of humanitarian diplomacy is enshrined as a legal framework involving humanitarian law. Whereas until the 1990's humanitarian access was assumed as a prerequisite to practice humanitarian diplomacy, the focus of modern is to negotiate access in the first place.

Humanitarian action and the practice of diplomacy have always been inherently linked.<sup>142</sup> The ICRC, considered by some as the architect of *humanitarian diplomacy*, can trace the practice of diplomacy to its beginning.<sup>143</sup> The movement's founder, Henri Dunant, was convinced that the individual and global responsibility to humanity was to be shared by state and non-state actors, and practiced through diplomatic function.<sup>144</sup> Siddharth Chatterjee, the ICRC's chief diplomat, credits the practice of diplomacy, particularly its aspects of advocacy and communication, with Dunant's work.<sup>145</sup> Dunant himself broadly embodied the diplomatic function in his humanitarian work. He traveled to the capitals of Europe to dialogue with decision-makers and influencers on humanitarian matters. When he directly appealed to state leaders, he reminded them of their moral responsibility to protect.<sup>146</sup> His book *In Memory of Solferino* is seen as an early form of advocacy.<sup>147</sup> Between 1863 and 1864, diplomatic conferences organized by Dunant were attended by over a dozen states. Shortly thereafter, the newly formed ICRC sent two delegates on a mission to approach the parties to the conflict (the Danish and Austro-Prussians) who were fighting over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The choice to refer to these ICRC members as "delegates" implied the nature of diplomatic function that is a

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<sup>142</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1212.

<sup>143</sup> Steve William Davison, "Speaking up for Humanity," *Red Cross Red Crescent Magazine*, no. 3 (2011): 4–7, [http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2011\\_3/4-7.html](http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2011_3/4-7.html); Christopher Lamb, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," (speech, Geneva, Switzerland, June 26, 2008), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, <http://www.ifrc.info/en/news-and-media/opinions-and-positions/speeches/2008/humanitarian-diplomacy/>.

<sup>144</sup> Frank J. Lechner, *Globalization: The Making of World Society* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 156.

<sup>145</sup> Siddharth Chatterjee, "Humanitarian Diplomacy - Relief to Sustainable Development for All" (speech, Geneva, Switzerland, June 13, 2012), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/opinions-and-positions/speeches/2012/humanitarian-diplomacy-relief-to-sustainable-development-for-all/>. Video recording available at [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_fg-WkuwW9Y&feature=youtu.be](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_fg-WkuwW9Y&feature=youtu.be).

<sup>146</sup> Lechner, *Globalization*, 156.

<sup>147</sup> Henry Dunant, *A Memory of Solferino* (Geneva: American Red Cross, 1939), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0361.pdf>.

trademark activity of humanitarian actors today.<sup>148</sup>

#### 2.4.2 Conceptual Introduction & Formation (1891-1983)

In 1891, as a response to public outcry, US President Benjamin Harrison began to apply diplomatic pressure on the Russian Government to stop persecution of minorities in the country.<sup>149</sup> Harrison's decision to act would be later described by US diplomat Straus as "such a clear and convincing recognition of humanitarian diplomacy."<sup>150</sup> The President and his staff dispatched diplomatic cables, participated in trans-national dialogue, and, at last, sent a fact-finding mission to Russia to engage directly with official counterparts. The delegation interviewed expatriates who had witnessed the atrocities, as well as the victims who had survived it. At the same time, Straus worked behind the scenes.<sup>151</sup> As the delegates returned from their mission in Russia, Straus convinced US and British newspapers to publish their findings. Simultaneously, he facilitated US-British cooperation in the commerce and civil society communities. The efforts of Straus and his British counterparts led to the tradition of *humanitarian diplomacy* in their respective states.<sup>152</sup> The Russian authorities responded to the pressure by

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<sup>148</sup> Brigitte Troyon and Daniel Palmieri, "The ICRC Delegate: An Exceptional Humanitarian Player?" *International Review of the Red Cross* 89 (March 2007): 865, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-865-troyon-palmieri.pdf>.

<sup>149</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 59; Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 51. Harrison served as US President from 1889–1893. In 1891, the United States noted an increased influx of refugees from Russia who cited widespread systematic persecution of Jews as their reason for applying for asylum. Upon learning this, Straus and a committee of influential private citizens and business leaders approached President Benjamin Harrison. Straus considered this the type of entanglement with which nations such as the United States, due to their large immigration numbers, must wrestle. The sympathies of Americans were awakened when they heard of suffering in their countries of origin. It was the state's responsibility to promptly and effectively address human suffering.

<sup>150</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 45.

<sup>151</sup> Oscar S. Straus (1850 -1926) was an American Diplomat who introduced the term "humanitarian diplomacy" into the vernacular of foreign policy.

<sup>152</sup> Alan Mittleman, Robert Licht, and Jonathan D. Sarna, *Jews and the American Public Square: Debating Religion and Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 33. For policy on British *humanitarian diplomacy*, see Carole Fink,

prosecuting those responsible for the killings.<sup>153</sup>

These experiences influenced Straus' understanding that a specific type of diplomacy was practiced in the humanitarian context. In fact, the first mention of the term *humanitarian diplomacy* is found in a prepared speech to the American Society of International Law. Tragedy, however, prevented Straus from delivering his remarks. The diplomat received word that his brother, Isidor Straus, a co-owner of the American department store, Macy's, died with his wife in the sinking of the passenger ship Titanic. The couple refused preferential treatment to board lifeboats.<sup>154</sup> In Straus' absence, the secretary of the society read the speech in which Straus declared that *humanitarian diplomacy* was the highest realm of political diplomacy because it was the "diplomacy of humanity."<sup>155</sup>

Social network analysis of Straus' speech, "The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," offers several key explanations and insights into states' practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain. Not only is the state the most central and powerful node in the social network, it is the only actor directly engaged in *humanitarian diplomacy*. The central role of the state can be explained through Straus' belief that the state had the clear mandate to protect and provide assistance (see the direct link between the State ego and the following nodes: assistance, protection, right, political). Straus and Dunant viewed the responsibility to protect as a chiefly moral duty of the state.<sup>156</sup> Straus further argued that preventing atrocities, oppression, and religious persecution through diplomatic activity and humanitarian intervention was justified "by a high act of

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*Defending the Rights of Others: The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority Protection, 1878-1938* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 49. Fridtjof of Nansen, the humanitarian and diplomat, was instrumental in Norway's willingness to neutrally insert itself into international humanitarian crises. See Larry Winter Roeder and Albert Simard, *Diplomacy and Negotiation for Humanitarian NGOs* (New York: Springer, 2013), 14.

<sup>153</sup> Naomi W. Cohen, *A Dual Heritage: The Public Career of Oscar S. Straus* (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1969), 128.

<sup>154</sup> June Hall McCash, *A Titanic Love Story: Ida and Isidor Straus* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2012), 198-199.

<sup>155</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 51.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.



policy above and beyond the domain of law.”<sup>157</sup>




Figure 2.5 Co-occurrence network (1912). The graph illustrates the roles and relationships the themes (see Table 2.5) play in Straus’ 1912 speech, *The Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States*. The “state” ego ranks highest in centrality (pink color).

Centrality in a network diagram does not imply that an actor is exclusive and independent. Centrality can also be indicative of a facilitator role, which is congruent with Straus’ policy on *humanitarian diplomacy*. He often depended on, coordinated with, and/or worked through social, commercial, and political entities,

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<sup>157</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 56.

as the previously mentioned story from 1891 illustrates. In fact, Straus believed that a state's *humanitarian diplomacy* was an expression of public will.<sup>158</sup>

The social network analysis also asserts Straus' belief that the state, by virtue of its mandate, resources, and position in the world, was also the most powerful actor to practice diplomacy in humanitarian contexts (see Figure 2.5). The least that a state could do was show disapproval on human rights abuses. When diplomatic measures were exhausted, the international community needed to consider other options. A way to further understand centrality and power is the previously alluded to reality that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century official diplomacy was the only recognized form of diplomacy.<sup>159</sup>

### 2.4.3 Shifting Imperatives & the ICRC (1984-1990)

Although the practice of diplomacy was often implied in humanitarian action, it was the post-Vietnam War era that ushered in the next discussion on the role of diplomatic function. Reflecting on this time period, Forsythe states "this type of failure to develop a well-considered humanitarian diplomacy in the face of brutal power politics was painfully exposed again in the Nigerian affair (1967–70)."<sup>160</sup>

Like in the previous decades, addressing protection-related issues was the prominent reason to practice diplomacy in humanitarian action. What changed, however, was the basis, or justification, from which this issue was addressed. Instead of arguing from moral authority, there now was legal justification for humanitarian actors to practice diplomacy.<sup>161</sup> The role of legal justification is

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<sup>158</sup> Oscar S. Straus, "Democracy and Open Diplomacy," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York* 7, no. 2 (1917): 156–58, doi:10.2307/1172241.

<sup>159</sup> Louis J. Nigro, Jr., "Theory and Practice of Modern Diplomacy: Origins and Development to 1914," *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues* 1, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (2010): 173.

<sup>160</sup> David P. Forsythe, *The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 201.

<sup>161</sup> *Overview of United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Report on the Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response*, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP, August 2012).

evident in Hans-Peter Gasser's work, and becomes clearer while analyzing the social network of his 1984 text.<sup>162</sup>




Figure 2.6 Co-occurrence network (1984). This graph illustrates the occurrence and interconnectedness of the themes in Gasser's text. By 1984, the ICRC has replaced the state as the

<sup>162</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10-12. Today's argument centers on moral, religious, legal, and prudential grounds, and includes arguments of reciprocity. See Hugo Slim, "Innovation in Humanitarian Action," Oxford Institute of Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict (2014), 4, [http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Skoll\\_Centre/Docs/essay-slim.pdf](http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Skoll_Centre/Docs/essay-slim.pdf); Jonathan Whittall, "'It's Like Talking to a Brick Wall:' Humanitarian Diplomacy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," *Progress in Development Studies* 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2009): 45, doi:10.1177/146499340800900104.

main actor. The concept of diplomacy in humanitarian action is developed as evident in the introduction of themes (e.g. assistance, Geneva Convention, parties to conflict) not present in Straus' 1912 speech.

In the social network, the Geneva Convention was not only added as a node, but immediately took on a central and mediating role. The Geneva Convention's direct relationship to key nodes (parties to conflict, armed conflict, political [process] assistance, and protection) indicates that it is the justification for the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action. Most notably, Gasser argued that the Geneva Convention gave the ICRC a unique status and incontrovertible right to not only engage in the practice of diplomacy, but to be the chief actor. The social network illuminates not only the introduction of the ICRC as a node, but also its replacement of the state as the focal ego. This transition in ownership is especially significant because Gasser introduces parties to conflict as a node, but it is the ICRC who serves as mediator between the state and parties to conflict. Gasser viewed this relationship as clear und uncontroversial. Tom Farer, in his 1983 book (the first of currently two books that include *humanitarian diplomacy* in their title), however, frames the practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain as a politically motivated instrument of a state's foreign policy.<sup>163</sup> Regardless, the proximity of the state and ICRC nodes in the social network is indicative of their interconnected and complicated relationship (see Figure 2.6).

Of interest are not only the newly introduced nodes (namely parties to conflict and the ICRC), but also Gasser's omission of other non-state actors (e.g. NGOs and the United Nations). Faith-based *humanitarian diplomacy* was gaining attention during this time. For example, the Vatican's uniquely religious, social, and political agenda brought it in increased contact with military and economic

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<sup>163</sup> The two books are Tom Farer's *Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy: A primer for Policy* and Hazel Smith's *Humanitarian Diplomacy*. Tom J. Farer, *Toward a Humanitarian Diplomacy: A Primer for Policy* (New York: New York University Press, 1980); Hazel Smith, "Humanitarian Diplomacy: Theory and Practice," in *Humanitarian Diplomacy: Practitioners and their Craft*, eds. Larry Minear and Hazel Smith (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), 36-62.

powers (1960-1990).<sup>164</sup> The omission of emerging non-state actors might be best understood by the ICRC's unique role of communicating and monitoring the respect of human rights law and international humanitarian law.




Figure 2.7 Co-occurrence network (2006). The concept of *humanitarian diplomacy* has evolved by 2006, as is evident when analyzing Harroff-Tavel's discussion of the ICRC's approach to diplomacy. With an expanding social network (consisting of nearly twice as many nodes as in 1912), the "NGO" theme is introduced while the "state" and "ICRC" nodes are moving closer in proximity.

<sup>164</sup> Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann, *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 181.

The ICRC's diplomatic mandate was reaffirmed and strengthened in 1994 when the United Nations conferred upon it observer status, citing its intermediary role in humanitarian issues.<sup>165</sup> This dispensation gave the ICRC improved and regular access to member states. As the ICRC now has an expedient channel when it must dialogue, advocate, or negotiate with political decision-makers, the ICRC and United Nations increased their diplomatic efforts, particularly in the area of protection.<sup>166</sup>

#### **2.4.4 Resurfacing as a Multidimensional Practice (2009-2012)**

After a nearly 15-year gap in literary occurrence of *humanitarian diplomacy* (except for a few mentions and republications of previous material), the concept resurfaced as a multifaceted and established practice. The social network analysis of Marion Harroff-Tavel's work from 2006 shows how the idea has developed over time. At first glance, it is obvious that the number of nodes, or egos, has grown exponentially (10 in 1912, 13 in 1984, 19 in 2006) (see Figure 2.7). The United Nations and NGOs are introduced as *new* actors in the network, as well as the themes of security and access. The growth of the network is indicative of the increasingly complex environment of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action.

Until now, state actors (1912) and the ICRC (1984) assumed that access would be granted. When the US administration dispatched the fact-finding mission in 1891, it assumed that the Russians, as they did, would welcome the party. Gasser viewed humanitarian access and free movement as an incontrovertible right anchored in the Geneva Convention. The Geneva

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<sup>165</sup> ICRC, "The ICRC is Granted Observer Status at the United Nations," *International Review of the Red Cross* No. 279 (December 31, 1990), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnhw.htm>; IFRC, "Red Cross Red Crescent Marks 10 Years of UN Permanent Observer Status," International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, accessed February 14, 2014, <https://www.ifrc.org/en/nouvelles/communiqués-de-presse/americas/united-states/red-cross-red-crescent-marks-10-years-of-un-permanent-observer-status/>.

<sup>166</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 3.

Convention's centrality, however, has weakened since Gasser introduced it in 1982. Originally the foundation on which the humanitarian community justified the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, the Geneva Convention's relationships in the network have decreased from ten in 1984 to only one in 2006.<sup>167</sup> In fact, the 2006 social network shows no direct relationship between access and the Geneva Convention nodes. Instead, negotiating access to civilian populations and ensuring safety of ICRC staff and beneficiaries have become principal activities of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action. To be able to address the growing complexities of humanitarian action, the humanitarian community's embrace and utilization of diplomatic function grew.

The ICRC recognized that its quiet and discreet approach to diplomacy, while representative of its culture and philosophy, had proven to be ineffectual at times in the modern humanitarian context.<sup>168</sup> Once a tool that the ICRC used to achieve a humanitarian goal (Gasser, 1984), the ICRC now views the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action as a comprehensive strategy.<sup>169</sup> It is in this time period that the IFRC publishes its *humanitarian diplomacy* policy.<sup>170</sup> The IFRC defines the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action as, "persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interest of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles."<sup>171</sup>

In the same time period (2007), Smith and Minear considered a variety of cases within the larger humanitarian sector in which *humanitarian diplomacy* has been practiced since the 1970s.<sup>172</sup> The practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action seeks to achieve the means necessary for humanitarian work: access,

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<sup>167</sup> Claude Bruderlein and Naz Modirzadeh, "Humanitarian Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities," Online Video Conference, September 25, 2008, <http://www.hpcresearch.org/events/humanitarian-diplomacy-21st-century-challenges-and-opportunities>.

<sup>168</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> IFRC, "Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy,"

[http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Governance/Policies/Humanitarian\\_Diplomacy\\_Policy.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Governance/Policies/Humanitarian_Diplomacy_Policy.pdf).

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

<sup>172</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice."

presence, protection, monitoring, and promotion of humanitarian issues. While offering a broad perspective on where and how diplomacy is practiced in the humanitarian contexts, Smith and Minear see it as “a distinctive, discrete and limited enterprise.”<sup>173</sup> Not only is a clear distinction made between official diplomacy (Track I) and unofficial diplomacy (Track II), such as *humanitarian diplomacy*, but also emphasis is placed on the fact that it is a highly professionalized activity. As such, they argue it should be limited to humanitarian officials (not everyday practitioners), a perspective that has received criticism as state-centric and conventional.<sup>174</sup>

By 2012, the social neighborhood and activities of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action have further expanded to twenty nodes (see Figure 2.8). Michel Veuthey, of the Order of Malta, brings the discussion on diplomatic function in the humanitarian domain to the present. He highlights that diplomacy in humanitarian contexts is practiced by a variety of actors. Non-state actors view the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action as a tool to achieve their strategic and operational goals, both on global and grassroots levels. Namely NGOs, non-state actors have moved to a more central position in the social network. They are now as connected to other nodes as the ICRC. The state, without losing much power, has shifted to a less central, more support-oriented position in the neighborhood. The security and *humanitarian diplomacy* nodes have moved closer together. The humanitarian access and protection nodes are now directly connected (and clustered closely together). This analysis confirms the support role that humanitarian diplomacy plays today in addressing program implementation challenges. In fact, non-state actors are preoccupied with gaining access, maintaining operational security, and negotiating the terms of humanitarian operations.<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>174</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 3.

<sup>175</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 195.






Figure 2.8 Co-occurrence network (2012). Humanitarian diplomacy's network is not only growing, but evolving. NGO actors, while still lesser in frequency and centrality, are moving closer to the center as states are moving away along with the United Nations.

## 2.5 DEFINITIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS

The definition of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action depends on the actor's interpretation and prioritization. Today's understanding of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is summarized by Philippe Régnier. His analysis indicates that *humanitarian diplomacy*, although distinct from traditional diplomacy, has the same multi-dimensional, multi-functional, and multi-institutional characteristics of multi-track diplomacy, an observation that this research solidifies in chapters 4 and 5. To Régnier, the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is best explained by the following:

1. Objectives: protecting and assisting
2. Instruments: diplomatic activities, such as negotiation and other communications
3. Multi-level: from headquarters to field level
4. Beneficiaries: those affected by conflict and disaster
5. Actors: state and non-state actors
6. Format: official and informal; discreet and public
7. Legal basis: IHL, human rights and disaster law<sup>176</sup>

Before considering how various actors practice diplomacy in humanitarian action, it is helpful to glance at a few definitions and descriptions of *humanitarian diplomacy* (see Table 2.7).

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<sup>176</sup> Régnier, “Emerging Concept,” 1211–37.

Table 2.7 Definitions and Descriptions

“Maximizing support for operations and programs, and building the partnership necessary if humanitarian objectives are to be achieved.” - Christopher Lamb (IFRC) <sup>a</sup>
“It is only through the establishment of humanitarian diplomacy as an integral part of the day to day work of National Societies and the International Federation, with the necessary capacities in place, that the humanitarian objectives referred to above can be effectively realized. ... The decision therefore to engage in humanitarian diplomacy, forge partnerships, is not a choice, but a responsibility.” - Siddharth Chatterjee (IFRC) <sup>b</sup>
“[Humanitarian Diplomacy] is an essential expression of Turkey’s role, identity and quest for justice in international politics.” - Cemalettin Haşimi (John Hopkins University) <sup>c</sup>
“[The] aim of humanitarian diplomacy is to protect, assist and find solutions for refugees, internally displaced persons, stateless persons and other persons of concern to the agency. ... It requires advocacy with governments and engagement with both sovereign states and non-state actors. It involves persuading state and non-state actors to keep borders open to gain access to, protect and assist refugees and to work toward durable solutions.” - Kelly Clements (United Nations) <sup>d</sup>
“Persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to act, at all times, in the interest of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles.” - IFRC Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy <sup>e</sup>
“The ICRC’s humanitarian diplomacy is a strategy for influencing the parties to armed conflicts and others - States, non-State actors and members of civil society. Its purpose is purely humanitarian and it is carried out through a network of sustained relationships - bilateral and multilateral, official and informal. ... employed to prevent and resolve humanitarian problems through dialogue, negotiation and the preparation of rules.” - Marion Harroff-Tavel (ICRC) <sup>f</sup>
“The art of achieving a humanitarian goal.” - Hans-Peter Gasser (ICRC) <sup>g</sup>
“A dialogue (private or public) between Governments and (or) humanitarian organizations, inter-government organizations (IOs) and non-government organizations (NGOs) or other Non-State Actors (NSAs).” - Michel Veuthey (Order of Malta) <sup>h</sup>
“The concept of humanitarian diplomacy encompasses the activities carried out by humanitarian organizations to obtain the space from political and military authorities within which to function with integrity. These activities comprise such efforts as arranging for the presence of humanitarian organizations in a given country, negotiating access to civilian populations in need of assistance and protection, monitoring assistance programmes, promoting respect for international law and norms, supporting indigenous individuals and institutions, and engaging in advocacy at a variety of levels in support of humanitarian objectives.” - Minear (Tufts University) and Smith (University of Warwick) <sup>i</sup>
“Negotiations that deal with access for relief purposes, where they are concerned with establishing, maintaining, extending, or modifying such access.” - Michele Acuto (University College London) <sup>j</sup>

*Note:* This table summarizes definitions and descriptors of humanitarian diplomacy. There exists no common definition of humanitarian diplomacy.

*Sources:*

<sup>a</sup> Lamb, “Humanitarian Diplomacy.”

<sup>b</sup> Labbé, “Interview with Siddharth Chatterjee, Chief Diplomat, IFRC.”

<sup>c</sup> Cemalettin Haşimi, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation.”

<sup>d</sup> “Q&A with Kelly Clements, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees.”

<sup>e</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy.”

<sup>f</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC.”

<sup>g</sup> Hans-Peter Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy.”

<sup>h</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It.”

<sup>i</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice.”

<sup>j</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*.

## 2.6 ACTORS

Diplomacy is often practiced in situations in which humanitarian space is restricted: conflicts, disasters, pandemics, and ongoing humanitarian emergencies.<sup>177</sup> In recent years, with a recognition that the principles of diplomacy function in humanitarian action are more broadly applicable, it is now practiced to influence policy, behavior, and thinking in the greater humanitarian system.<sup>178</sup> Quantitative text analysis indicates that, most commonly, diplomacy is practiced in the context of armed conflict. Negotiating terms such as access and protection of civilians is the most prominent activity.<sup>179</sup> However, in analyzing over 70 examples of *humanitarian diplomacy*, there are other contexts that are slowly emerging. While these environments differ from conflicts, they are subject to the same constraints that diplomatic function may be able to address. Some argue the existence of two legal contexts for diplomacy in humanitarian action: natural disasters and armed conflicts.<sup>180</sup> Diplomatic tools are now common in supporting initiatives related to Disaster Risk Reduction.<sup>181</sup> The practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is commonly used when addressing needs and interests of vulnerable populations.<sup>182</sup>

Social network diagrams are helpful in showing what nodes (actors, issues, and activities) have relationship with others. The network graph in Figure 2.9

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<sup>177</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 14-15, 259-270.

<sup>178</sup> IFRC, "IFRC Strategy on Violence Prevention, Mitigation and Response 2011-2020," International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2011, 22, accessed August 12, 2016, <http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/53475/IFRC%20SoV%20REPORT%202011%20EN.pdf>.

<sup>179</sup> Jan Egeland, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 352-68.

<sup>180</sup> Veuthey, "Saving It," 3-4.

<sup>181</sup> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Disaster Risk Reduction: A Global Advocacy Guide," International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2012, 11, [http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/reducing\\_risks/DRR-advocacy-guide.pdf](http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/disasters/reducing_risks/DRR-advocacy-guide.pdf).

<sup>182</sup> "What we do: Humanitarian diplomacy," International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/humanitarian-diplomacy/>.

illustrates actors who practice diplomacy in humanitarian action. What the diagrams are not able to express, however, is whether or not the relationship is functional. Like in most personal and professional relationships, communication is frequently a key issue. Coordination is often cited as a major issue in humanitarian effectiveness. In light of this, there are calls for greater diplomatic engagement during large-scale humanitarian emergency responses to proactively prevent communication and coordination challenges. Today, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has a widely recognized mandate to coordinate during humanitarian emergencies.<sup>183</sup>




Figure 2.9 Co-occurrence network (combined data – actors). This graph illustrates the actor neighborhood when data is aggregated from the 4 texts and actors are isolated from all other themes. Given their frequency (large node size = occurs frequently) and ties (more lines = more relationship and power), the ICRC and states emerge as prominent actors. Yet, since the ICRC has the greatest centrality (red = high centrality) in the actor

<sup>183</sup> The Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator is one of the few positions in the humanitarian system with explicitly defined diplomatic responsibilities. See Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 125-126.

neighborhood, it is the most connected and well resourced, having more options available to it than to others. In recent years the ICRC has emerged as the actor with the most defined approach to humanitarian diplomacy and plays a unique diplomatic role in the international community.

In humanitarian action, diplomacy can be practiced on the highest government levels, but, at the same time, depend on local volunteers who are interacting with community leaders.<sup>184</sup> In some instances, primary emphasis is placed on grass root diplomatic activities.<sup>185</sup> In others, diplomatic activity can operate almost exclusively in the realm of foreign policy amongst member states in the humanitarian community.<sup>186</sup> However, as the social network graphs indicate, diplomacy focused on humanitarian issues has historically been approached through multi-lateral partnership (despite a lack of effective coordination at times).<sup>187</sup> This commitment to multi-lateral coordination is anchored in the fact that much of humanitarian effectiveness depends on multi-lateral interaction.<sup>188</sup> According to the ICRC, the only way to practice *humanitarian diplomacy* is through a multi-dimensional approach.<sup>189</sup>

In the years leading up to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the greater humanitarian community applied a multilateral approach in its negotiations with the Taliban. The effectiveness of diplomacy in humanitarian action in this example depended on well-coordinated communication on multiple levels through a variety of channels: public and private, local and global.<sup>190</sup> The lesson here is

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<sup>184</sup> John Hewko, "Humanitarian Diplomacy Offers the Olive Branch Needed in Today's Violent World," Devex, October 23, 2015, <https://www.devex.com/news/humanitarian-diplomacy-offers-the-olive-branch-needed-in-today-s-violent-world-87148>.

<sup>185</sup> For the case study on Columbia, see Lizzie Brock, "Protection Through Diplomacy in Colombia," in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 325-346.

<sup>186</sup> Predominantly state-initiated diplomatic efforts have led to humanitarian intervention. For example, see United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1970 (2011)," February 26, 2011, <https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013-B03D-4859-9D61-5D0B0F2F5EFA/0/1970Eng.pdf>.

<sup>187</sup> Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 362.

<sup>188</sup> Hewko, "Olive Branch."

<sup>189</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2.

<sup>190</sup> Antonio Donini, "Negotiating with the Taliban," in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 153-173.

that organizations must integrate diplomatic function into every level of their operations in a systematic and transparent manner.<sup>191</sup> What is becoming increasingly clear is that the system in which the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action takes place is highly interdependent and volatile.<sup>192</sup>

Every day, humanitarian practitioners find themselves practicing diplomatic function just as much as official diplomats who are involved in humanitarian issues.<sup>193</sup> Yet, who are those involved in diplomatic function in the humanitarian domain? Diplomacy is not exclusive to official diplomats. Nor is the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action reserved for those directly providing humanitarian assistance.<sup>194</sup> Results from quantitative text analysis indicate that there are multiple actors who fit into two main categories: state and non-state actors. State actors include individual government officials (e.g. diplomats, elected officials, etc.) and government agencies on local, national, and global levels. Non-state actors include (in order of frequency): the ICRC, NGOs, the UN, and parties to conflict.<sup>195</sup> A strong representation of these actors is vital to gaining a “stronger recognition of community perspectives in the international humanitarian and development system and cooperation arrangements.”<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Brock, “Protection Through Diplomacy in Colombia,” 325.

<sup>192</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 4.

<sup>193</sup> Gerard Mc Hugh and Manuel Bessler, “Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners,” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006, 5, <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/28BEC3628B99A532852571070071B4B3-un-ocha-30jan.pdf>.

<sup>194</sup> Thomas E. Novotny, Ilona Kickbusch, and Michaela Told, *21st Century Global Health Diplomacy* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2013), 217.

<sup>195</sup> The discussion on the role of parties to conflict falls outside the scope of this research. Other actors that are often mentioned are the Order of Malta and MSF. Further, the media plays a prominent role in humanitarian diplomacy. For further discussion, see Veuthey, “Saving It,” 10.

<sup>196</sup> IFRC, “Strategy 2020: Saving Lives, Changing Minds,” International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2010, 27, accessed January 28, 2014, <http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/general/strategy-2020.pdf>.

### 2.6.1 State Actors

Providing assistance is just one facet of state actors' involvement in humanitarian affairs. Similarly, diplomatic practice in humanitarian action is considered to be one aspect of the broad official diplomatic system.<sup>197</sup> As states integrate humanitarian affairs into foreign policy, there are those who categorize any foreign policy involvement in humanitarian affairs as *humanitarian diplomacy*. For example, Turkey uses *humanitarian diplomacy* as an umbrella term to describe the state's aid and development agenda. In this case, *humanitarian diplomacy* encompasses

all activities in foreign policy, ranging from visa liberation policy to the opening of new embassies, involvement with humanitarian assistance to maintaining positive civilian-state relations, being pro-active during times of crisis and taking responsibility in international organizations such as UN. Second, it is defined as a framework developed by Turkey to move beyond diplomatic models and humanitarian visions formed by the Westphalian nation-state model.<sup>198</sup>

Most commonly, however, states view *humanitarian diplomacy* as a policy practice limited to particular and discernible humanitarian issues. States primarily channel *humanitarian diplomacy* through their development agencies (e.g. Department for International Development (DFID), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)), and direct efforts to particular causes. The US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, for example, continues Straus' tradition by addressing issues related to violence, conflict, and persecution.<sup>199</sup> High-ranking officials engage in the process of diplomacy during tense or highly publicized

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<sup>197</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2.

<sup>198</sup> Cemalettin Haşimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation," *Insight Turkey* 16, no. 1 (Winter, 2014), 141, [http://www.academia.edu/20660642/Turkeys\\_humanitarian\\_diplomacy\\_and\\_development\\_cooperation](http://www.academia.edu/20660642/Turkeys_humanitarian_diplomacy_and_development_cooperation).

<sup>199</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 204. See also Anne Richards, "Humanitarian Diplomacy in New York & Geneva," The Office of Website Management, news release, October 11, 2012. <https://geneva.usmission.gov/2012/10/11/anne-richards-on-humanitarian-diplomacy-in-new-york-geneva/>.



humanitarian situations.<sup>200</sup> Straus believed that only exceptional situations called for *humanitarian diplomacy*. Today, this type of diplomacy is more frequently implied than explicitly stated in foreign policy. In the strictest sense of the practice, official diplomats discreetly raise particular issues with their international counterparts regarding humanitarian issues.<sup>201</sup>

The *humanitarian diplomacy* of a state should shape foreign policy. In that regard, it should be human-centered, conscience-driven, and its efforts concentrated on protection, humanitarian assistance, and development.<sup>202</sup> It is important that state actors view this specific form of diplomacy not as a tertiary element of foreign policy, but as an affirmative goal of it.<sup>203</sup> Diplomacy in humanitarian situations has been a distinctive practice of the US administration. A congressional report on human rights stated “Consideration for human rights in foreign policy is both morally imperative and practically necessary.”<sup>204</sup> However, the US has a history of breaking with the tradition of American *humanitarian diplomacy* at times, when it is most needed.<sup>205</sup> Generally, official *humanitarian diplomacy* is less principled than that of non-state actors because states weigh human rights issues with often competing political and economic agendas.

Non-state actors are increasingly accepting of state actors’ role in facilitating diplomacy since they cannot operate independently from political

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<sup>200</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 203.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 204-205.

<sup>201</sup> Richards, “Humanitarian Diplomacy in New York & Geneva.”

<sup>202</sup> Hasan Ulusoy, “Turkey Position Paper: World Humanitarian Summit 2016,” Foreign Ministry, Multilateral Political Affairs, 2016, 8, <http://whsturkey.org/turkey-and-the-summit/key-documents-for-turkey>.

<sup>203</sup> Farer, *Primer for Policy*, 2.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>205</sup> For example, in light of Hitler’s emerging anti-Semitic campaigns in the mid 1930’s, the US State Department asked Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to delete references to humanitarian diplomacy in a speech as the administration had “quietly buried humanitarian diplomacy with World War I.” See Naomi Wiener Cohen, *The Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948* (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2003), 140.

issues.<sup>206</sup> While diplomacy in the humanitarian context is often practiced in highly politicized settings, it should have no political agenda.<sup>207</sup> Straus believed that diplomatic function in humanitarian issues had to be above the suspicion of selfish purposes and not used as a disguise for state political or economic ambitions.<sup>208</sup>

There are contexts in which state-centric *humanitarian diplomacy* is less contentious. Outside of the domain of humanitarian emergencies, diplomatic efforts can garner the political will of the international community to improve humanitarian effectiveness. For example, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action were the result of state-initiated diplomacy in the humanitarian domain.

When states deploy their military, it is far more controversial. In this context there are two possible justifications for military engagement: humanitarian intervention and humanitarian assistance.<sup>209</sup> State actor engagement is often controversial in the context of providing assistance in natural disasters (e.g. typhoons or earthquakes). Although military actors may consider some of their actions in complex environments to be humanitarian in nature, they are often seen as politically motivated and can cause challenges to non-state humanitarian actors. In the aftermath of the most recent US-led invasion of Iraq, this dynamic hampered the operations of the humanitarian community. The public often assumed that, due to overlap and shared activities, non-state humanitarian actors were complicit in all the activities of military actors.<sup>210</sup>

State-centric practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian domain can be seen as seeking to extend political influence, rather than fulfilling the humanitarian imperative. Such can quickly threaten non-state humanitarian

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<sup>206</sup> Thomas G. Weiss, "Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action," *Ethics & International Affairs* 13, no. 1 (March, 1999): 1-22, doi:10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00322.x.

<sup>207</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 128.

<sup>208</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 47.

<sup>209</sup> See "Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, <https://www.unocha.org/legacy/what-we-do/coordination-tools/UN-CMCoord/overview>.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid.

activities.<sup>211</sup> For example, despite collaboration, major international capital and will, the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action did not prevent Somalia from becoming a failed state. Political and humanitarian diplomatic activity clashed, and created a distorted approach that resulted in a breakdown in diplomacy.<sup>212</sup> When militaries provide relief assistance, it is vital that non-state actors, such as UN OCHA, use diplomatic channels to communicate and monitor a framework guided by the principles of humanitarian action.

### 2.6.2 Non-state Actors

Non-state actors' practices of diplomacy in humanitarian action have varying degrees of neutrality and comfort relative to coordination and communication with state actors. Non-state actors invest significant time and effort into practicing a form of diplomacy unique to their non-political status.<sup>213</sup> Their diplomatic activities do not follow a "well-established regime" as their traditional official counterparts.<sup>214</sup> Therefore, while a variety of non-state actors practice diplomacy in humanitarian situations, it would be a mistake to view all activities as a cohesive, coordinated system.<sup>215</sup> Attitudes and policies on, and application of, diplomatic function in humanitarian action vary greatly.<sup>216</sup> The humanitarian imperative enables non-state actors, especially the ICRC, access to many but certainly not all, of the important debates on humanitarian issues. Non-state actors' lack of political muscle is a contributing factor to their dependence on state action. They can, however, compensate for the lack of diplomatic options by

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Karin von Hippel, "Blurring of Mandates in Somalia," in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 298-322.

<sup>213</sup> Deborah Mancini-Griffoli and André Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict* (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004), 11, <http://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Humanitarian-Negotiationn-A-handbook-October-2004.pdf>.

<sup>214</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 9.

<sup>215</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 206.

<sup>216</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 32.

forming coalitions.<sup>217</sup> Alliances in humanitarian diplomatic activities lead to effectiveness, consistency, and greater influence. This is one of the reasons why the ICRC's *humanitarian diplomacy* strategy stresses the importance for partnership amongst like-minded actors. Non-state actors need to create robust management and education infrastructures in order to ensure that all humanitarian practitioners are empowered and equipped to practice diplomacy.<sup>218</sup>

The ICRC is a key non-state actor in the diplomatic domain.<sup>219</sup> Since *humanitarian diplomacy* is very much a part of the movement's DNA, the ICRC's approach, compared to other non-state actors, has by far the most breadth and depth.<sup>220</sup> This is evident when generating a network graph isolating actors. In terms of depth, the movement has a definition, strategy, and policy on *humanitarian diplomacy*. The movement's organizational structure reflects its commitment to diplomacy from the top down: the president is considered the chief diplomat and delegates represent the movement's principles from the global to the local level. In terms of breadth, the ICRC, compared with other non-state counterparts, applies the tools of diplomatic function most consistently and extensively, as will become more evident when these tools are presented in the next section.

The ICRC is the lead ego in the social neighborhood of actors (fig 2.9). It serves as a coordinator, or facilitator, of interactions and activities amongst the other players. This role can be explained, firstly, by the ICRC's unique relationship and responsibility to manage and monitor activities and compliance with international humanitarian law.<sup>221</sup> Secondly, because of its privileged access (which some in the movement consider a right) to public authorities it has a

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>218</sup> "Workshop On Diplomacy And Negotiation For Humanitarian NGOs," InterAction, <https://www.interaction.org/event/workshop-diplomacy-and-negotiation-humanitarian-ngos>.

<sup>219</sup> Lamb, "Humanitarian Diplomacy."

<sup>220</sup> Henry Minear, *Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries* (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2002).

<sup>221</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 12.

mandate to exercise diplomatic function.<sup>222</sup> Because of the relationship to international humanitarian law and access to governments, the ICRC has, in its own words, a “privileged seat in decision-making forums with governments,” which it uses to consult with them on humanitarian matters.<sup>223</sup>

The United Nations is another non-state actor extensively involved in diplomacy in the humanitarian domain.<sup>224</sup> The international community recognizes the UN’s diplomatic role in humanitarian contexts because of its mandate, including the coordination of humanitarian emergencies.<sup>225</sup> Some suggest that the UN’s practice of diplomatic function can be a helpful model for other non-state actors, but an actionable evidence base is lacking.<sup>226</sup> UN agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC), have a unique standing amongst member states.<sup>227</sup> The UN OCHA practices diplomatic function through its coordination of large-scale humanitarian emergency responses. Some view OCHA as the primary agency to carry out diplomatic responsibilities.<sup>228</sup>

Since the turn of the century, NGOs have increasingly been engaged in diplomatic activities addressing relief, development, and human rights issues.<sup>229</sup> Nevertheless, their role has been given little attention in research. Beyond empirical observation, there is a dearth of robust literature and frameworks for NGO-centric humanitarian diplomacy.<sup>230</sup> To study NGOs’ relationship to diplomatic practice, this systematic review had to expand keyword searches to

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<sup>222</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy.”

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

<sup>224</sup> Whittall, “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 37.

<sup>225</sup> Andrew F. Cooper, Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 359, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.001.0001.

<sup>226</sup> Whittall, “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 38.

<sup>227</sup> Elizabeth G. Ferris, *The Politics of Protection: The Limits of Humanitarian Action* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), 29. Guy Goodwin-Gill is quoted here explaining that the UNHRC uses moral authority and persuasive powers.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>229</sup> Roeder and Simard, *Diplomacy and Negotiation*, 197.

<sup>230</sup> Kelly-Kate Pease and Kelly McBride, “Human Rights and Humanitarian Diplomacy (1856 - ),” *Oxford Bibliographies*, May 29, 2015, doi:10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0126.

include phrases such as “humanitarian negotiations.” NGOs are increasingly practicing diplomacy in humanitarian action. Organizations with an operational presence in conflict theaters, as well as those who are considered human rights organizations, are more familiar with the practice of diplomacy (e.g. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and several consortiums of NGOs, such as the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court).<sup>231</sup>

NGOs’ influence in the realm of global diplomacy is most evident when their efforts are expressed through a coalition of several organizations. These umbrella associations influence debates and decisions regarding public policy, international humanitarian law, disaster risk reduction, and the humanitarian effects of armed conflict.<sup>232</sup> The purpose and application of diplomacy depends greatly on the individual actor. This dynamic will be discussed later when attention will be brought to the strategic goals and operational objectives that guide much of the practice.

To some, NGOs should complement, but not lead, diplomatic activities in the humanitarian sector. They are to support official negotiations taking place between states and international organizations (e.g. ICRC, UN).<sup>233</sup> NGOs appear to embrace the auxiliary role, as most prefer to be isolated from political interactions, exerting their influence quietly. They prefer regular but discreet advocacy activities and restrained interactions with decision-makers and influencers outside of high-profile situations. NGOs practice diplomatic function to address specific operational challenges, but rarely rely on diplomacy as a strategic policy to communicate organizational values, principles, and humanitarian causes. NGOs’ diplomacy is implied, rather than stated, and much of their diplomatic activities take place on local rather than on global levels.

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<sup>231</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 10.

<sup>232</sup> “Workshop On Diplomacy And Negotiation.”

<sup>233</sup> Soledad Herrero, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access: Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection, February 12, 2014, [https://phap.org/system/files/article\\_pdf/Herrero-HumanitarianNegotiations\\_0.pdf](https://phap.org/system/files/article_pdf/Herrero-HumanitarianNegotiations_0.pdf).

Locally, NGOs can lend their perceived reliability and neutrality in order to complement the official humanitarian diplomacy of states and IOs.<sup>234</sup> In keeping their diplomatic activities purely humanitarian and locally focused, NGOs can serve as influence brokers in these instances.<sup>235</sup> They can create safe platforms that encourage debate, and subsequent compliance, with peace agreements that are being brokered on the official levels.<sup>236</sup> When it comes to grassroots operations diplomacy, NGOs are considered the “new diplomats or the managers of another kind of diplomacy.”<sup>237</sup>

### 2.6.3 Coordination Amongst all Actors

This section on actors began with a note on coordination, and attention must be brought back to this important matter. The practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is only effective when there exists coordination amongst state and non-state actors on both global and local levels.<sup>238</sup> For non-state actors, coordination leads to greater credibility and influence, a powerful alternative to political muscle. In contexts that require political will (i.e. complex humanitarian crises or strategic initiatives such as disaster risk reduction), non-state actors are most effective in diplomacy when they collectively address issues. This unified voice gives individual NGOs greater access to influence relevant debates.<sup>239</sup>

At a high-level, coordination is most commonly initiated by IOs. This type of inter-agency coordination has proven successful, even in highly complex

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<sup>234</sup> Frits Kalshoven, *Assisting the Victims of Armed Conflict and Other Disasters* (New York: Springer Netherlands, 1989), 47.

<sup>235</sup> Melissa Labonte, *Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms, Strategic Framing, and Intervention: Lessons for the Responsibility to Protect* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 55-56.

<sup>236</sup> Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), 145.

<sup>237</sup> Kalshoven, *Assisting the Victims*, 47.

<sup>238</sup> Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 359.

<sup>239</sup> An example is the involvement of NGOs in the Hyogo Framework. See Roeder and Simard, *Diplomacy and Negotiation*, 2; IFRC, “Disaster Risk Reduction,” 22.

humanitarian and political contexts.<sup>240</sup> Because of the need for coordination, the ICRC has positioned itself in recent years as the vanguard agency in *humanitarian diplomacy*, proffering courses on diplomacy and offering to coordinate diplomatic activities with other partners who acknowledge their unique role and status on the international scene.<sup>241</sup> In determining policy and considering ways to address humanitarian issues, state actors are increasingly learning to listen to IOs and NGOs who can gather information and offer insights from the field perspective, which are necessary for good diplomacy.<sup>242</sup>

## 2.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to explore what is known about the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action. It is evident diplomatic function has always played a definitive role in the humanitarian domain. The practice of diplomacy has grown quietly alongside the construction of the humanitarian apparatus.

Despite increasing awareness of the role diplomacy plays in humanitarian action, there are gaps in the collective knowledge of the topic. As state and non-state actors continue to redefine both their individual roles and the parameters of the practice, questions arise about how to best coordinate diplomatic function. Identifying the role of diplomacy becomes most helpful when it is conceptualized into something humanitarian actors can apply. The practice is not currently strategically coordinated within institutions and amongst the greater humanitarian community; therefore, individual organizations define and implement their *humanitarian diplomacy* policies differently. The underlying problem explaining the gaps is the lack of conceptualization of the practice.

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<sup>240</sup> David Morton, "Steep Learning Curves in the DPRK," in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 194-214.

<sup>241</sup> For strategy, see IFRC, "Strategy 2020," 13-17. For training, see International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Online Course in Humanitarian Diplomacy," International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, <http://www.ifrc.org/en/get-involved/learning-education-training/certified-professional-development-courses/online-course-in-humanitarian-diplomacy/>.

<sup>242</sup> Roeder and Simard, *Diplomacy and Negotiation*, 2.



A striking observation of this systematic review is the fact that diplomacy has become so much part of the today's humanitarian fabric that state and non-state actors have inherently adopted the term *humanitarian diplomacy* to describe and differentiate the practice from other types of diplomacy. The evidence presented in this chapter explains both the prevalence of the practice as well as the particular characteristics of *humanitarian diplomacy*.

Diplomatic function in humanitarian action has become prevalent because of necessity. Mounting evidence suggests that humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian effectiveness are fundamentally interconnected. Although actors aim to achieve different objectives with their practice of diplomacy, literature consistently points to one grand goal behind these objectives: aid effectiveness. Diplomacy is essential to designing, implementing, and safeguarding effective humanitarian activities. To that end, the empirical link between diplomacy and humanitarian effectiveness explains the prevalence of the practice.

Those engaged in diplomacy in humanitarian action are increasingly referring to the practice as *humanitarian diplomacy*, because, despite varied definitions of the idea and operationalization of the practice, there are essentially three common characteristics. Firstly, today's practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is best described as multi-dimensional. The quantitative text analysis employed by this systematic review identified subtle yet significant shifts in the understanding and implementation of this particular type of diplomacy. 125 years ago, the practice was one-dimensional: single actor (state), single purpose (protection), single basis (moral), and single context (war). Today, numerous state and non-state actors on local, national, and global levels engage in official and informal diplomatic function in different humanitarian contexts. Secondly, diplomacy in humanitarian action is a shared responsibility. This study has revealed the interdependence amongst global and local actors in effective aid delivery. The multiple actors do not practice diplomacy in a vacuum. For example, the elements of localization and collaboration speak to the reality that much depends on the actors' ability to engage local communities in aid programming. Since humanitarian assistance is a collective activity, its effectiveness depends greatly on a social contract rather than on formal

agreements. Thirdly, the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is a complementary tool. In fact, *humanitarian diplomacy* is rarely a stand-alone programmatic activity, but a tool for ensuring humanitarian programming is implemented properly.

In preparation for the next chapter, there are several key takeaways. As prevalent as diplomatic function is in humanitarian action, there exists a lack of conceptualization. Yet the evidence presented in this literature review might also hold the clues that can address the problem, namely, how to conceptualize the humanitarian diplomatic process. Similar to the characteristics of the multi-track diplomacy concept in conflict resolution, state and non-state actors in humanitarian action share the responsibility of practicing complementary, and multi-dimensional diplomatic function. When considering the MTD concept, findings suggest an effective peace process, like *humanitarian diplomacy*, requires multi-stakeholder engagement on local and global levels. In the next chapter, the reader will learn that the peace process, just like humanitarian effectiveness, depends on the international community to collaboratively share diplomatic space, including unofficial local actors. Therefore, it is time to present the third building block, namely multi-track diplomacy, in order to determine what elements of MTD, along with the other evidence of this research, can inform the conceptualization and operationalization of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action.

## *Chapter 3*

# **New Conceptualization: Multi-Track Diplomacy for the Humanitarian Context**

### **3.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Diplomacy is the management of relations through communication. This research has been occupied with how best to theorize and manage the flow of information triggered by the practice of humanitarian diplomacy. More exactly, as aid effectiveness is the primary goal of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, the investigation centers on whether conceptualizing and operationalizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD improves aid delivery. The previous chapter presented evidence that diplomacy in humanitarian action is practiced by a diverse set of state and non-state actors on local, national, and global levels in order to deliver effective humanitarian assistance. A common thread through the research findings thus far is that aid effectiveness depends on actors' ability to engage (i.e. diplomacy) local (i.e. localization) communities in a participatory (i.e. collaboration) fashion. This is an important point because the premise of this

research is that humanitarian diplomacy must be conceptualized in a particular way to improve aid effectiveness. The previous chapter uncovered several elements leading to the conclusion that considering recent developments in the peace process relative to diplomacy might be helpful, namely the focus on local community engagement and inclusion of official and informal actors in the process.

This chapter seeks to determine whether principles from the MTD framework can shed light on how best to conceptualize and operationalize humanitarian diplomacy. The premise of MTD is that the peace process is an intricate system in which diplomatic function and space are shared by a variety of actors.<sup>243</sup> Introducing, empowering, and equipping a variety of actors can complement diplomatic efforts. On the other hand, the lack of coordination, accountability, and a proper way to measure effectiveness leaves room for improving this concept. Since MTD functions effectively only when diplomatic activities are coordinated, any incompatibility (e.g. different mandates or an inflexible, overly principled approach) will have a direct impact on the outcome of a negotiation.

Firstly, this chapter provides an overview of diplomacy (3.2). This section also considers the influence globalization, shifting trends in conflict, and the democratization of diplomacy had on the development and recognition of the tracks of diplomacy concept. Secondly, the MTD concept, the third research variable of this study, is presented along with nine commonly recognized tracks of diplomacy (3.3). Thirdly, inasmuch as the third sub-question seeks to ascertain which elements of the MTD concept can inform the conceptualization and operationalization of humanitarian multi-track diplomacy, the relevance of the MTD theory is discussed (3.4).

Fourthly, HMTD, the researcher's conceptualization of the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is introduced (3.5). The purpose of this section is to systematically aggregate the evidence on humanitarian diplomacy,

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<sup>243</sup> "What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?," Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, accessed June 9, 2016, <http://imtd.org/about/what-is-multi-track-diplomacy/>.

humanitarian effectiveness, and MTD in order to formulate and rationalize the HMTD concept.

The reader is introduced to the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O) —domain, identity, privacy, localization, and, objective (3.6). These classifications inform how humanitarians develop their diplomatic strategy. Then in section (3.7), the reader will learn why humanitarians prefer consensus-based diplomatic tools and how they practice them. Building on the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O), four diplomatic tools (dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion) are presented. These tools in the practitioner's toolbox are only effective when utilized for the proper purpose; therefore, dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion are positioned on a consensus to coercion continuum. At the end of this chapter the reader will be prepared to follow this research into its next phase: the development of a methodology to operationalize the HMTD concept.

### **3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMACY**

Diplomacy can be described as “the peaceful dialogue and interaction between political units.”<sup>244</sup> Traditionally, the function of diplomacy was only carried out by states.<sup>245</sup> Governments aspire to achieve their foreign policy goals through diplomatic methods, using communication and negotiation as the primary means through which to resolve conflict.<sup>246</sup> States have principally used diplomacy to

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<sup>244</sup> Nigro, Jr., “Theory and Practice,” 195.

<sup>245</sup> Teresa La Porte, “The Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Non-State Actors and the Public Diplomacy Concept,” *Public Diplomacy Theory and Conceptual Issues*, ISA Annual Convention (April, 2012), <http://files.isanet.org/ConferenceArchive/58816b94a39845d9a5b618ae52e7c80c.pdf>; Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “diplomacy,” accessed June 9, 2016, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomacy>.

<sup>246</sup> Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 10; Marija Manojlovic and Celia Helen Thorheim, *Crossroads of Diplomacy: New Challenges, New Solutions*, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 13 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, October, 2007), 5, [http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20071000\\_cdsp\\_paper\\_manojlovic.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20071000_cdsp_paper_manojlovic.pdf).

manage their relationships with neighboring states and the international community as a whole.<sup>247</sup> Diplomacy is seen as a tool for implementing a state's foreign policy and reinforcing its political standing in the world.<sup>248</sup> Essentially only one type of diplomacy has existed in traditional thought: official, bilateral, state-to-state diplomacy.<sup>249</sup>

Diplomacy had been anchored in a 17<sup>th</sup> century notion of statehood, but a growing acknowledgment emerged that diplomacy must be adapted to remain relevant and practical.<sup>250</sup> Those criticizing traditional diplomacy argue the practice is static and ceremonious.<sup>251</sup> To them, conventional diplomacy relies too heavily on bi-lateral rather than multi-lateral processes and is slowed by cumbersome bureaucracy.<sup>252</sup> Others argue that, below the surface, diplomacy has adjusted to the landscape in which it is required to operate, and has proven to be resilient and adaptable.<sup>253</sup> Relevant to this research are three contributing factors that have directly impacted diplomacy's operating environment and, incidentally, paved the way for the emergence of MTD: globalization, shifting trends in modern conflict, and the democratization of diplomacy in a variety of arenas. These factors will be discussed in the next sections.

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<sup>247</sup> *The ABC of Diplomacy* (Bern: Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 2008), 3, [https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/GlossarezurAusse npolitik/ABC-Diplomatie\\_en.pdf](https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/publications/GlossarezurAusse npolitik/ABC-Diplomatie_en.pdf).

<sup>248</sup> Fattah Moataz Fattah, "Diplomacy" (Lansing: Central Michigan University), accessed December 18, 2014, <http://www.chsbs.cmich.edu/fattah/courses/usf/formal diplomacy.htm>.

<sup>249</sup> Nigro, Jr., "Theory and Practice," 195.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>251</sup> Jan Hennings, "The Semiotics of Diplomatic Dialogue: Pomp and Circumstance in Tsar Peter I's Visit to Vienna in 1698," *The International History Review* 30, no. 3 (2008): 515–44, doi:10.1080/07075332.2008.10415484.

<sup>252</sup> Costas M. Constantinou, Pauline Kerr, and Paul Sharp, eds., *The SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* (London: SAGE Publications, 2016), 72.

<sup>253</sup> Strobe Talbott, "Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner's Perspective," *Foreign Policy*, no. 108 (Autumn, 1997): paragraph 15, doi:10.2307/1149090; Manojlovic and Thorheim, *Crossroads of Diplomacy*, 5.

### 3.2.1.1 Globalization

Diplomacy has not been immune to globalization's far-reaching impact.<sup>254</sup>

Globalization emphasizes the interconnectedness and interdependence of people and states.<sup>255</sup> It is the “deterritorialization of political, economic and social space.”<sup>256</sup> Globalization has united people, politics, economy, and society beyond their citizen identity. Many people participate in advocating global causes such as climate change and human rights. As a result, states and citizens are directly interacting with one another more frequently. Governments, however, have proven slow adapting to rapid change as their approaches are often incompatible with the demands brought by the trend of globalization. States are having difficulty responding to transnational issues through traditional diplomatic measures. Key state actors are beginning to supplement hard power with collaborative, multidimensional, and cooperative partnerships.<sup>257</sup>

The increased contact brought on through globalization has influenced many aspects of politics, society, and economy.<sup>258</sup> Francis Campbell notes globalization has compelled state actors to recognize the role of unofficial actors.<sup>259</sup> This is most noticeable in the sharing of diplomatic space. Even though state actors are still directly negotiating with official counterparts, at times they are sitting at the table with non-state actors actively influencing negotiations through a variety of direct and indirect channels.<sup>260</sup> Once self-determining, official diplomacy is increasingly dependent on external influences that can sway an

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<sup>254</sup> Hainsfurther, “Globalization of Diplomacy”; Talbott, “Globalization and Diplomacy,” paragraph 15.

<sup>255</sup> “Health Topics: Globalization,” World Health Organization, accessed July 21, 2017, <http://www.who.int/topics/globalization/en/>.

<sup>256</sup> Weiss, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 60.

<sup>257</sup> Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 1, 284.

<sup>258</sup> “Areas of Work: Globalization,” Global Policy Forum, accessed June 10, 2016, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization.html>.

<sup>259</sup> Francis Campbell, “Has Globalization Changed the Nature of Diplomacy?” (lecture, Cambridge University: Ethical Standards in Public Life, February 20, 2015), 6, <http://www.vhi.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/resources-folder/campbell-2015>.

<sup>260</sup> Hainsfurther, “The Globalization of Diplomacy.”

agreement. The increased contact and shared diplomatic space brought on by globalization have caused states to amend their policies and approaches to diplomatic interactions.<sup>261</sup> Once rather cleanly compartmentalized, diplomacy and domestic policy within states today are often intermingled.<sup>262</sup>

Globalization has also impacted how diplomats approach conflict resolution.<sup>263</sup> Today, peace processes that are initiated and dominated by Western governments are considered interventionist, inefficient, and incompatible with the demands of today's globalized world. These top-down approaches exclude civil society from contributing to and participating in peace-building and development initiatives that depend on local acceptance and involvement for lasting success.<sup>264</sup> Recognizing the need for other actors to be involved and empowered to complement negotiations in a globalized world, Joseph Montville introduced the concept of Track II diplomacy, which is discussed in the next section of this chapter.<sup>265</sup>

### **3.2.1.2 Shifting Trends in Conflict**

A second factor changing the environment for diplomacy is how the type of conflict has changed. The principal function of diplomacy has traditionally been international (state to state) conflict resolution.<sup>266</sup> Yet non-international armed

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<sup>261</sup> "Areas of Work: Globalization."

<sup>262</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *World Peace Foundation and Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, International Organization 43, no. 3 (1988), 431, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706785>.

<sup>263</sup> Hugh Miall, "Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task," in *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook*, eds. Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, and Norbert Ropers (Berlin: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 67–90, [http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/miall\\_handbook.pdf](http://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/miall_handbook.pdf).

<sup>264</sup> Camilla Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka: A Role for Civil Society?," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 2 (March, 2003): 196, doi:10.1177/0022343303040002004.

<sup>265</sup> William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, "Foreign Policy According to Freud," *Foreign Policy*, no. 45 (1981): 145–57, doi:10.2307/1148317.

<sup>266</sup> Manojlovic and Thorheim, *Crossroads of Diplomacy*, 5.



conflicts are the most commonly occurring type of conflict today.<sup>267</sup> Conventional diplomacy has proven inadequate in resolving these prevalent types of conflicts.<sup>268</sup>

Increased intrastate conflicts inspired Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald to develop the MTD framework.<sup>269</sup> International diplomacy struggled to be successful in resolving non-international armed conflict. Inasmuch as non-international conflicts involve state and armed non-state actors, it is not surprising that only one third of civil conflict was resolved through the involvement of official diplomacy in peace agreements.<sup>270</sup> Alarming about the prevalence of civil conflict today is that civilians are becoming primary targets.<sup>271</sup> Civilian deaths in previous wars represented about 5% of the total deaths. Today, 90% of conflict fatalities are civilian.<sup>272</sup>

Increasingly states are no longer the main actors in conflicts, and as a result non-state actors are increasingly crucial to the peace process.<sup>273</sup> Here lies a significant challenge. Often this type of conflict limits access and, henceforth, the

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<sup>267</sup> In addition, research shows that since the end of World War II five times more people have died as a result of internal conflict than from interstate wars. In the last 70 years there have been over 120 civil conflicts, but only 25 interstate wars. Lisa Trei, "In Post-Cold War Era, Civil Wars' Causes Misunderstood Post-Colonial Conflicts in Small, Weak States More to Blame than Ethnic, Religious Strife," Stanford University, accessed June 10, 2016, <http://news.stanford.edu/news/2002/september25/civilwar-925.html>.

<sup>268</sup> Scott M. Thomas, *The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: The Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century*, Culture and Religion in International Relations (New York: Springer, 2005), 14.

<sup>269</sup> "What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?."

<sup>270</sup> Roy Licklider, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (September 1995): 681, doi:10.2307/2082982; Michelle Mack, "Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts," (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, February 2008), 17, <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0923.htm>.

<sup>271</sup> Reed M. Wood, Jacob D. Kathman, and Stephen E. Gent, "Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts," *Journal of Peace Research* 49, no. 5 (September 28, 2012): 647–60, doi:10.1177/0022343312449032.

<sup>272</sup> UNICEF, "Patterns in Conflict: Civilians Are Now the Target," accessed June 10, 2016, <http://www.unicef.org/graca/patterns.htm>.

<sup>273</sup> John Davies and Edward (Edy) Kaufman, *Second Track Citizens' Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 2.

involvement of external official or unofficial negotiators.<sup>274</sup> It is often in the interests of states facing such internal conflict to label the conflict as an internal disturbance to limit the role of international diplomatic actors.<sup>275</sup> And, when non-state armed actors are referred to as terrorists, diplomacy is quickly substituted with counter-terror measures.<sup>276</sup> As a result, diplomacy is less often utilized in conflict resolution. Kovacs and Svensson, for example, note that military intervention, once a last-resort measure after exhausting all diplomatic options, is becoming the dominant means to end conflict.<sup>277</sup> The tendency to turn to armed intervention has not proven successful in securing peace. The nature of civil conflicts requires diplomatic engagement involving different actors.<sup>278</sup> The peace process must be approached in a multidimensional manner, taking place on multiple tracks of official and non-official diplomacy.<sup>279</sup>

### **3.2.1.3 Democratization of Diplomacy**

A third factor affecting modern diplomacy is the democratization of democracy. As previously noted, diplomacy has become more collaborative due to the influence of globalization. As a result, diplomatic space and function are often shared amongst official and unofficial actors. Democratized diplomacy, interconnected with the previous factor, now emphasizes that diplomacy and foreign policy should be collaborative and makes space for non-official actors to influence the output. This means the public expects access to information, updates

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<sup>274</sup> Mack, "Increasing Respect," 15.

<sup>275</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>276</sup> Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Isak Svensson, "The Return of Victories? The Growing Trend of Militancy in Ending Armed Conflicts" (paper, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, September, 2013), 2, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/8b5c9fb5-9173-47da-969f-28d8124cbc67.pdf>.

<sup>277</sup> Kovacs and Svensson, "Return of Victories?," 7.

<sup>278</sup> Jeffrey Haynes, *Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics*, Routledge Handbooks (Abingdon: Routledge, 200), 274.

<sup>279</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, *Conflict Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: Principles, Methods, and Approaches* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 149.

on negotiations, and the opportunity to participate in policy development<sup>280</sup>

Diplomatic responsibilities are shared by state and non-state actors and the preference is to rely on soft power instead of hard power.<sup>281</sup>

In the aftermath of World War II, James Marshall suggested that despite the democratization of states, diplomacy had not yet been liberated. The diplomatic and military branches of a government, to Marshall, seemed to be the least open to democratizing all elements of a state.<sup>282</sup> Giandomenico Picco, an expert in conflict resolution, shares the sentiment that to this day diplomacy remains monopolized by government.<sup>283</sup> Specifically, the concerns are that the confidential and professionalized approaches to diplomacy do not always guarantee peace. The pervasive privacy of the diplomatic circles is inconsistent with the value of accountability to and representation of the public.<sup>284</sup> In today's globalized context, diplomacy's code of confidentiality is facing increased scrutiny and officials are slowly adapting when and how they communicate with the public.<sup>285</sup> For some this is not enough; there is a call for diplomats to move away from informing citizens after the fact, and involve them in negotiations from

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<sup>280</sup> Richard Grant, "The Democratisation of Diplomacy: Negotiating with the Internet," Netherlands Institute of International Relations (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, September, 2005), 5, [https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050900\\_cli\\_paper\\_dip\\_issue100.pdf](https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050900_cli_paper_dip_issue100.pdf).

<sup>281</sup> Aleksandar Plavšin, "Advantages And Disadvantages Of Democratization Of Diplomacy In The Conditions Of New Technologies," *Socioeconomica: Journal for Theory and Practice of Socio-economic Development* 3, no. 5 (July 5, 2014), 145, <http://socioeconomica.info/xmlui/handle/11171/136>.

<sup>282</sup> James Marshall, "International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy," *The American Political Science Review* 43, no. 1 (February, 1949), 83, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1950316>.

<sup>283</sup> Giandomenico Picco, "A New International System?," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* (2005), 32, [http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/04-picco\\_\\_10\\_4\\_05.pdf](http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/04-picco__10_4_05.pdf).

<sup>284</sup> Marshall, "International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy," 89.

<sup>285</sup> Vladimir Fedorovič Petrovskij, "Diplomacy as an Instrument of Good Governance," in *Modern Diplomacy*, ed. Jovan Kurbalija (Academic Training Institute, 1998), 40, [http://site.iugaza.edu.ps/wmodallal/files/2010/02/Modern\\_Diplomacy.pdf](http://site.iugaza.edu.ps/wmodallal/files/2010/02/Modern_Diplomacy.pdf).

the outset.<sup>286</sup>

Not all welcome progressive developments in diplomacy. Traditionalists argue state diplomacy, despite its limitations, is more important than ever and, therefore, must remain true to its original design. They argue against inclusiveness in diplomatic practice. To them, non-traditional actors erode diplomacy's establishment and threaten the stability of international relations. There are those within the diplomatic corps who seek to delegitimize unofficial actors' practice of diplomacy.<sup>287</sup> Official diplomats are left with striking a delicate balance between honoring confidentiality with their counterparts and remaining accountable to their public base, all while finding pragmatic and peaceful resolutions amenable to all stakeholders. Globalization and the democratization of diplomacy will limit the role and effectiveness of official diplomacy at the negotiation table.<sup>288</sup>

Early on, Marshall anticipated and countered these apprehensions. He felt that a "cult of expertness" was prevalent within the ranks of his colleagues in the diplomatic corps.<sup>289</sup> Their resistance to sharing diplomatic space and function, as well as their deliberate undermining of non-official actors, was a sign of pride and defensiveness. He envisioned a shared diplomatic space that included individual actors and would potentially lead to greater success in peace mediation practices.<sup>290</sup> Today, governments are trying to find ways to not only inform, but also involve the public in the diplomatic process.<sup>291</sup> An early example came in 1945 when the US administration invited delegations from civic groups representing forty million Americans to attend conferences and to advise the US administration on policy development. Their involvement contributed to the US joining the United Nations and the charter having such a strong emphasis on

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<sup>286</sup> Marshall, "International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy," 83.

<sup>287</sup> Paul Meerts, *Diplomatic Negotiation: Essence and Evolution* (The Hague: Clingendael, 2015), 15, [https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Diplomatic\\_Negotiation\\_Web\\_2015.pdf](https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Diplomatic_Negotiation_Web_2015.pdf).

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>289</sup> Marshall, "International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy," 85.

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid.*, 85.

<sup>291</sup> Grant, "Democratisation of Diplomacy," 5.

human rights and education.<sup>292</sup> Today's sentiment, although often more defined in rhetoric than in practice, is that diplomats should view their primary role as facilitators rather than protectors of the diplomatic process. As facilitators, they are representatives of the public's interests, values, and needs and, therefore, their participation in the diplomatic process is essential.<sup>293</sup>

The democratization of diplomacy paved the way for non-traditional actors to play an increasing role in resolving conflict. Today they are supporting agreements, dialoguing with the public, and encouraging reconciliation on all levels.<sup>294</sup> More than ever, many states have accepted the reality that they must share diplomatic space with non-state actors.<sup>295</sup> Non-traditional actors, according to Picco, (e.g. NGOs, individuals) now have access to the diplomatic space and are bringing with them, among many other contributions, a level of credibility that had been previously absent in official diplomatic practice.<sup>296</sup> External stakeholders and global citizens are increasingly placing more trust in non-state actors (e.g. Amnesty International, Greenpeace) whom they view more likely to influence policy and behavior than state actors.<sup>297</sup>

These new powerful actors, however, balance their newfound power with an ability to also gain support on the grass roots level. Their inclusive, local, and empowering approach is perceived as credible by local constituents who believe non-state actors can bring a balanced, at times neutral, assessment and perspective, and include facilitators, participants, and representatives from the local community in a debate or mediation.<sup>298</sup> Marshall played a crucial role in stimulating a debate that eventually led to Track II diplomacy. His thoughts on the topic serve as a good summary of the development of diplomacy: "[if it is] men

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<sup>292</sup> Gideon Baker and David Chandler, *Global Civil Society: Contested Futures*, Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 35.

<sup>293</sup> Charles W. Kegley, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 12<sup>th</sup> ed. (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2008), 492.

<sup>294</sup> Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka," 195.

<sup>295</sup> Plavštin, "Advantages And Disadvantages," 146.

<sup>296</sup> Picco, "A New International System?," 32.

<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 61.

rather than states that are the ultimate foundation of good will, then every possible means must be explored to enable men to plan and participate in the expression of international good will.”<sup>299</sup> The vision of inclusive diplomacy is slowly being realized. Today, the MTD framework, for example, provides an actionable framework through which the peace process is viewed as a dynamic system involving a variety of official and informal actors. The way for the MTD concept was paved by the expansion of diplomacy into two separate tracks that will next be discussed.

### 3.2.2 Tracks of Diplomacy

Globalization, conflict, and the democratization of diplomacy are key trends that have influenced diplomacy to be viewed as a boundary-spanning activity.<sup>300</sup> Underestimated in previous decades, non-traditional actors’ involvement in conflict resolution is more accepted today.<sup>301</sup> Conflict resolution is seen as a living system. The peace process is approached with unique types and levels of diplomacy along with a comprehensive set of participants.<sup>302</sup> The TOD classify diplomacy into two primary tracks: official (Track I) and unofficial (Track II) (see Figure 3.1). These tracks are also referred to as Track I and Track II.<sup>303</sup> The

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<sup>299</sup> Marshall, “International Affairs: Citizen Diplomacy,” 90.

<sup>300</sup> Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2008), 44-45.

<sup>301</sup> Picco, “A New International System?,” 32.

<sup>302</sup> Diplomacy as a System: Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*, Kumarian Press Books for a World That Works 3rd sub ed. (West Hartford, CN: Kumarian Press, 1996), 11. Types of Diplomacy: Tobias Böhmelt, “The Effectiveness of Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies in Third-Party Interventions,” *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 2 (February, 2010): 167, doi:10.1177/0022343309356488; “Glossary: Tracks of Diplomacy,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed April 18, 2016, <http://glossary.usip.org/resource/tracks-diplomacy>.

Levels of Diplomacy: Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 28-29.

<sup>303</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 168. Some refer to Track I as “D” Diplomacy and Track II as “d” Diplomacy. See Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 12.

premise was that effective conflict resolution always involves official and unofficial actors, and it takes place on separate, sometimes intersecting, paths.<sup>304</sup> The TOD became the foundation on which MTD was later developed and expanded.<sup>305</sup>




Figure 3.1 Tracks of diplomacy. The TOD theory classifies diplomacy into two tracks: official (Track I) and unofficial (Track II). Track II activities are often seen as complementary to those of Track I.

The idea of TOD emerged in 1981 when Joseph Montville introduced Track II Diplomacy as unofficial, informal communication by outside or third party actors, including private citizens.<sup>306</sup> As a career diplomat, he recognized that a second track of diplomacy could complement official diplomatic dialogue that was often obstructed in times of conflict.<sup>307</sup> While others did not use this term, movements such as the interactive problem-solving workshop (Burton, Fisher, and

<sup>304</sup> Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution*, 140.

<sup>305</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 2.

<sup>306</sup> Charles Homans, “Track II Diplomacy: A Short History,” *Foreign Policy*, June 20, 2011, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/06/20/track-ii-diplomacy-a-short-history/>. McDonald offers Montville as the inventor of Track II diplomacy. “What is Multi-Track Diplomacy?.”

<sup>307</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 1.

Kelman) influenced the conceptualization of Track II diplomacy.<sup>308</sup> Governments initially dismissed it as “freelance diplomacy.”<sup>309</sup> Yet an acknowledgment materialized that the emergence of non-traditional conflicts on the global stage required a shift in approach.<sup>310</sup> Today, states not only tolerate but also depend on (and initiate) the TOD approach.<sup>311</sup>

The following definition of TOD identifies the parties and what they attempt to accomplish. The TOD can be seen

as diplomatic initiatives by outside state or non-state parties to transform a dispute by communicating information, proposing new solutions, and directly influencing the crisis using carrots and sticks that can help generate movement towards potentially overlapping bargaining positions.<sup>312</sup>

The definition above indicates that there is outside involvement of multiple actors. As early as the 1960s it was recognized that bi-lateral, third party involvement in a conflict setting could help restart and maintain communication.<sup>313</sup> This, along with providing analysis, can help parties reflect on the conflict’s roots and triggers.<sup>314</sup> With no standard to evaluate third party involvement in a conflict, little is understood about the effectiveness of outside mediation.<sup>315</sup> The most commonly accepted view is that effectiveness depends on complementary tracks of

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<sup>308</sup> Diana Chigas, “Track II (Citizen) Diplomacy,” *Beyond Intractability*, eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Boulder: University of Colorado Conflict Information Consortium, 2003), <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/track2-diplomacy>.

<sup>309</sup> Homans, “Track II Diplomacy.”

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 170.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid., 167.

<sup>313</sup> Christopher Mitchell, “From Controlled Communication to Problem Solving: The Origins of Facilitated Conflict Resolution,” *International Journal of Peace Studies* 6, no. 1 (Spring 2001), [http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6\\_1/Mitchell2.htm](http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Mitchell2.htm).

<sup>314</sup> Ronald J. Yalem, “Controlled Communication and Conflict Resolution,” *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 3–4 (September 1, 1971), 266, doi:10.1177/002234337100800306.

<sup>315</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 169.



diplomacy.<sup>316</sup> Supporters of this approach credit the TOD framework as the key to settling conflicts, citing its greater flexibility and versatility compared to traditional state-initiated diplomacy.<sup>317</sup>

The above definition of the TOD classifies state and non-state actors as separate actors. State actors represent official or Track I diplomacy. They practice formal government-to-government diplomacy.<sup>318</sup> Track I, more broadly, also incorporates official actors from IOs (e.g. United Nations) and political associations (e.g. African Union, Arab League, and European Union).<sup>319</sup> Track I is exclusive to official actors. Track II is inclusive of nongovernmental actors who are involved in unofficial diplomatic activities.<sup>320</sup>

These unofficial actors can be individuals or institutions with the potential to positively influence the peace process. They may be experts, leaders, or decision-influencers that represent, for example, academia, religion, NGOs, or a particular group within civil society. Their primary source of recognition and credibility may be global or local.<sup>321</sup> They share the potential to not be official representatives of a state.<sup>322</sup> They lack the official status, but these actors are known to be creative, open-minded, and inclusive. Additionally, they can dialogue with a variety of stakeholders with fewer constraints than official diplomats.<sup>323</sup>

Track II diplomacy encompasses “unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process.”<sup>324</sup> Independent actors often conduct unofficial

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<sup>316</sup> Julian Thomas Hottinger, “The Relationship Between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy: Choosing to Engage: Armed Groups and Peace Processes,” *Accord 16* (London: Conciliation Resources, 2005), [http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord16\\_13Therelationshipbetweentrackone\\_2005\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord16_13Therelationshipbetweentrackone_2005_ENG.pdf).

<sup>317</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 170.

<sup>318</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”

<sup>319</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 4.

<sup>320</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>321</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 95; “Glossary: Tracks of Diplomacy”

<sup>322</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 73.

<sup>323</sup> “Glossary: Tracks of Diplomacy.”

<sup>324</sup> Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 1.

interactions, which can lead to a lack of coordination and create counterproductive overlap and confusion.<sup>325</sup> Further, there are suggestions that a lack of accountability and responsibility exists amongst Track II actors.<sup>326</sup> There currently does not exist a proper way to measure the effectiveness of the TOD. The defined roles and lines of engagement of Track I and Track II actors are neither satisfactorily clear in theory nor in practice. Practitioners and theorists have agreed that Track II must be more clearly defined and quantified.<sup>327</sup> The gaps between theory and practice can lead to a perceived lack of legitimacy of Track II interventions.<sup>328</sup> There lacks evidence to suggest that TOD can always lead to conflict resolution.<sup>329</sup> Track I actors must learn to recognize the value that Track II can bring and Track II must appreciate the reality that official diplomats often face enormous pressure to find practical solutions.<sup>330</sup>

Although two-thirds of Post-Cold War settlements were the result of a third-party involvement, Track II is still less effective when it is the only track in operation.<sup>331</sup> One observation is that unofficial diplomacy can ease short-term tension, but permanent agreements are not always the natural result.<sup>332</sup> Track II actors seem to maximize; however, the potential to “work together to understand better the dynamics underlying the conflict and how its transformation from violence (or potential violence) to a collaborative process of peacebuilding and sustainable development might be promoted.”<sup>333</sup> Through Track II, “actual or potential conflict can be resolved or eased by appealing to common human

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<sup>325</sup> Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution*, 149.

<sup>326</sup> Hottinger, “Choosing to Engage,” 59.

<sup>327</sup> Peter Jones, *Track Two Diplomacy in Theory and Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 154.

<sup>328</sup> Kristel Gbodossou, “Third-Party Requirements in Track Two: The Theory-Practice Gap within the African Context” (final paper, University of Ottawa, 2014), 37, <http://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/31054>.

<sup>329</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 171.

<sup>330</sup> Jones, *Track Two Diplomacy*, 20-21.

<sup>331</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 180; Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 169.

<sup>332</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 168.

<sup>333</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 3.

capabilities to respond to good will and reasonableness.”<sup>334</sup>

First Track diplomacy carries more clout because of a state’s ability to mobilize resources, including power and influence.<sup>335</sup> Track I actors have at their disposal the “offices, mediation, and sticks and carrots to seek or force an outcome, typically along the win-lose or ‘bargaining’ line.”<sup>336</sup> As the efficacy of the TOD depends on the ability to maximize resources and options, Track I actors who leverage their resources wisely can yield enormous power in the diplomatic process.<sup>337</sup> Despite this, Track I does not work in a vacuum: it is most effective when unofficial actors execute it.<sup>338</sup> For example, former US president Jimmy Carter mediated as an unofficial actor to mitigate the 1994 US-North Korea crisis, but his role was still interpreted by the North Koreans as official.<sup>339</sup> TOD appear to offer promise in negotiating intrastate, ethnic conflicts, an area where traditional diplomacy repeatedly fails.<sup>340</sup>

Second Track diplomacy complements, but does not substitute, official diplomacy. It cannot be viewed as an alternative to official diplomacy because it can contribute resources and opportunities unavailable to Track I counterparts.<sup>341</sup> The complementary nature of Track II is evident in different ways. It can open different channels of communication, including direct interaction with members of civil society, and can assist to overcome cultural divides, something that official diplomacy usually cannot do.<sup>342</sup> Official tracks can quickly reach their limit in identity-based conflicts because parties to conflict can find themselves in an “adversarial frame that is self-perpetuating and mutually destructive.”<sup>343</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Homans, “Track II Diplomacy.”

<sup>335</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 169.

<sup>336</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 24.

<sup>337</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 167.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>340</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 134.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>343</sup> Ronald J. Fisher, “Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse,” *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (May 1, 2001): 307, doi:10.1177/0022343301038003003.

Unofficial diplomacy can assist in this complexity by opening new channels of communication by stimulating constructive dialogue that can lead to mutually agreed-upon solutions.<sup>344</sup> It is suggested that this type of unofficial dialogue is a game changer in hostile deadlocks. Firstly, it has the ability to sustain dialogue well beyond official channels. Secondly, informal communication, analysis, along with pragmatic, inclusive, and needs-based goals, can reduce the tension and trauma that the various parties have.<sup>345</sup>

While classified as different tracks, the TOD do not work independent of one other.<sup>346</sup> To benefit from the complementary nature of the TOD, negotiations have to be coordinated.<sup>347</sup> For example, official diplomacy can provide the political muscle needed at times. Track II, on the other hand, can empower “the socially, economically, and politically disenfranchised groups by giving them a platform from which they can air their views on how peace can be achieved in their own communities or nations.”<sup>348</sup> Including informal actors, traditionally excluded from the peace process, can become a deciding factor in conflict prevention and mediation.<sup>349</sup> By dividing diplomacy into official and unofficial tracks of diplomacy, the TOD theory legitimizes the role that informal actors play in the diplomatic process. The MTD framework expands the two-track theory by introducing multiple informal tracks of diplomacy.

### 3.3 MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

As previously noted, peace agreements exclusively negotiated on official tracks

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<sup>344</sup> Davies and Kaufman, *Second Track*, 3.

<sup>345</sup> Fisher, “Cyprus,” 317.

<sup>346</sup> Hottinger, “Choosing to Engage,” 56.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Jeffrey Mapendere, “Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks,” *Culture Of Peace Online Journal* 2, no. 1 (2000): 66, [http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TrackOneandaHalfDiplomacy\\_Mapendere.pdf](http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TrackOneandaHalfDiplomacy_Mapendere.pdf).

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., 68.

rarely lead to lasting peace.<sup>350</sup> Evidence suggests involvement of a Track II actor has often resulted in preferred outcomes in the peace process.<sup>351</sup> Since the “nongovernmental movement toward peacemaking and peacekeeping has grown exponentially in recent years,” Diamond and McDonald conclude, “the designation of Track Two no longer covered the variety, scope, and depth of citizen involvement.”<sup>352</sup> As a result, the MTD framework expands the TOD concept (see Figure 3.2).<sup>353</sup>




Figure 3.2 Expanded TOD concept. The MTD concept recognizes and involves a diverse set of actors that complement one another to achieve peace. Whereas Track I diplomacy was viewed as the primary track of diplomacy in the TOD Concept, in this model, official diplomacy shares diplomatic space and is not considered more important than others.

MTD emphasizes the important role of informal dialogue between official and non-official actors (e.g. individuals, NGOs, faith-based groups, educational and corporate institutions).<sup>354</sup> By adding additional tracks to the TOD concept, MTD provides a unique perspective on the complex peace process. Diamond and

<sup>350</sup> Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka,” 204.

<sup>351</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 20.

<sup>352</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 4.

<sup>353</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 11.

<sup>354</sup> Scott M. Thomas, “The ‘Levels of Analysis’ and the Future International Politics of Religious Identity,” *Religious Diversity in Canada* (Government of Canada, June 5, 2013), <http://www.horizons.gc.ca/eng/content/%E2%80%99Clevels-analysis%E2%80%99D-and-future-international-politics-religious-identity>.

McDonald describe MTD as,

a conceptual way to view the process of international peacemaking as a living system. It looks at the web of interconnected activities, individuals, institutions, and communities that operate together for a common goal: a world at peace.<sup>355</sup>

MTD looks at conflict in its context. Considering geographic and societal dynamics helps to identify triggers and transformers that are present.<sup>356</sup> As a result, emphasis is placed on local actors and their capacity to influence the peace process.<sup>357</sup> This is important, because the sustainability of peace often depends on an empowered civil society that can prevent violence at its local root, back the terms of an agreement, and play a role in the reconciliation process.<sup>358</sup> While many actors and activities are included within the MTD framework, there are those who argue that their contributions warrant classification into a unique track. For example, there are calls to add the health sector, women, the arts and culture to be classified as additional tracks of diplomacy.<sup>359</sup>

MTD encourages system-wide dialogue on different levels (from local to global).<sup>360</sup> It can be described as “people-to-people” diplomacy. Much of its activity focuses on awareness and empowerment on the community level.<sup>361</sup> MTD activities can unite diverse actors for the common goal of peace. This can reduce “their sense of threat from the adversary group.”<sup>362</sup> As a result, those involved are

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<sup>355</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 1.

<sup>356</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 29.

<sup>357</sup> Ibid., 181-182.

<sup>358</sup> Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka,” 204.

<sup>359</sup> Neil Arya, “Peace through Health I: Development and Use of a Working Model,” *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 20, no. 3 (July, 2004), 255, doi:10.1080/1362369042000248839; Rajender Gupta and Neelam Choudhary, “Unofficial Diplomacy At Work: A Saarc Perspective,” *American International Journal of Research in Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences* (2013), 61.

<sup>360</sup> Austin, Fischer, and Ropers, *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict*.

<sup>361</sup> “Glossary: Multitrack Diplomacy,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed July 24, 2017, <https://www.usip.org/glossary/multitrack-diplomacy>.

<sup>362</sup> Daniel Lieberfeld, “Evaluating the Contributions of Track-two Diplomacy to Conflict Termination in South Africa, 1984-90,” *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 3 (May 1, 2002): 355, doi:10.1177/0022343302039003006.

more likely to more positively represent the peace terms with their constituents.<sup>363</sup> The inclusion of multiple actors can also shed a new light on goals and policies, leading to creative alternatives and solutions.<sup>364</sup> This allows different participants to shape and clarify agreements, and to reduce divisions, mainly on the local level, from the start.

Unofficial diplomacy often paves the way for official diplomacy.<sup>365</sup> From 1984 to 1990, several tracks of diplomacy were utilized to resolve the conflict in South Africa. Informal tracks complemented Track I negotiations by lending legitimacy in the negotiation options and by lobbying for citizens-level support of the process.<sup>366</sup> Multi-party, multi-track approaches appear to play a key role in building trust, which is the first step in resolving conflict and preventing more violence.<sup>367</sup>

Coordination of MTD activities can prove difficult in practice.<sup>368</sup> This was the case in one of the European Union's mediation attempts. A report showed that overlap and misaligned mandates limited the EU's capacity to mediate effectively.<sup>369</sup> When involving civil society in crafting peace agreements, greater emphasis must be placed on proper coordination of diplomatic activities that are taking place in distinctive spaces and amongst different actors.<sup>370</sup> Furthermore, ways must be found to integrate local and international activities and approaches. The peace process in Northern Ireland is a good example of how MTD can be

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<sup>363</sup> Ibid., 355.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid., 358.

<sup>365</sup> Kenneth W. Thompson, *Institutions and Leadership: Prospects for the Future* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987).

<sup>366</sup> Lieberfeld, "Evaluating the Contributions of Track-Two," 355.

<sup>367</sup> Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka," 208.

<sup>368</sup> Fisher, "Cyprus," 328.

<sup>369</sup> Véronique Dudouet and Matteo Dressler, "From Power Mediation to Dialogue Facilitation: Assessing the European Union's Approach to Multi-Track Diplomacy," *Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (Berlin: Berghof Foundation, 2016),

<http://www.woscap.eu/documents/131298403/131553554/Scoping+Study+-+Multitrack+Diplomacy.pdf/9b32d526-8cb0-4c0f-9032-d54653fe6688>.

<sup>370</sup> Sean Byrne, "Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (May 1, 2001): 328, doi:10.1177/0022343301038003004.

operationalized to become “coordinated, complementary, multilevel, and multimodal” activities that deal with a variety of issues, including root causes, at once.<sup>371</sup>

These practical challenges point to theoretical gaps in the MTD concept. Some suggest, “there has been a somewhat uncritical willingness to embrace MTD, without an adequate conceptualization of how activity in the various tracks can fit together.”<sup>372</sup> Searches for critical analyses of MTD have produced very few results. One possible reason is the tendency in literature to use the TOD and MTD terms interchangeably. Secondly, MTD is a relatively new concept that has yet to be thoroughly explored. New research must concentrate on how to best implement and evaluate MTD activities. It must also be noted that the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), which was founded by the developers of the concept (Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond), produces much of today’s literature on the topic.<sup>373</sup> This observation is not a criticism IMTD, for its contributions are commendable, but rather a call for more diverse research.

Today’s MTD model encompasses nine different tracks (see Figure 3.3). McDonald and Diamond emphasize, “no one track is more important than the other, and no one track is independent from the others.”<sup>374</sup> In the next section, these nine tracks are briefly introduced.

### **3.3.1.1 Track 1- Official Diplomacy**

Like the TOD approach, McDonald and Diamond’s MTD framework view Track 1 as official, governmental diplomacy. Here it should be noted that official diplomacy in and of itself is multi-dimensional and operates on multiple-tracks. There are many different levels of actors within government diplomacy who play

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<sup>371</sup> Ibid., 332.

<sup>372</sup> Alex Austin, Martina Fischer, and Norbert Ropers, eds., *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook* (Berlin: Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 86, doi: 10.1007/978-3-663-05642-3.

<sup>373</sup> Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, <http://www.imtd.org/>.

<sup>374</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”



an active role in any given negotiation or peace process.<sup>375</sup> MTD does not contribute new ideas of official diplomacy beyond what has been discussed in the previous section of this chapter. This is because MTD's emphasis has been on the expansion of Track II diplomacy. Worth mentioning is that Track I diplomacy has had to adapt to the shift in the power balance. Firstly, official diplomacy is no longer the only powerful track. Non-official actors, through their increased status and heard voice, can wield carrots and sticks.<sup>376</sup> Secondly, there are times when official diplomacy is dependent on unofficial diplomacy. At times, informal diplomatic activities have set the stage for Track I negotiators who, with grass roots level support, were able to continue high-level talks.<sup>377</sup>




Figure 3.3 Multi-track diplomacy. The MTD conceptualizes the peace process as a system in which several actors and their activities operate interdependently. (Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*.)

<sup>375</sup> Mohammad Younus Fahim, *Diplomacy, The Only Legitimate Way of Conducting International Relations* (printed by author, 2010), 75.

<sup>376</sup> Böhmelt, "Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies," 169.

<sup>377</sup> "Unofficial Communication, Citizen Diplomacy, and Multi-Track Diplomacy," Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 1998, <http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/citdip.htm>.

In conflict mediation, it is of utmost importance to select not only the best-suited actor for a particular activity, but also the most appropriate time for such an engagement.<sup>378</sup> This leads to the conclusion that official actors may not always be the default actors to lead a negotiation. In fact, research concludes that informal tracks of diplomacy can be initiated independent of Track 1.<sup>379</sup>

### **3.3.1.2 Track 2 – Professional Diplomacy**

Track 2, “Professional Diplomacy,” although not official, is organized and described as the “professional nongovernmental action attempting to analyze, prevent, resolve, and manage international conflicts by non-state actors.”<sup>380</sup> This form of unofficial diplomacy can bring healthy perspectives and make significant contributions. For example, while official diplomacy often immediately involves outsiders, non-official professional actors, such as NGOs, tend to emphasize the role that insiders to culture and civil society can play.<sup>381</sup> “Internal ‘third parties’ or indigenous peacemakers” take a long-term, sustainable approach by helping in building the necessary local, social infrastructure to “manage conflict over time.”<sup>382</sup> This is one of the reasons why NGOs play an important, but often overlooked, role in mediating conflict resolution.<sup>383</sup> Their primary function can be “communication-facilitation.”<sup>384</sup>

Especially in intrastate ethnic conflicts, NGOs can build bridges by overcoming stereotypes through cross-community awareness exercises. These activities contribute to overcoming sectarian tension and stereotypes through

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<sup>378</sup> Ibid.

<sup>379</sup> Lee Yaniv, “People-to-People Peace Making: The Role of Citizen Diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” (CPD Best Student Paper Prize in Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, 2013), 5.

<sup>380</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”

<sup>381</sup> Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 182.

<sup>382</sup> Ibid., 28.

<sup>383</sup> Ibid., 8, 182.

<sup>384</sup> Böhmelt, “Tracks of Diplomacy Strategies,” 170.

respectful dialogue that does not exasperate the underlying pressure.<sup>385</sup> Examples of Track 2 actors are the Carter Center, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Harvard Centre of Negotiation, and Institute of Multi Track Diplomacy.<sup>386</sup> These organizations often work in tandem with governments and IOs, an approach that appears to be most effective in settling prolonged, complex conflict.

Some are uncomfortable not as much with the practice of MTD, but with viewing unofficial diplomacy as a form of diplomacy. To them, the designation of “diplomat” should be reserved for officials representing their state.<sup>387</sup> To others, however, the strength of Track 2 diplomacy is the lack of specialized diplomats. While official diplomats, by virtue of their office, often advocate their states’ agendas, informal diplomats tend more naturally to gravitate towards the role of facilitators who empower parties to jointly resolve conflict.<sup>388</sup>

There is a call for non-traditional actors, including humanitarian NGOs, to engage more in MTD activities because these initiatives seem to lead to greater behavior change than traditional methods.<sup>389</sup> It has been noted that humanitarian actors can encourage dialogue and cooperation. Humanitarian activities can build relationships and trust, which become crucial in peacebuilding and peace sustaining campaigns, prior to the beginning of diplomatic dialogue. Humanitarian actors have also contributed to normalizing situations and have the capacity to monitor the status of an agreement.<sup>390</sup> As an example, the ICRC was instrumental in negotiating the opening of supply routes in Sri Lanka. The ICRC’s involvement contributed to an annually observed ceasefire, which enabled the continuation of

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<sup>385</sup> Byrne, “Consociational and Civic Society,” 329.

<sup>386</sup> Ibid., 322.

<sup>387</sup> Jones, *Track Two Diplomacy*, 7.

<sup>388</sup> Herbert C. Kelman, “The Development of Interactive Problem Solving: In John Burton’s Footsteps,” *Political Psychology* 36, no. 2 (April 24, 2015), 251, doi:10.1111/pops.12265.

<sup>389</sup> Adhik Badal, “The Essence of Strategic Peacebuilding in Nepal,” Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy Conflict Perspectives, November 18, 2013, <http://conflictperspectives.imtd.org/index.php/regions/asia/95-the-essence-of-strategic-peacebuilding-in-nepal>.

<sup>390</sup> Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka,” 197.

child vaccination campaigns.<sup>391</sup>

In other conflicts, it has been noted that the benefit of humanitarian actors' involvement is that they tend to look at challenges through long-term lenses. During the peace process, development projects offering a "wide range of related programs, projects and initiatives" can contribute to sustainable community transformation.<sup>392</sup> The professional, informal track promotes localized diplomacy, which is vital in addressing violence where it is often first mobilized. This approach can be effective as "the entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the message, attitudes and behavior of the conflictants."<sup>393</sup>

### **3.3.1.3 Track 3 – Business Diplomacy**

Track 3, according to McDonald and Diamond's framework, is "Peacemaking through Commerce."<sup>394</sup> To them, enterprise can contribute to peace. In this globalized world, corporations have taken to establishing their own diplomacy groups.<sup>395</sup> Corporate diplomacy focuses on the role of companies operating in politically and socially charged situations. This role is still rather undeveloped, but offers significant potential.<sup>396</sup> Much of the discussion about the role of business in conflict centers on the negative impact it can have. There are, for instance, those who argue "the private sector can act as a spur to or generator of conflict."<sup>397</sup> Yet others note the benefit to involving companies in the peace process. Interest in market stability and business continuity can contribute to effective conflict

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<sup>391</sup> Ibid., 204.

<sup>392</sup> Todd Walters, "Case Study: The Evolution of the Balkans Peace Park Project" (Burlington: University of Vermont, Institute for Environmental Diplomacy and Security, August, 2012), 25, <http://www.uvm.edu/ieds/sites/default/files/balkans-peace-park.pdf>.

<sup>393</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>394</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 108.

<sup>395</sup> Hainsfurther, "Globalization of Diplomacy."

<sup>396</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 111.

<sup>397</sup> Nick Killick, V.S. Srikantha, and Canan Gündüz, *The Role of Local Business in Peacebuilding* (Berlin: Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2005), 3, <http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2593/>.

mitigation.<sup>398</sup> Some parties to conflict view corporations as more credible than official actors. For example, in the prolonged conflict in Colombia a commander in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia noted “We do not trust the government because there [sic] are corrupt and ineffective...but we do trust the business community because we know they have self-enlightened interests and can deliver on their promises.”<sup>399</sup>

The private sector has the capacity to contribute to the peace process. When coordinated properly, these actors can influence the peace process, but there are those who believe corporations, who are driven by fiscal bottom lines, must be transparent about their motivations to engage in the peace process.<sup>400</sup> McDonald and Diamond recognize the strengths and weaknesses of this track. Through business involvement, individuals can gain access to the economy, but can also be exploited by it.<sup>401</sup> One suggestion is for corporate diplomacy to focus on funding other tracks of diplomacy.<sup>402</sup> Here lies one area of potential overlap with other tracks, notably Track 8: Diplomacy through Funding.

#### **3.3.1.4 Track 4 – Citizen Diplomacy**

Track 4, “Citizen Diplomacy,” encompasses the involvement of private individuals in the peace process. The primary function of citizen diplomacy is advocacy and it takes place through “citizens diplomacy, exchange programs, private voluntary organizations, non-governmental organizations, and special interest groups.”<sup>403</sup> Proponents of this track of diplomacy believe that, as global citizens, individuals have the right and obligation to engage in one-on-one

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<sup>398</sup> Ulrike Joras, *Companies in Peace Processes: A Guatemalan Case Study*, Culture and Social Practice (New York: Transcript-Verlag, 2015), 16, <http://www.transcript-verlag.de/Flyer/download/ordernumber/690>.

<sup>399</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>400</sup> Candace L. White, “Exploring the Role of Private-Sector Corporations in Public Diplomacy,” *Public Relations Inquiry* 4, no. 3 (September 1, 2015), 318, doi:10.1177/2046147X15614883.

<sup>401</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 113.

<sup>402</sup> Ibid.

<sup>403</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”

diplomatic interaction.<sup>404</sup> The goal is to overcome barriers and stigmas and to establish commonality, community, and cooperation through personal relationships.<sup>405</sup> When citizens can show other people the interconnectedness (or system) of conflict, this will help address underlying issues to conflict in the community, reduce stress and frustrations, and create a more supportive environment in the peace process.<sup>406</sup>

In practice, there are challenges. McDonald and Diamond recognize the difficulty to harness the potential and coordinate the activities of this track. Traveling to a foreign destination is only one part of citizens' diplomacy. Citizens on the other end of the globe must embrace their guests' message and be willing to become citizen diplomats themselves. Citizen diplomats, who themselves have experienced conflict and are involved on the grass-roots level to bring resolution, remain "preoccupied with their day-to-day survival."<sup>407</sup> As a result, participants on the local level feel powerless.<sup>408</sup> In post-conflict Sri Lanka, however, a significant improvement could be noted by taking the civil society approach of looking at small, local examples of peace on a personal or local level. There is potential for citizens to travel abroad and advocate for local peers to participate in the peace process. The belief exists that peace programs that target the local level can affect regional and national change. Harmony on the local level, which begins with individuals and their families, is seen as a catalyst for peace on high levels.<sup>409</sup>

### **3.3.1.5 Track 5 – Academic Diplomacy**

"Peacemaking through Learning" includes research, teaching, and learning initiatives. These activities "seek to provide training in practitioner skills such as

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<sup>404</sup> "Understanding Citizen Diplomacy," The Center for Citizen Diplomacy, accessed June 23, 2016, <https://www.centerforcitizendiplomacy.org/about-us/understanding/>.

<sup>405</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 60.

<sup>406</sup> Orjuela, "Building Peace in Sri Lanka," 207.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, 200.

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

negotiation, mediation, conflict resolution, and third-party facilitation.”<sup>410</sup> Key actions include sharing of information and offering policy advice.<sup>411</sup> Universities provide the research platform to seek peace solutions, and also train the future diplomats.<sup>412</sup> Closely related is “scientific diplomacy,” which “is the use of scientific collaborations among nations to address the common problems facing 21st century humanity and to build constructive international partnerships.”<sup>413</sup> In these regards, this track of diplomacy influences both the higher and lower levels of diplomatic activity. In one example, parties to conflict were invited on research trips to states that had undergone successful peace processes.<sup>414</sup> Participants can only positively contribute to the peace process when they have access to learning opportunities. Empowering multiple actors through MTD is one thing; equipping them with the essential skills to participate in the peace process productively is quite another challenge. Behind this challenge lies the enormous potential in finding ways to train local citizens, teachers, journalists, and NGO actors.<sup>415</sup>

### **3.3.1.6 Track 6 – Diplomacy through Advocacy**

“Diplomacy through Advocacy” is the sixth track in McDonald and Diamond’s framework and covers a broad spectrum of political, social, and environmental activism.<sup>416</sup> Yet environmental NGOs are the ones leading the charge in this type of diplomacy. It is noted that their activities have had significant influence in

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<sup>410</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”

<sup>411</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 60.

<sup>412</sup> “Georgetown University Named as State Department Research Partner on Diplomacy and Development: Real Issues, Real Research, Real Impact,” *Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service*, April 29, 2016, <https://sfs.georgetown.edu/georgetown-university-named-state-department-research-partner-diplomacy-development-real-issues-real-research-real-impact/>.

<sup>413</sup> Nina V. Fedoroff, “Science Diplomacy in the 21st Century,” *Cell* 136, no. 1 (January 9, 2009): 9, doi:10.1016/j.cell.2008.12.030.

<sup>414</sup> Orjuela, “Building Peace in Sri Lanka,” 205.

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, 203.

<sup>416</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 87.

positively shaping government policy.<sup>417</sup> When it comes to contributing to positive outcomes, NGOs have the most influence when policy is being developed.<sup>418</sup> Human rights diplomacy also fits into this track of diplomacy, as negotiation and persuasion are utilized “for the specific purpose of promoting and protecting human rights.”<sup>419</sup> McDonald and Diamond suggest that Track 6 “provides a necessary counterbalance to Track 1 by making sure that it does not act entirely unrestrainedly, without checks on its propensity to abuse power.”<sup>420</sup> Here a tension is identified: while the purpose of advocacy is to represent those who cannot speak up for themselves, this function can also lead to alienating key players, such as those from Track 1.<sup>421</sup> When working in a system of diplomacy, the advocacy track should complement but not drive the process and actors must find ways to avoid confrontation.<sup>422</sup>

### **3.3.1.7 Track 7 – Faith-based Diplomacy**

The role of faith, spirituality, and religion in diplomacy is captured in Track 7, “Faith-based Diplomacy.” This track looks at peace, non-violence, and morality through a faith-based lens. A growing trend within this track of diplomacy is the emergence of interfaith dialogue, which often takes the shape of a public forum wherein leaders from different religious groups address controversial issues in a non-threatening, reconciliatory, and unifying way.<sup>423</sup> The contributions of the Mennonites, Quakers, and Franciscan movements have influenced conflict

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<sup>417</sup> Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, eds., *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations* (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008), 2.

<sup>418</sup> Ibid.

<sup>419</sup> Michael O’Flaherty et al., eds., *Human Rights Diplomacy: Contemporary Perspectives*, Nottingham Studies on Human Rights (Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 25.

<sup>420</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 92.

<sup>421</sup> Ibid.

<sup>422</sup> Valentin Katrandjiev, *Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities* (Belgrade: Diplo Foundation, 2006), 101.

<sup>423</sup> Jacob Bercovitch and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, “Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution,” *International Negotiation* 14, no. 1 (2009), 367, doi:10.1163/157180609X406562.



resolution practice still applicable to this day.<sup>424</sup> Faith-based diplomacy “recognizes that religion has been a mission dimension of statecraft” and emphasizes a problem-solving approach by “integrating faith into the existing framework of diplomatic or political, institutions, [and] social relations.”<sup>425</sup>

There are organizations such as Catholic Relief Services that have a global reach in peace mediation.<sup>426</sup> But this track of diplomacy frequently functions on civic and local levels where religious leaders organize their local communities to be involved in the national peace process.<sup>427</sup> Practitioners of faith-based diplomacy depend on official diplomacy as the primary means to peace and seek opportunities for collaboration. Officials must recognize that faith-based diplomacy can complement official process.<sup>428</sup> While faith-based diplomacy can be effective, some suggest that it is only successful in non-religious conflicts as faith-based diplomacy can hinder the peace process and lead to more conflict.<sup>429</sup> During and after the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, religious leaders used their platform to perpetuate conflict rather than promote peace.<sup>430</sup> Equally, official diplomats opened up channels of communication with leaders of the religious community.<sup>431</sup>

Faith communities can exercise significant influence in the peace process.

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<sup>424</sup> Thomas, *Global Resurgence*, 179.

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., 182.

<sup>426</sup> Bercovitch and Kadayifci-Orellana, “Religion and Mediation,” 187.

<sup>427</sup> David R. Smock, ed., “Religious Contributions to Peacemaking: When Religion Brings Peace, Not War,” United States Institute of Peace, *Peaceworks* 55 (January 1, 2006), <http://www.usip.org/publications/religious-contributions-peacemaking-when-religion-brings-peace-not-war>.

<sup>428</sup> Megan Shore, *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

<sup>429</sup> Lee Marsden, “Faith-Based Diplomacy: Conservative Evangelicals and the United States Military,” *Politics and Religion* 7, no. 3 (September, 2014), 495, doi:10.1017/S1755048313000497.

<sup>430</sup> Dion van den Berg, et al., *Tales of War and Peace: Religious Leaders During and After the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Calculated Hypocrisy or Paving the Way for Peace?* (Utrecht: KV Pax Christi, A Case Study for the Knowledge Forum on Religion and Development Policy, March, 2008), 3, <http://bibalex.org/baifa/en/resources/document/345104>.

<sup>431</sup> Ibid., 30.

Their ability to mobilize people that trust them on the grass-roots level is a quality that makes faith-based diplomacy relevant. Former U.S. secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, was once quoted as saying that faith-based organizations have, “more resources, more skilled personnel and a longer attention span, more experience, more dedication and more success in fostering reconciliation than any other government.”<sup>432</sup> While it is noteworthy that in 40% of peace mediations faith-based diplomacy played a significant role, it is not the solution to all conflict and gives rise to legitimate concerns.<sup>433</sup>

### **3.3.1.8 Track 8 – Diplomacy Through Funding**

Track 8 is “Peacemaking through Providing Resources.” MTD requires financial backing and, according to McDonald and Diamond, the donor community can set “the agenda for the field, defining its critical issues and establishing priorities.”<sup>434</sup> The Track 8 donor community includes private individuals and institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and government agencies, including USAID, all of which have financial muscle.<sup>435</sup> Actors in this track can wield significant power, as they are the ones who write the checks. The structure, approval process, and potential for abuse make this a difficult track to manage.<sup>436</sup> One of the problems with this track is that at times when funding has ceased, so has the dialogue.<sup>437</sup>

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<sup>432</sup> Daniel Philpott and Gerard Powers, *Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World*, Studies in Strategic Peacebuilding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 326.

<sup>433</sup> Joanna Kulska, “A Balanced Perception of Religion in International Relations,” *Global Policy Journal* (blog), July 29, 2015, <http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/29/07/2015/balanced-perception-religion-international-relations>.

<sup>434</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 108.

<sup>435</sup> Gupta and Choudhary, “Unofficial Diplomacy,” 209.

<sup>436</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 111.

<sup>437</sup> Gupta and Choudhary, “Unofficial Diplomacy,” 177.

### **3.3.1.9 Track 9 – Diplomacy through Information**

Communication and information are essential to diplomacy.<sup>438</sup> Track 9, “Peacemaking through Information,” seeks to influence public opinion and can, at times, initiate diplomatic processes.”<sup>439</sup>

There are official diplomats who view the increased role of media as problematic. Diplomatic negotiations, once confidential, are now being monitored and appraised by the public and other state actors in real-time.<sup>440</sup> Gupta and Choudhary observe, “Although track nine is the innermost circle, joining all other tracks, it has different roles to play in the different tracks. It is often surrounded by the controversial issue of whether the mumbo-jumbo of official diplomacy should be done with or without media.”<sup>441</sup>

Official actors have learned to appreciate the strengths and benefits of the role of media.<sup>442</sup> This track has the potential to especially complement Track 4, the personal form of diplomacy, as media diplomacy tools can educate and assist with personal lobbying, signatures campaigns, and opinion polls.<sup>443</sup>

## **3.4 RELEVANCE OF THE MTD CONCEPT**

This research is examining to what extent humanitarian diplomacy can be conceptualized as HMTD to improve humanitarian effectiveness. As the third research variable, the MTD framework was presented here to extrapolate findings that might be useful in conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy. Several observations are worth noting. MTD views the peace process as an interdependent system. It seeks one primary goal, namely peace. Reviews of the TOD and MTD

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<sup>438</sup> Cristina Archetti, “Media Impact on Diplomatic Practice: An Evolutionary Model of Change” (paper, University of Salford, Manchester, UK, 2010), 2, <http://usir.salford.ac.uk/12444/>.

<sup>439</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 120.

<sup>440</sup> Eytan Gilboa, “Media Diplomacy Conceptual Divergence and Applications,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 3, no. 3 (June 1, 1998), 56, doi:10.1177/1081180X98003003005.

<sup>441</sup> Gupta and Choudhary, “Unofficial Diplomacy,” 61.

<sup>442</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>443</sup> Yoel Cohen, *Media Diplomacy: The Foreign Office in the Mass Communications Age* (n.p.: Routledge, 2012), 205.

concepts revealed two prerequisites to peace: increased local capacity and informal actor involvement. The key strength of MTD is that it can involve, empower, and equip different actors on different levels in the peace process. This participatory environment, when coordinated properly, can lead to greater accountability and ultimately to peace.

Key is the lesson that a single-actor approach (official or unofficial) is less effective than when multiple tracks complement each other. Actors must overcome competing mandates and an overly principled approach and unite around the common goal of peace. When this happens, MTD can give parties more options. If properly coordinated it can keep the dialogue going. If there is a breakdown in negotiations between official actors, for example, informal dialogue may reestablish the communication and reenergize the peace process.

Introducing multiple actors and activities presents the MTD theory with a practical challenge, namely coordination. Coordination quickly breaks down in settings when competing mandates and independent activities are not strategically intertwined. Also, coordination can only take place when all actors accept the complementary role that others play in the MTD process. State actors, in particular, must appreciate that unofficial actors bring value to the official negotiation table. Likewise, non-official actors must also respect the role, pace, and necessity of state-to-state diplomacy.

Presenting MTD was a critical step in this research. At this stage it is safe to conclude that simply adding *humanitarian diplomacy* as an additional track to the MTD framework is insufficient. However, diplomatic function in humanitarian action, like MTD, takes place in a dynamic, interdependent system involving a variety of actors with different objectives and approaches. Some elements of diplomatic function in humanitarian action are characteristic of MTD. Yet, the incompatibilities with Diamond and McDonald's MTD framework of the peace process require a distinct conceptualization relevant to the context of humanitarian action.

### 3.5 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

US Special Representative Richard Holbrooke once said “Diplomacy is not like chess. It’s more like jazz—a constant improvisation of a theme.”<sup>444</sup> In that regard, to conceptualize diplomacy in humanitarian action there has been value in understanding not only the characteristics of conventional diplomacy, but also the expansion of diplomacy into separate tracks. After reviewing the evidence on humanitarian effectiveness, diplomatic function in humanitarian action, and MTD, it has been concluded that “humanitarian diplomacy” remains the best way to refer to this particular type of diplomacy, but humanitarian diplomacy is most accurately conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy. This research theorizes that HMTD is best defined as “a multidimensional approach to achieving humanitarian objectives through dialogue, advocacy, negotiation, and persuasion.”

This researcher is by no means the first to describe humanitarian diplomacy as multidimensional or to contemplate the similarities between certain elements of humanitarian diplomacy and MTD. Philippe Régnier, in his research on humanitarian diplomacy, describes the development of the general diplomacy field as having a direct impact on how to view humanitarian diplomacy:

Diplomacy is becoming increasingly fragmented: it is no longer primarily bilateral but also multilateral, no longer simply intergovernmental but also multi-institutional and multi-functional (multi-track diplomacy), and no longer exclusively the prerogative of ministries of foreign affairs, given the growing role played by other ministries and multiple private actors and non-state pressure groups. A new diplomatic language (global and sector diplomacy) is rapidly spreading around the globe.<sup>445</sup>

Régnier’s description concisely summarizes the elements of humanitarian diplomacy that are characteristic of multi-track diplomacy. In fact, several elements of the MTD framework bring clarity to humanitarian diplomacy.

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<sup>444</sup> Derek Chollet and Samantha Power, *The Unquiet American: Holbrooke in the World* (Reprint, New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 19.

<sup>445</sup> Régnier, “Emerging Concept,” 1211–37.

Humanitarian diplomacy is not correctly captured by the conventional nomenclature of diplomacy best described as official and bilateral. Considering what is known of humanitarian diplomacy, there is growing recognition that, like in the MTD framework, official and informal actors on local, national, and global levels share in diplomatic space. Further, a theme that repeatedly emerged in the previous three chapters was the significance of informal diplomatic activity on the local level. To that end, humanitarian diplomacy can be viewed through the lens of MTD, that is, a system-wide practice of diplomacy in an interdependent system shared by a variety of official and informal actors. In the MTD concept, unofficial local actors and their capacities are critical to the success of the peace process. What should be carried over from MTD to the HMTD theoretical framework is the view of diplomacy as a system in which all actors are empowered to play a key role in diplomatic function.

Inasmuch as the MTD framework is one way to look at the role of diplomacy in the peace process, it can only go so far in explaining humanitarian diplomacy. MTD is an expansion of the two-track concept of diplomacy. While Diamond and McDonald emphasize that the tracks, namely official and unofficial, are equal, the framework does not go far enough to satisfy the humanitarian effectiveness benchmarks of localization and collaboration that require equitable sharing of diplomatic space.

MTD recognizes that coordination amongst the variety of interdependent actors in the peace process is critical, but it falls short in identifying the boundaries of the interdependent relationships. In other words, there are no written rules on what Régnier referred to as the “new diplomatic language.”<sup>446</sup> In that sense, MTD cannot sufficiently explain the process of operationalizing humanitarian diplomacy.

On the quest to determine whether conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD contributes to humanitarian effectiveness, the MTD model has confirmed what was discovered in the study on humanitarian diplomacy and effectiveness: diplomacy is a multidimensional, interconnected system in which

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<sup>446</sup> Ibid.

complementary activities take place. To identify the boundaries, or parameters, of this interconnected system, this research will return to the results of the analysis of humanitarian diplomacy with the lessons learned by evaluating MTD.

### 3.6 PARAMETERS OF HMTD

Those who practice humanitarian diplomacy perceive the role of diplomacy differently. How they classify humanitarian diplomacy directly impacts how and when they practice it. The literature offers several insights into the application and challenges of humanitarian diplomacy's practice. Five major classifications have consistently emerged in the empirical research, each characterized by a dichotomous tension that actors must reconcile by identifying with one end of the spectrum (see Figure 3.4).




Figure 3.4 HMTD parameters. Humanitarian actors rank the parameters based on their individual and organizational frameworks of diplomatic function.

Firstly, there is the matter of identity. Humanitarian diplomacy can be seen as a tool available to every participant in humanitarian affairs, or as a specialized craft

limited to diplomats and humanitarian officials. Secondly, humanitarian diplomacy can be applied in either public or discreet formats, depending on the context and the actors. Next, humanitarian diplomacy can be incorporated into an overarching strategic communications approach or applied as a tool to address operational challenges as they emerge. Fourthly, those practicing humanitarian diplomacy must accept the reality that its practice often takes place in a political environment. Lastly, humanitarian diplomacy can be either modified to suit the particular context or be practiced in a generalized fashion. Table 3.1 illustrates each classification and the two dichotomous descriptors with which most actors identify.

Table 3.1 Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O)

Parameter	Element	Description
<b>D</b> omain	Humanitarian	Diplomacy is practiced in an environment focused on the humanitarian imperative (to address suffering wherever it is found). It is mainly coordinated (and depended on) by humanitarian actors and is independent of political actors. Non-state actors avoid interaction with government officials.
	Political	Diplomacy takes place in political context in which political actors are key in securing agreements and supporting the humanitarian imperative. Non-state actors are dependent on state engagement, namely coordinating responses, providing assistance, and security. They routinely interact with state officials.
<b>I</b> dentity	Functional	Diplomacy is an implied tool rather than a stated job requirement. It is a shared responsibility of all humanitarian actors and is practiced regularly and informally in ad hoc situations.
	Positional	Diplomacy is an official and specialized activity, limited to trained or experienced professionals and high-ranking officials. It is deliberate, follows protocol, and is mostly focused on a particular and major issue.
<b>P</b> ublicity	Public	Diplomacy is a highly collaborative, interactive, and transparent activity. Diplomatic tools are practiced to inform constituents, mobilize support, influence decisions and behaviors, and shame or confront violators. Diplomatic activities (i.e. negotiations) take place in public environments or the outcomes are made public to foster coordination, transparency, and accountability.
	Confidential	Diplomacy is a discreet or private activity in which confidentiality is paramount to stabilize relationships, limit escalation, and protect information. It is influenced-based and relies on back channels.



<b>L</b> ocalization	Contextualized	Diplomacy is customized depending on where multi-track activities take place (local, national, and/or global levels). Practitioners are prepared to adjust tools to respect culture, customs, and social considerations.
	Standardized	Diplomacy is a standardized, one-size-fits-all practice and its activities reflect the organization's culture and the practitioner's personality and background.
<b>O</b> bjective	Strategic	Diplomacy is incorporated into all aspects of the organization. It is practiced to communicate vision, mission and key messages. Diplomacy is practiced to manage global interagency relationships and is driven by leadership and policy (humanitarian diplomacy or strategic communication policy).
	Operational	Diplomacy is focused on particular operational situations, mostly ad hoc and in the field, operating theater. Activities include negotiating access, maintaining humanitarian space, implementing and monitoring programs, and addressing security issues.

*Note:* Humanitarians' practice of diplomatic function is informed by their ranking of the parameters of HMTD. Each parameter (e.g. Identity) is demarcated by two distinct elements (e.g. Functional or Positional).

### 3.6.1 Domain: Humanitarian vs. Political

Since humanitarian diplomacy takes place at the intersection of foreign policy and humanitarian action, it is as humanitarian as it is political.<sup>447</sup> Although some believe that humanitarian and traditional diplomacy only occasionally interact, consensus in literature suggests that humanitarian diplomacy is not only predominantly practiced *in* non-humanitarian contexts, but also driven *by* non-humanitarian actors.<sup>448</sup> Humanitarian effectiveness depends on the ability to navigate this critical intersection of humanitarian and political activity.<sup>449</sup> Humanitarian diplomacy is both essential and controversial. Through diplomatic activities, humanitarian actors are inserting themselves in political environments. They come in closer contact with political actors and are becoming increasingly dependent on state action.

<sup>447</sup> Farer, *Primer for Policy*, 2–3.

<sup>448</sup> For discussion on overlap, see Kevin M. Cahill, ed., *Human Security for All: A Tribute to Sergio Vieira De Mello*, International Humanitarian Affairs Series 5 (Bronx: Fordham University Press, New York: The Center for International Health and Cooperation, 2004), 136, [http://fordham.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=human\\_af](http://fordham.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=human_af) fairs; Smith, "Theory and Practice," xv, 12, 256.

<sup>449</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 204–205.

Humanitarian diplomacy is intrinsically linked to the foundational humanitarian principle of humanity (to address suffering wherever it is found), which is a responsibility shared by state and non-state actors.<sup>450</sup> Much of the literature's attention centers on diplomatic activities in the context of armed conflict. Today's armed conflicts are marked by a lack of regard for laws, norms, and proportionality. Armed groups regularly disregard their responsibility to protect non-combatants; in fact, civilians are often primary targets. These complex environments call for each actor to exhaust all available diplomatic resources. Further, there are situations that call for "coercive measures, including the use of force."<sup>451</sup> In these contexts there is not only overlap of diplomatic activity, but also of different purposes for which to practice diplomacy in the first place. MTD efforts are mainly concentrated on peace, while humanitarian actors emphasize achieving humanitarian objectives.<sup>452</sup> Tensions in mandates and values can exasperate the challenges that diplomats encounter at this crossroad of diplomatic activity.<sup>453</sup>

When humanitarian actors insert themselves into conflict situations they enter an unambiguously political arena.<sup>454</sup> Humanitarian action cannot exist in a vacuum void of political undercurrents. Humanitarian and political agendas regularly intersect.<sup>455</sup> To frustrate the matter further, long gone are the days when all parties to conflict automatically accept humanitarian organizations as neutral actors.<sup>456</sup> Non-state actors, therefore, find themselves increasingly in diplomatic interaction with state actors, including military forces tasked with providing relief

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<sup>450</sup> Australian Red Cross, "Policy Statement on Advocacy," February 2011, 1.

<sup>451</sup> Claude Bruderlein and Jennifer Leaning, "New Challenges for Humanitarian Protection," *BMJ* 319 (1999), 431, doi:10.1136/bmj.319.7207.430.

<sup>452</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10-12; Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 6.

<sup>453</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 10; Smith, "Theory and Practice," 44.

<sup>454</sup> Humanitarian diplomacy is practiced in the environment of international affairs. Whittall, "Occupied Palestinian Territory," 37.

<sup>455</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 204.

<sup>456</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 11.

assistance in the aftermath of a disaster.<sup>457</sup> MSF recognizes that humanitarian emergencies present opportunities for states to practice disaster diplomacy in an effort to strengthen domestic and international policies.<sup>458</sup> There are those in the humanitarian field who recognize their limited capacity to address political and development failures that hamper humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>459</sup> IOs such as the UNHCR think that political involvement will always be required to solve a humanitarian crisis.<sup>460</sup>

Today, state actors' involvement in humanitarian affairs is broader than providing assistance. Many states recognize their own responsibility to balance the humanitarian and political implications of their humanitarian diplomacy policies.<sup>461</sup> In 1912, Straus stipulated that a state's humanitarian diplomacy had to be above suspicion, and not be used as a disguise to further political or economic interests.<sup>462</sup> Minear and Smith reaffirm this principle in the contemporary discussion on humanitarian diplomacy by observing that, while humanitarian diplomacy often takes place in highly politicized settings, it should have no political agenda.<sup>463</sup> A state should, therefore, concentrate its efforts on protection, humanitarian assistance, and development.<sup>464</sup>

Today, in light of the war on terrorism, there exists little political will to enforce the responsibility to protect. Politicians are afraid that labeling their

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<sup>457</sup> Cahill, ed., *Human Security for All*, 137.

<sup>458</sup> Claire Magone, Michael Neuman, Fabrice Weissman, eds., *Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed: The MSF Experience* (London: Hurst & Company, Médecins Sans Frontières, 2011), 30, [https://lakareutangranser.se/sites/default/files/humanitarian\\_negotiations\\_revealed.pdf](https://lakareutangranser.se/sites/default/files/humanitarian_negotiations_revealed.pdf). See also Ferris, *Politics of Protection*, 78.

<sup>459</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 11.

<sup>460</sup> Nicholas Morris, "The Balkans: The Limits of Humanitarian Action" in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 347–371.

<sup>461</sup> Farer, *Primer for Policy*, 57.

<sup>462</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 47.

<sup>463</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 128.

<sup>464</sup> Ulusoy, "Turkey Position Paper," 1-10.

involvement as humanitarian diplomacy will be viewed as a Trojan horse.<sup>465</sup> Because of these traditions, most states concentrate their humanitarian diplomacy efforts on unambiguous issues caused by violence, conflict, and persecution.<sup>466</sup>

Failure to find a political solution can result in a humanitarian emergency.<sup>467</sup> Likewise, humanitarian emergencies, such as those caused by natural disasters, can trigger political crises. Some view humanitarian diplomacy as a politically motivated instrument of the democratic state. Therefore, activities of humanitarian diplomacy must be shaped by public involvement.<sup>468</sup> Individuals and non-governmental organizations often appeal to their governments when they learn of global humanitarian issues. To Straus, public conscience was vital in shaping a state's humanitarian diplomacy. When American business people, missionaries, and health and social workers observed human rights violations or humanitarian emergencies they appealed to the US government for protection, assistance, and even compensation.<sup>469</sup> Straus viewed humanitarian diplomacy as something often initiated by the public but always facilitated by the state. State and non-state actors have to embrace their unique strengths as well as responsibility to complement each other's efforts in humanitarian emergencies.<sup>470</sup>

Coordination of humanitarian diplomacy greatly depends on influence and political will.<sup>471</sup> Non-state actors can often motivate state actors to engage in humanitarian situations.<sup>472</sup> State actors have a broad range of options at their disposal (carrots and sticks) that non-state actors do not.<sup>473</sup> This center of power is

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<sup>465</sup> Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era," *Security Dialogue* 35, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 137, doi:10.1177/0967010604044973.

<sup>466</sup> Richards, "Humanitarian Diplomacy in New York & Geneva."

<sup>467</sup> Whittall, "Occupied Palestinian Territory," 37.

<sup>468</sup> Farer, *Primer for Policy*, 50.

<sup>469</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 51.

<sup>470</sup> Roeder and Simard, *Diplomacy and Negotiation*, 172.

<sup>471</sup> Ibid., 399; Masood Hyder, "Nurturing Humanitarian Space in Sudan," in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 239-257.

<sup>472</sup> Dietrich Schindler, "Significance of the Geneva Conventions for the Contemporary World," *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 836 (December 31, 1999), <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jq6t.htm>.

<sup>473</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 14.

often a point of contention in debates. State involvement in humanitarian affairs, through diplomatic or military engagement, often clashes with humanitarian principles. Even when state-led activities contain a humanitarian element, many view the involvement as essentially political.<sup>474</sup> Government engagement can directly affect the acceptance, safety, and programmatic effectiveness of humanitarian organizations in conflict zones.<sup>475</sup>

Some have established ground rules for state and non-state interaction. For state and non-state coordination in humanitarian diplomacy to operate effectively, the humanitarian principles should “set the agenda for the negotiations.”<sup>476</sup> Since neutrality and independence are central pillars of the humanitarian principles, there is little space for compromise. Others are more pragmatic; they argue that without compromise there would in fact be very little humanitarian action.<sup>477</sup> In complex humanitarian environments, compromise is very much a part of the fabric of humanitarian diplomacy. There are even those who question the true neutrality of principled actors who view the humanitarian principles as the sacrosanct honor code.<sup>478</sup> Parties to conflict, for example, may question how actors such as the ICRC can be purely neutral and independent when over 85% of their funding depends on government support and centers on multi-lateral dialogue in the global political arena.<sup>479</sup> This is not a new debate. In the 1970s, discussions amongst individuals in the ICRC centered on how the movement could balance its commitments to diplomatic function and humanitarian assistance. Some viewed relief assistance and advocacy as a conflict in humanitarianism.<sup>480</sup> Others argued that the movement should hold steady and invest more resources into studying the complexities and tensions that

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<sup>474</sup> An example could be either a peacekeeping mission or humanitarian disaster relief.

<sup>475</sup> Cahill, ed., *Human Security for All*, 137.

<sup>476</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” xv.

<sup>477</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 33-34.

<sup>478</sup> For more on the relationship between HD and humanitarian principles, see Chatterjee, “Relief to Sustainable Development.”

<sup>479</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy.”

<sup>480</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 34.

<sup>480</sup> Forsythe, “The Work of The ICRC,” 115.

humanitarian law, assistance, and diplomacy bring.”<sup>481</sup> As much of humanitarian interaction takes places from positions of weakness and centers on “negotiating the non-negotiable,” actors must often accept compromises.<sup>482</sup>

To that end, non-state actors must find ways to balance practicality, theory, and commitment to the humanitarian principles.<sup>483</sup> Humanitarian action can “only succeed with the support of political and diplomatic coalitions of convenience, rallied through an engagement in the public space.”<sup>484</sup> To recognize the tension of “together but separate,” state and non-state actors must recognize that most of their activities can complement, rather than compete with, their mandates. The agreement, however, must exist that “humanitarian diplomats do not carry any national political messages and do not promote a particular model of society.”<sup>485</sup> Humanitarian actors must accept the reality that often only a political resolution can lead to lasting change and an end to human suffering.<sup>486</sup> Access negotiations often depend on states’ diplomatic activities. According to Egeland, there are more than twenty countries that are restricting humanitarian space.<sup>487</sup>

It is imperative that humanitarian actors develop policies and systems conducive to interagency coordination. Such will require them to build broad support networks that transcend ideological divides.<sup>488</sup> The task of humanitarian diplomacy is to define the relationship with wide-ranging actors who are involved in a humanitarian crisis. It is the responsibility of the humanitarian community to

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<sup>481</sup> Ibid.

<sup>482</sup> Deborah Mancini-Griffoli and André Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation: A Handbook for Securing Access, Assistance and Protection for Civilians in Armed Conflict* (Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2004), 12.

<sup>483</sup> Cahill, ed., *Human Security for All*, 50.

<sup>484</sup> Magone, Neuman, and Weissman, eds., *Humanitarian Negotiations*, 197.

<sup>485</sup> Régnier, “Emerging Concept,” 1218.

<sup>486</sup> Smyser, *The Humanitarian Conscience*, 265.

<sup>487</sup> Jan Egeland, Adele Harmer, and Abby Stoddard, *To Stay and Deliver: Good Practice for Humanitarians in Complex Security Environments*, Policy and Studies Series (OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, 2011).

<sup>488</sup> Jan Egeland, “The Challenges of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in *Human Security for All: A Tribute to Sergio Vieira De Mello*, ed. Kevin M. Cahill, International Humanitarian Affairs Series 5 (Bronx: Fordham University Press, New York: The Center for International Health and Cooperation, 2004), 129–41, <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/ugroningen/docDetail.action?docID=10586755&ppg=1>.

educate and coordinate with these players.<sup>489</sup> Consistency in messaging and collaboration across the humanitarian-political divide are also essential in addressing humanitarian issues through diplomatic activities.<sup>490</sup> In addition to coordinating efforts, non-state actors can create alternative diplomatic channels and networks to reinforce their neutrality and independence from states and IOs.<sup>491</sup> These often take the form of public advocacy campaigns, including the utilization of celebrity diplomacy. Interestingly, NGOs, regardless of their stance on neutrality and independence, often rely on a government donor or sponsor to negotiate major issues with their counterparts in the target country when faced with perpetual impediments, threats, and challenges.<sup>492</sup>

### **3.6.2 Identity: Function vs. Position**

The driver, the volunteer, and first responders in the introduction of this book have one thing in common: they, like most humanitarians, do not see themselves as diplomats.<sup>493</sup> Humanitarians prioritize diplomatic function over position. The individual practitioner, by virtue of being a humanitarian and not a diplomat, is faced with regular situations that require the use of diplomatic tools.<sup>494</sup> In the eyes of the IFRC, humanitarian diplomacy is equally an individual mindset as it is a collective responsibility of the humanitarian community.<sup>495</sup>

This leads to an important question: Why do humanitarians incorporate diplomatic function into their work but rarely consider themselves to be

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<sup>489</sup> Ibid., 133.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid., 176.

<sup>491</sup> Mark Bradbury, *State-building, Counterterrorism, and Licensing Humanitarianism in Somalia* (Briefing Paper, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, September, 2010), 4, <http://fic.tufts.edu/assets/state-building-somalia.pdf>.

<sup>492</sup> Egeland, "Challenges of Humanitarian Diplomacy," in Cahill, *Human Security for All*, 131.

<sup>493</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 8.

<sup>494</sup> Bruderlein and Modirzadeh, "Humanitarian Diplomacy in the 21st Century." Gasser views it as a tool to meet a humanitarian goal. See Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10.

<sup>495</sup> IFRC, "Disaster Risk Reduction," 17.

diplomats? One reason might be self-consciousness. According to Minear and Smith, aid workers are not comfortable with the term “humanitarian diplomacy;” to them it is an awkward description of what they do. Smith and Minear believe humanitarians still associate diplomacy as “a function of states carried out by trained professionals, not the preoccupation of aid agencies and their personnel.”<sup>496</sup> The authors conclude that humanitarians must clearly demarcate their activities as separate from those of diplomats representing their states. Another explanation is more practical: the function of humanitarian diplomacy is merely absent in most job descriptions. Humanitarians, irrespective of what organization they find themselves in or in which part of the hierarchy they fit, will be required to negotiate, dialogue, and advocate.<sup>497</sup> Many of them wear two hats; the humanitarian and diplomat hat.<sup>498</sup> The need for diplomatic function is mostly implied rather than explicitly stated.<sup>499</sup> As a result, humanitarian practitioners are rarely empowered and equipped to practice humanitarian diplomacy.

The operational theater of humanitarian action is the best place to observe humanitarian diplomacy as a function. The tools of humanitarian diplomatic function are employed in ad hoc situations (e.g. ensuring local access and acceptance, negotiating terms with local partners and communities).<sup>500</sup> MSF sees field staff as the primary diplomats of the organization.<sup>501</sup> These individuals engage in operational diplomatic function out of necessity. In Iraq, for example, a group of NGOs organized in order to collectively address operational issues. Humanitarian diplomacy was not part of the group’s strategy, but it became a core

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<sup>496</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 8.

<sup>497</sup> “Humanitarian Diplomacy: An Experienced Practitioner Addresses Today’s Unprecedented Challenges: Q&A with Kelly Clements, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees,” *The Foreign Service Journal* (April, 2016), <http://www.afsa.org/humanitarian-diplomacy>.

<sup>498</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross, *The Annual Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross* (Geneva: ICRC, 1991).

<sup>499</sup> See Straus et al., “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States,” 45–59.

<sup>500</sup> Forsythe, “The Work of The ICRC,” 115.

<sup>501</sup> Kalshoven, *Assisting the Victims*, 43.



activity of the consortium.<sup>502</sup> Another example of diplomatic function is how the ICRC refers to its team members. In calling them “delegates,” the movement signals that humanitarian diplomacy is an implicit function of every member of the movement.<sup>503</sup>

Other humanitarians prioritize position over function. To them, the lack of intentionality, organization, and training serve as arguments for the view that humanitarian diplomacy is a professional trade of few, rather than the practice of many. Minear and Smith suggest that poorly executed diplomacy can impede specific projects. This can affect the standing of the overall humanitarian community in a particular situation.<sup>504</sup> Therefore, humanitarian diplomacy should be regarded as a highly specialized craft because it is “a distinctive, discrete, and limited enterprise.”<sup>505</sup> The authors suggest non-governmental organizations “have a more problematic connectional status” with the practice, so NGOs’ practice of diplomatic function may not be considered truly representative of bona fide diplomatic activity.<sup>506</sup> Some view humanitarian diplomacy as a form of official diplomacy that requires highly experienced and globally accredited officials to lead diplomatic efforts.<sup>507</sup> Smyser, who served as a senior official in the US government as well as United Nations believes that consolidating positional humanitarian diplomacy could take the shape of a “College of Conciliators.” Consolidating diplomacy to a professional expertise would enable representatives of this association to become the facilitators of humanitarian diplomatic activities in highly complex humanitarian emergencies. The College of Conciliators, appearing much like a state’s diplomatic corps, could be imbedded in the United

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<sup>502</sup> For the case study in Iraq, see Claudia Rodriguez, “Negotiating the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Action in Iraq,” in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 108–130.

<sup>503</sup> Troyon, “Exceptional Humanitarian,” 97.

<sup>504</sup> Larry Minear, “The Craft of Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 33.

<sup>505</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 37.

<sup>506</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>507</sup> W. R. Smyser, *Humanitarian Conscience: Caring for Others in the Age of Terror* (Gordonsville, VA: St. Martin's Press, 2003), 265.

Nations' humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.<sup>508</sup>

Although Dunant and Straus approached humanitarian diplomacy from different positions, both pushed the boundaries of conventional diplomacy. Straus believed in breaking with diplomatic tradition when civil society, media, and the business community were better positioned to complement diplomatic activities. Dunant crossed the humanitarian line and entered the political realm when the humanitarian imperative required such. Since humanitarian diplomacy operates within fewer confines than traditional diplomacy and is practiced regularly by non-professionals, the two books on this issue (by Farer in 1980 and Minear and Smith in 2006) have been criticized for classifying the practice as state-centric and professional.<sup>509</sup>

### **3.6.3 Publicity: Confidential vs. Public**

What should actors do when they are confronted with armed groups or states that do not recognize moral or legal reasons to protect civilians? When traditional diplomacy has failed, does the international community immediately resort to other measures? Straus, when considering this predicament, argued that it was not diplomacy itself that had failed, but the method by which it was employed.<sup>510</sup> To him, secret negotiations and treaties were not only unrepresentative of democracy, but also bound for failure. He believed that humanitarian issues warranted a break with the diplomatic tradition of confidentiality. Diplomatic etiquette needed to be replaced by effective alternatives when doing so served the interests of vulnerable people. For example, humanitarian diplomats could resort to shaming governments or encourage journalists to report matters impacting oppressed people groups.

When investigators returned from the fact-finding mission to Russia, they presented evidence of government-sanctioned persecution to President Harrison. They predicted that the ongoing violence could displace up to one million people

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<sup>508</sup> Ibid., 263.

<sup>509</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 3.

<sup>510</sup> Straus, "Democracy and Open Diplomacy," 158.

in Europe. After official dialogue and negotiations failed, Straus shared the findings with European allies and had them published by *The New York Times* and *The London Times*.<sup>511</sup> Later in 1903, Straus viewed a massacre of Jews in Romania as “another need for humanitarian diplomacy.”<sup>512</sup> Straus exercised his influence by hosting a forum to discuss the matter. There, former US President Cleveland urged the United States administration to advocate, persuade, educate, and protect on behalf of those whose right to life and safety were being threatened.<sup>513</sup> When diplomatic protests were ignored, Straus proceeded by frustrating the economic market of the regime, his alternative to humanitarian intervention.<sup>514</sup> He instigated British-American cooperation in the banking sector, which prevented new loans from being extended to Russia. In fact, as a result of this pressure, according to a report in the *Washington Times*, Russia began to prosecute 350 persons for crimes committed in the pogrom.<sup>515</sup>

What is the best approach for non-state actors when they face similar issues? How should they respond to human rights violations or denials of access? Traditionally, these approaches have been quiet, confidential, and discreet.<sup>516</sup> Independent of governmental humanitarian diplomacy, the practice is largely characterized by confidential or influence-based representations.<sup>517</sup> These actors must balance a commitment to transparency and accountability with the reality that their participation in state-dominated diplomatic processes requires them to honor the principle of confidentiality seen as vital to stabilizing ongoing negotiations.<sup>518</sup>

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<sup>511</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 205. See also Cohen, *A Dual Heritage*, 127.

<sup>512</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 92.

<sup>513</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>514</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>515</sup> Cohen, *A Dual Heritage*, 128.

<sup>516</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 5, 10.

<sup>517</sup> *Ibid.*, 5, 19.

<sup>518</sup> Brian Hocking et al., *Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* no. 1 (Report, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October, 2012), 30,

NGOs' credibility, operational effectiveness, and accountability can also be affected when they only rely on back-channel approaches.<sup>519</sup> In the operational theater of humanitarian action, non-state actors practice not only private diplomacy but also channel their influence through public forums and communiqués.<sup>520</sup> As a neutral arbitrator, the ICRC has to emphasize not only its independence but also exercise restraint not to escalate matters, especially in highly politicized humanitarian emergencies.<sup>521</sup> Yet there is recognition that discretion and soft diplomacy in today's world are often inadequate. The new millennia signaled a shift in strategy for the ICRC. Its present policy on humanitarian diplomacy highlights multilateral diplomacy and networking as key factors in addressing humanitarian issues.<sup>522</sup> Generally, however, the ICRC prefers to approach violating governments and parties in a quiet, confidential manner. It only resorts to public reporting or shaming when international norms are clearly violated, and parties show no commitment to abide by agreements.<sup>523</sup>

One practical reason why some non-state actors prefer to negotiate discreetly is their lack of political influence that limits their ability to escalate negotiations. Resorting to shaming is rarely productive in the long run.<sup>524</sup> Non-state actors must find a balance between confidentiality and public transparency. Comfort levels vary with utilizing these diplomatic options. This is most evident in NGO partnerships. Here, individual member organizations are often placed in impossible situations because "although non-public negotiations are a valid and often useful form of humanitarian advocacy, they run counter to the goals of building a common, unified position across humanitarian actors."<sup>525</sup>

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<http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/dinamfellow/conf2012/HOCKING-Futures-of-Diplomacy.pdf>.

<sup>519</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 89.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>521</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2.

<sup>522</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>523</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 12.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid.

<sup>525</sup> Stoddard et al., "State of the Humanitarian System," 90.

### 3.6.4 Localization: Contextualized vs. Standardized

Effective aid delivery requires emphasis on localization. In the humanitarian context, this means not only the program activities require localization, but also the communication activities surrounding community-based, participatory design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation approaches. In light of this, the localization parameter is presented on a continuum from contextualized to standardized. This range is important to understand as global humanitarian actors respond to local needs. Humanitarian diplomacy is described as “dialogue with both its localized contexts and its globalized politics.”<sup>526</sup>

There is increasing recognition that localizing humanitarian diplomacy will require actors to consider local laws, as well as language, customs, values, and tradition.<sup>527</sup> For the reason that evidence describes humanitarian diplomacy as informal, the question remains if humanitarian diplomats contextualize their diplomatic strategy or introduce a standardized approach. Standardized humanitarian diplomacy, much like global official diplomacy, would operate “within a ‘regime,’ understood as a set of ‘social institutions composed of agreed-upon principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that govern interaction of actors in specific issue areas.’”<sup>528</sup> Consequently, diplomacy is a standardized, one-size-fits-all practice and its activities reflect the organization’s culture and the practitioner’s personality and background.

On the other hand, contextual diplomacy understands that “prepackaged programs and approaches developed in one context can translate badly in other local realities.”<sup>529</sup> Contextualized diplomacy is customized depending on where multi-track activities take place (local, national, and global levels). Practitioners are prepared to adjust tools to respect culture, customs, and social considerations. Effective humanitarians learn to adapt their approach, including being sensitive to using sector-appropriate terms that might be misinterpreted in the field (e.g.

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<sup>526</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 2.

<sup>527</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 9.

<sup>528</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 9.

<sup>529</sup> Anderson, Brown, and Jean, *Time To Listen*, 25.

rewording “victims” to “survivors”).<sup>530</sup>

### 3.6.5 Objectives: Strategic vs. Operational

This chapter has presented the multiple actors, tools, and complex environment of humanitarian diplomacy. Equally diverse are the reasons why these actors reach for diplomatic function in the first place. As traditional diplomacy seeks to maintain peaceful relations, and MTD’s primary goal is peace, humanitarian diplomacy’s primary goal is not peace.<sup>531</sup> Analysis of key texts and literature surveys on the topic reveal there are two predominant themes that emerge as to the reasons why actors employ humanitarian diplomacy: protection and assistance.<sup>532</sup> When protection is the motivation, actors most commonly communicate, represent, or defend the humanitarian imperative, humanitarian principles, or respect for international humanitarian law. Addressing assistance, on the other hand, usually centers on specific operations continuity issues (e.g. denial of access, security, monitoring).

Humanitarian diplomacy supports operational and strategic activities.<sup>533</sup> It helps humanitarian actors achieve their humanitarian goal.<sup>534</sup> Specifically, it creates a process to address broader, cross-cutting issues, while also helping to address case-by-case, day-to-day issues affecting humanitarian effectiveness (Minear & Smith). One of the key aims of humanitarian diplomacy is to ensure effective aid delivery.<sup>535</sup>

Organizations can use humanitarian diplomacy as a strategic communications tool for explaining why and how it acts. Strategic communication

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<sup>530</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>531</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 5.

<sup>532</sup> Herrero, “Negotiating Humanitarian Access.” **Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.** See also Conflict Dynamics and MercyCorps, “Humanitarian Negotiations in Complex Emergencies” (presentation, World Health Organization Health Action in Crisis Pre-Deployment Training, Geneva, 2006), <http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/training/predeployment/Humanitarian%20Negotiations%20in%20complex%20emergencies.ppt>.

<sup>533</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 187, 240.

<sup>534</sup> Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 10.

<sup>535</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 6.

ensures that the message is consistently aligned both internally and externally. Strategic humanitarian diplomacy can “ultimately contribute to the reaffirmation of a common core of human values.”<sup>536</sup> Externally, humanitarian diplomacy today has become the strategy used by actors to channel their influence for humanitarian causes.<sup>537</sup> From public campaigns to quiet mediation, diplomatic function in humanitarian action can strengthen strategic messaging and assist in overcoming operational challenges.<sup>538</sup> The ICRC takes a strategic approach to integrate humanitarian diplomacy into all aspects of the movement’s activities.<sup>539</sup> The organization’s practice of diplomacy can be witnessed from policy formation on the global stage to program implementation in the field.

The humanitarian narrative requires consistent messaging. Humanitarian diplomacy policies are used to communicate a strategic humanitarian message (i.e. protection, respect for IHL, principles).<sup>540</sup> To MSF, humanitarian diplomacy is a tool that strategically addresses operational concerns through consistent communication of its independence and emphasis on its exclusively humanitarian focus.<sup>541</sup> OXFAM’s advocacy division seeks to use a variety of platforms to introduce and gain support for humanitarian causes.<sup>542</sup> The ICRC Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy is called a strategy for influence. In other terms, humanitarian diplomacy is a way to ensure a consistent communication flow of the organization’s brand image and the reiteration of its commitment to the humanitarian principles. Only clearly defined approaches and humanitarian principles will create the trust foundational to any successful humanitarian diplomatic mission. Therefore, the ultimate objective is to garner the acceptance of human rights law and international humanitarian law through parties involved

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<sup>536</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 9.

<sup>537</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 5.

<sup>538</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 89.

<sup>539</sup> Ibid.; “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy.”

<sup>540</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 5.

<sup>541</sup> See comments from Fabien Dubet, UN representative of MSF. Bruderlein and Modirzadeh, “Humanitarian Diplomacy in the 21st Century.”

<sup>542</sup> “Our People: Advocacy,” OXFAM Policy and Practice, <http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/our-people/advocacy>.

in a conflict.<sup>543</sup> Strategy 2020 was adopted by the IFRC six months after it published the Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy. In this document, the federation describes the practice of humanitarian diplomacy as a means “to prevent and reduce vulnerability in a globalized world.”<sup>544</sup>

Internally, the IFRC integrates humanitarian diplomacy into its organizational culture, encouraging those with diplomatic aptitude to apply their skills in the organization’s interest. To fulfill its diplomatic objective, it seeks to collaborate with governments as well as NGOs, highlighting the following as key aspects of the policy:

- The responsibility to persuade;
- Persuading with the appropriate diplomatic tools and actions;
- Focusing on areas of knowledge and expertise; and
- Engaging at appropriate times with partners outside the [m]ovement.<sup>545</sup>

Likewise, the ICRC realized that it needed a more sophisticated approach to humanitarian diplomacy, but the development of a policy was ultimately a learning process that took nearly thirty years.<sup>546</sup> Although it once was considered an ad hoc feature (Forsythe, 1972) and a tool (Gasser, 1984), the ICRC frames humanitarian diplomacy as a strategy for influence in tactical and operational contexts with a focus on principled action informed by the humanitarian principles. In conflict settings, the ICRC centers its diplomatic activities on the respect of international humanitarian law and insistence that the organization has an internationally recognized role. It strategically coordinates between different actors as networking with all involved stakeholders allows the ICRC to influence the humanitarian situation.

Humanitarian diplomacy is a strategic way to develop new networks and platforms to raise awareness and build partnerships.<sup>547</sup> The IFRC defines humanitarian diplomacy as, “persuading decision makers and opinion leaders to

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<sup>543</sup> Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 10.

<sup>544</sup> IFRC, “Strategy 2020,” 21.

<sup>545</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy,” 2.

<sup>546</sup> Forsythe, *The Humanitarians*, 223.

<sup>547</sup> Bruderlein and Modirzadeh, “Humanitarian Diplomacy in the 21st Century.”



act, at all times, in the interest of vulnerable people, and with full respect for fundamental humanitarian principles.”<sup>548</sup> Turkey, an emerging player in foreign affairs, is seeking to leverage humanitarian diplomacy to gain greater influence on the global stage.<sup>549</sup> It has formulated a unique humanitarian diplomacy doctrine that seeks to strategically raise the nation’s profile, credibility, and position.<sup>550</sup>

The IFRC wishes to utilize its *humanitarian diplomacy* policy by leading other organizations when it is best qualified to do so. It commits to working with other partners as long as they share the standards determined by the IFRC. It expects its partners “to acknowledge [its] distinctive place in the national and in the international system, and to respect [its] mandate and independence of action.”<sup>551</sup> In this regard, humanitarian diplomacy is uniquely helpful in establishing and managing consortiums of like-minded actors. Therefore, the ICRC is prepared to coordinate global humanitarian diplomacy when the movement is best positioned to do so. To the ICRC, this networking with all stakeholders involved enables the movement to influence humanitarian situations through partnership and by raising awareness. In contrast, there are those that question the ICRC’s ability to coordinate, because “the top level of the ICRC has been persistently conservative and risk averse in humanitarian diplomacy, as has the Confederation in offering its ‘good offices’ in international relations.”<sup>552</sup>

Not only can humanitarian diplomacy strengthen an organization’s overall strategy, but it can be specifically applied in particular situations. In fact, most literature discusses the role of humanitarian diplomacy in the context of attempts to ensure operations continuity. In this analysis, matters of humanitarian assistance appear in literature twice as often as strategic and philosophical issues.

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<sup>548</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy,” 2.

<sup>549</sup> Richards, “Humanitarian Diplomacy in New York & Geneva.”

<sup>550</sup> Senem Cevik, “An Emerging Actor in Humanitarian Diplomacy,” *University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy Blog*, December 19, 2013, <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/emerging-actor-humanitarian-diplomacy>; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects,” *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 41, no. 6 (2013): 866, doi:10.1080/00905992.2013.857299.

<sup>551</sup> IFRC, “Strategy 2020,” 27.

<sup>552</sup> Forsythe, *The Humanitarians*, 240.

Humanitarian diplomacy commonly, for instance, “facilitates the delivery of [humanitarian] assistance.”<sup>553</sup>

Operational humanitarian diplomacy is an ongoing process. Actors, for example, have to continually renegotiate local access in the field, even after an official agreement has been brokered on global or national levels.<sup>554</sup> Strategic communications strengthen operations-focused humanitarian diplomacy. The ICRC’s broad strategic communication approach to humanitarian diplomacy is evident in the day-to-day operations environment in which local personnel is empowered to represent the interests of the organization.<sup>555</sup> Insofar as MSF uses a strategic communications approach to globally explain its humanitarian mission, it relies on staff and volunteers to adequately use the tools of diplomatic function to implement programs.<sup>556</sup> There are hopes that comprehensive strategies on humanitarian diplomacy can lead to improved access to affected populations.<sup>557</sup>

The diplomatic tools (dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion) are applied to overcome the greatest hurdles to humanitarian effectiveness, namely security, access, and coordination, all of which are prerequisites to humanitarian action.<sup>558</sup> These challenges must be overcome in order to ensure effective aid delivery.<sup>559</sup> Thus, humanitarians spend much of their energy to establish acceptance. Humanitarian diplomacy involves negotiating the free movement of relief goods and personnel. Actors increasingly have to dialogue and negotiate regarding the security of personnel.<sup>560</sup> At times, up to one half of humanitarian staff can be prevented from traveling to, or living and working in, emergency settings. Therefore, humanitarian diplomacy is also referred to as “access

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<sup>553</sup> Whittall, “Occupied Palestinian Territory,” 37.

<sup>554</sup> Toni Pfanner, “Principled Humanitarian Action in the East Timor Crisis,” in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 174–193.

<sup>555</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 22.

<sup>556</sup> See comments of Fabien Dubet (UN representative of MSF): Bruderlein and Modirzadeh, “Humanitarian Diplomacy in the 21st Century.”

<sup>557</sup> IFRC, “Strategy 2020,” 25.

<sup>558</sup> Claudia Rodriguez, “Humanitarian Action in Iraq,” 108.

<sup>559</sup> Morton, “Steep Learning Curves,” 199.

<sup>560</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 18.

negotiation.”<sup>561</sup> Case studies in Iraq, Lebanon, Nepal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan affirm that humanitarian diplomacy’s activities are preoccupied with addressing operational issues. These often center on gaining access and ensuring that actors accept the humanitarian code of conduct.<sup>562</sup>

Humanitarian action is often hampered by absence of national governance, a crippled infrastructure, limited budgets, and lack of coordination amongst NGOs and other humanitarian actors.<sup>563</sup> Efforts to overcome these impediments frequently cause state and non-state actors to interact.<sup>564</sup> In all of these instances, humanitarian diplomacy activities must take place simultaneously on global and local levels. When local operations are hampered by denial of access, organizations must address the problem not only at the point of denial, but engage with all stakeholders who are involved in the emergency. Much of diplomacy is also directed at coordination, building networks, and partnerships. In Lebanon, UNICEF expanded its limited implementation capacity by partnering with other agencies. Although all shared the same goal of ensuring survival of people, diplomatic function was evident in all aspects of the partnership formation and management, including the monitoring and evaluation phases. Humanitarian actors require humanitarian space, so they focus on gaining access, maintaining operational security, and negotiating the terms of humanitarian operations.<sup>565</sup> In that regard, much of humanitarian diplomacy can be classified as ad hoc diplomacy.<sup>566</sup>

### **3.7 DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION**

As observed previously, state and non-state actors (e.g. ICRC, United Nations, NGOs) are practitioners of humanitarian diplomacy. It is helpful to look inside the

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<sup>561</sup> Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 363.

<sup>562</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 215.

<sup>563</sup> André Roberfroid, “Negotiating for Results in the Lebanon,” in Minear and Smith, *Humanitarian Diplomacy*, 84–107.

<sup>564</sup> Smith, “Theory and Practice,” 265.

<sup>565</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 1.

<sup>566</sup> Forsythe, “The Work of The ICRC,” 115.

toolboxes to see what diplomatic tools they have at their disposal. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) seeks to utilize all necessary and available means to influence decisions on, and gather support for, humanitarian issues. What is interesting, however, is that the IFRC, along with the other actors in this analysis, have commonly reached for four diplomatic tools in the last 125 years: dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion.<sup>567</sup> Figure 3.5 highlights these tools on a consensus to coercion scale and illustrates the frequency with which the tools occur in literature. The content analysis ranks the tools by order of preference: dialogue (42%), negotiation (38%), advocacy (12.5%), and persuasion (8%).



Figure 3.5 Tools of diplomacy (text analysis results). The text analysis totaled the occurrences of each tool (including variations). Of all tool references in the data, dialogue occurred most frequently, appearing 42% of the time. The results suggest that humanitarians prefer consensus-based tools (dialogue and negotiation).

### 3.7.1 Dialogue

Much of humanitarian diplomacy either begins with or centers on dialogue, defined as “a conversation or exchange of ideas that seeks mutual understanding through the sharing of perspectives.”<sup>568</sup> It takes place on global and local levels, and can require formal or informal interaction.<sup>569</sup> In the stories from the introduction, it was dialogue amongst a variety of actors that led to a unified

<sup>567</sup> This is according to quantitative text analysis and a survey of over 70 specific examples of applied humanitarian diplomacy.

<sup>568</sup> “Glossary: Dialogue,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed April 18, 2016, <https://www.usip.org/glossary/dialogue>.

<sup>569</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 1, 10. See also Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 10–11; Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 18.

campaign to develop a vaccine. Dialoging on the issues was the primary way non-state actors interact with governments.<sup>570</sup> The ICRC views dialogue as a core component of preventing and resolving humanitarian problems. It is seen as a non-political way for non-state actors to remain close to political diplomatic efforts without directly participating in the political process. As the ICRC seeks to be included in major forums on humanitarian matters, it views this diplomatic tool as a way to indirectly exercise its influence through networking.<sup>571</sup> Hosting conferences, such as the 2004 joint conference held by the ICRC and the University of Islamabad, enables humanitarian actors to build a foundation for dialogue, dissemination of humanitarian law, and future humanitarian diplomacy activities.<sup>572</sup> Hosting these types of forums strengthens the relationship between the National Societies and public authorities.<sup>573</sup>

Since humanitarian diplomacy depends on having information, official and informal dialogue (on local, national, and global levels) is the primary means for gathering the facts.<sup>574</sup> Often before official channels of negotiation have been established, non-state actors initiate informal dialogue.<sup>575</sup> It is a way for non-state humanitarian actors to make contact and begin interaction on matters of operational significance with parties to conflict.<sup>576</sup> In tense settings, dialogue creates a safe and non-committal environment where the different parties involved can share their concerns and opinions.<sup>577</sup> When President Harrison commissioned the fact-finding mission to Russia, the assignment revolved around dialogue with official counterparts (including the Czar and his representatives). Further, the delegates interviewed victims, civil society leaders, and expatriates (e.g. business people, missionaries, humanitarians, and teachers) who witnessed the

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<sup>570</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 20.

<sup>571</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2.

<sup>572</sup> Ibid., 15.

<sup>573</sup> IFRC, "Strategy 2020," 25.

<sup>574</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 11.

<sup>575</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 11, 15, 18.

<sup>576</sup> Veuthey, "Saving It," 10, 11. See also Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 11; Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 11.

<sup>577</sup> Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation*, 66.

persecution.<sup>578</sup> Dialogue often serves as the opening act in humanitarian diplomacy. After channels of communication have been established, dialogue many times continues at various administrative levels.<sup>579</sup> Simultaneously, actors return to their toolbox to see what other tools will serve their diplomatic purpose.

### 3.7.2 Negotiation

There is a good reason why humanitarian diplomacy is also referred to as “access negotiation.”<sup>580</sup> Like the driver in the introductory story who had to negotiate at the checkpoint, humanitarian actors find themselves regularly negotiating matters not only with state but also non-state actors.<sup>581</sup> In fact, every step of the way, from securing donations to implementing a project, negotiation is a widely used tool, viewed by state and non-state actors as an essential aspect of humanitarian diplomacy.

Practically speaking, negotiations help to procure visas for humanitarian staff. They establish the flow of logistics and finances in emergency response, and the safety of aid workers often depends on negotiations.<sup>582</sup> Humanitarian negotiations with armed actors, government officials, and civil society can result in flexibility, access, and ultimately humanitarian effectiveness.<sup>583</sup> Negotiation is a commonly used function, but still underdeveloped concept.<sup>584</sup>

Non-state actors view negotiation as a central tool in designing, securing, and maintaining operational presence and effectiveness.<sup>585</sup> Yet, it serves more than just practical, access-related objectives. It is also used as a tool to prevent

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<sup>578</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 32.

<sup>579</sup> Ibid.

<sup>580</sup> Egeland, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” in Cooper, Heine, and Thakur, *The Oxford Handbook*, 363.

<sup>581</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 1.

<sup>582</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 1. See also Gasser, “Humanitarian Diplomacy,” 10; Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 15.

<sup>583</sup> Stoddard et al., “State of the Humanitarian System,” 75.

<sup>584</sup> Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation*, 13.

<sup>585</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 1.

further violence in a conflict.<sup>586</sup> Irrespective of its objectives, humanitarian negotiation requires the coordination of the multiple actors and their activities. In Myanmar, when individual attempts to secure access to victims of Typhoon Nargis failed (and only created more tension), it was the collaborative and diplomatic approach of the UN and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) community that resulted in the flow of relief goods, services, and staff. From 1996 to 2001, NGOs learned that negotiation with the Taliban required diplomacy that emphasized coordination and consistent messaging. While negotiations led by individual actors and their organizations can be futile in conflict and post-conflict settings, the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq created a central platform from which the various organizations could negotiate operational requirements, such as humanitarian space.<sup>587</sup> According to an evaluation conducted by an independent consultant, the work of the coordination committee remained effective despite increased operational challenges and increasing humanitarian needs.<sup>588</sup>

Humanitarian diplomats have reached for the four tools in varying frequency throughout the past 125 years (see Figure 3.5). Negotiation has consistently played a role in humanitarian diplomacy, but in the post-Vietnam Era appears not to have been the preferred tool of choice. Its notable absence can be explained through Gasser's view on the ICRC's status.

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<sup>586</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 202.

<sup>587</sup> Rodriguez, "Humanitarian Action in Iraq," 108–130.

<sup>588</sup> Greg Hansen. "Evaluation of the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI)." ALNAP, March 2007, 5. <https://www.alnap.org/system/files/content/resource/files/main/935.pdf>.




Figure 3.6 Tool utilization (1912-2012). Depending on the year and actor, the diplomatic tools (dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, persuasion) have been utilized with varied frequency and preference.

Gasser's work reveals that governments rarely challenged the ICRC's mandate and presence, so the ICRC could concentrate its efforts on persuading parties to conflict to respect international humanitarian law (but he conceded that this alone didn't guarantee that all actors respected those rights and roles).<sup>589</sup> In 1912, through the lens of the state actor, negotiation was the primary tool of humanitarian diplomacy. Looking at the functions of state actors today, their tools of humanitarian diplomacy have remained concentrated on negotiation, dialogue, and advocacy. State actors have something to negotiate with; they have political muscle (carrots and sticks) that other humanitarian actors do not.<sup>590</sup> Negotiation became an increasingly prominent tool with the ICRC receiving observer status in the 1990s. Although the status does not give the neutral ICRC something to bargain with, it does give the movement something to stand on during

<sup>589</sup> Ibid.

<sup>590</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 3.



negotiations, namely a legal mandate recognized by the majority of member states. Furthermore, mandate, credibility, reliability, and access to field partners strengthen their hand in negotiations.<sup>591</sup> The ICRC views negotiations as the key tool to securing humanitarian agreements.<sup>592</sup> Specifically, prisoner exchanges and the repatriation of wounded and dying prisoners depend on the movement's ability to negotiate. In diplomatic negotiations, compensation, concessions, and compromise are inescapable byproducts.<sup>593</sup> Thus, principled organizations such as the ICRC have to wrestle with how to negotiate without conceding and undermining the humanitarian principles.

### 3.7.3 Advocacy

Advocacy is the most prominently appearing support tool in humanitarian activities. This is because of its purely humanitarian focus.<sup>594</sup> Advocacy is broadly applied to raise awareness and change attitudes on public policies, behaviors, and humanitarian conditions. It takes place on local and global levels (and concerns itself with local and global issues). Press conferences and mass media campaigns can help raise awareness on certain issues.<sup>595</sup> Advocacy reinforces the importance of protection principles. It reaffirms the responsibilities that actors have in particular conflict settings and brings attention to humanitarian matters ranging from disasters to public health emergencies. Advocacy is also a popular tool for reporting on human rights violations and operational impeding of authorities.<sup>596</sup>

Straus believed that advocacy was the intersection where the public's concerns confronted states' behaviors and called on them to act. Advocacy was a tool of civil society to bring global protection-related issues to the attention of

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<sup>591</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 3.

<sup>592</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>593</sup> Meerts, *Diplomatic Negotiation*, 69.

<sup>594</sup> United Nations, *Humanitarian Decade: Challenges For Humanitarian Assistance In The Last Decade And Into The Future* (Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2004), 87.

<sup>595</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 58.

<sup>596</sup> Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation*, 71.

government leaders.<sup>597</sup> Straus often encouraged newspapers to report on domestic and international human rights abuses. He thought humanitarian diplomacy should unite people across political, cultural, and religious divides in order to speak up for the suffering and speak against abuses.<sup>598</sup> To this day, advocacy is commonly utilized in the context of conflict and human rights abuses.<sup>599</sup> In these situations, actors such as the ICRC draw on their vast network of official and unofficial contacts “in order to foster heightened awareness of the plight of victims of armed conflicts, support for the ICRC’s humanitarian action, and respect for humanitarian law.”<sup>600</sup>

Non-state humanitarian actors can call on political actors to fulfill their responsibility to protect through peace missions and other interventions.<sup>601</sup> This type of advocacy emerged from the humanitarian community in light of the famine in Ethiopia during the 1980s and the Somalia crisis the following decade.<sup>602</sup> Although humanitarian actors rarely publicly advocate the use of force, synchronized humanitarian diplomacy efforts by state and non-state actors have directly led to military interventions.<sup>603</sup> For example, during the 2011 civil conflict in Libya, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970. When the UN charged NATO to enforce the resolution, it cited the responsibility to protect civilians.<sup>604</sup>

According to best practice, humanitarian actors have a responsibility to advocate when they witness human rights abuses.<sup>605</sup> The Sphere Project added advocacy to its protection principle in the 2011 edition *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. According to them, the explicit statement of advocacy is a new addition, but the relationship of advocacy and

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<sup>597</sup> Straus et al., “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States,” 53.

<sup>598</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 221.

<sup>599</sup> Ferris, *Politics of Protection*, 269.

<sup>600</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 5.

<sup>601</sup> Ferris, *Politics of Protection*, 5.

<sup>602</sup> *Ibid.*, 109.

<sup>603</sup> Pfanner, “Principled Humanitarian Action,” 22.

<sup>604</sup> United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1970 (2011).”

<sup>605</sup> The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, 2011 ed. (Rugby: Practical Action Publishing, 2011), 24, 32.

protection were implied in the previous editions.<sup>606</sup> Humanitarian actors should advocate on behalf of affected populations to relevant national authorities and global decision-makers and influencers. To Sphere, these actors “may use different modes of action including diplomacy, lobbying, and public advocacy.”<sup>607</sup> In recent years, OCHA’s mandate has been expanded to include not only coordination of humanitarian responses, but also the management of humanitarian advocacy.<sup>608</sup> Advocacy can be effective in creating awareness of new emergencies, but appears to have less affect on helping in resolving ongoing crises.<sup>609</sup>

### 3.7.4 Persuasion

As instances of humanitarian protection are increasing in frequency (and complexity), so also is the debate on the role of persuasion in humanitarian diplomacy becoming increasingly important.<sup>610</sup> The definition and practical implications of persuasion are varied and problematic. In the political arena of diplomacy, persuasion is considered a power-based tool.<sup>611</sup> There is growing recognition that the majority of states’ power is insufficient to apply persuasion (combination of word and deed). Therefore, the international community should focus its attention on other diplomatic tools to prevent conflict and manage international relationships.<sup>612</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> Cecilia Furtade, email to author, 2014.

<sup>607</sup> The Sphere Project, *Humanitarian Charter*, 32.

<sup>608</sup> Ferris, *Politics of Protection*, 93.

<sup>609</sup> Peter Walker and Daniel G. Maxwell, *Shaping the Humanitarian World*, Global Institutions (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 138–141.

<sup>610</sup> Hugo Slim, “Marketing Humanitarian Space: Argument and Method in Humanitarian Persuasion,” (Geneva: ALNAP/ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2003), 3.

<sup>611</sup> Rob Grace, “Understanding Humanitarian Negotiation: Five Analytical Approaches,” Advanced Training Program on Humanitarian Action, November 30, 2015, <http://atha.se/thematicbrief/understanding-humanitarian-negotiation-five-analytical-approaches>.

<sup>612</sup> Milan Jazbec, “Persuasion in Sociology of Diplomacy,” Diplo Foundation, 2013, <http://www.diplomacy.edu/resources/general/persuasion-sociology-diplomacy>.

Although Straus believed international law allowed states to use force as a means to protect themselves, he debated to what degree states could effectively intervene in humanitarian situations. As a result, he distinguishes between the functions of diplomacy (e.g. dialogue, negotiation, advocacy) and undiplomatic approaches such as persuasion through force.<sup>613</sup>

At that point, the last resort to provide protection, namely use of force, had to be considered.<sup>614</sup> Persuasion is also absent with non-state actors, as humanitarians generally use dialogue, negotiation, and advocacy as tools of diplomatic function to find agreeable solutions. They are unlikely to resort to persuasion tactics (they do use persuasion for fundraising purposes, but this application falls outside the scope of this research).<sup>615</sup> In literature, humanitarian diplomacy and persuasion are most commonly linked with the attempt to convince armed actors to respect humanitarian standards and end violence.<sup>616</sup> There are two ways to persuade: by argument or by force.<sup>617</sup> It appears that those who incorporate persuasion as an element of humanitarian diplomacy persuade through argument rather than force.<sup>618</sup> This analysis identified the ICRC as the only actor with a relationship to the diplomatic tool of persuasion.<sup>619</sup> In fact, the ICRC's humanitarian diplomacy introduces persuasion as the primary tool (and believes as an organization it has a responsibility to persuade). However, in the range of options that the movement's definition of persuasion allows, shaming a violating

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<sup>613</sup> Straus et al., "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States," 46.

<sup>614</sup> Straus, "Democracy and Open Diplomacy," 156.

<sup>615</sup> Lena Khor, *Human Rights Discourse in a Global Network: Books beyond Borders* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2016), 130.

<sup>616</sup> Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, *Humanitarian Negotiation*, 21.

<sup>617</sup> Jovan Kurbalija, ed., "Persuasion, the Essence of Diplomacy: A Publication in honour of Professor Dietrich Kappeler" *Issuu* (Geneva: Diplo Foundation, Msida: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, 2013), 92, <https://issuu.com/diplo/docs/persuasion>.

<sup>618</sup> Andrew MacLeod et al., "Humanitarian Engagement with Non-state Armed Groups," (London: Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 29, 2016), 27, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/research/2016-04-29-NSAG.pdf>.

<sup>619</sup> In 1984 and 2006 the ICRC discussed persuasion as a tool to ensure protection. Persuasion played a more prominent role in the text from 1984.

actor is the most threatening one (and considered as the last resort).<sup>620</sup> In the ICRC's context, persuasion appears to emphasize the movement's moral and legal obligation to appeal, challenge, and hopefully influence behavior rather than forcibly instill it. In this practice, delegates must often try to convince parties that a specific humanitarian solution must be sought. Delegates frequently use this common approach to try to influence belligerent parties by arguing that it is in those parties' own interests to address a certain humanitarian issue.<sup>621</sup>

### 3.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION

To determine how best to conceptualize and operationalize the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, this research has considered the individual qualities of and relationships between humanitarian effectiveness, the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, and MTD. When aggregating these findings, *humanitarian diplomacy* has emerged as a definitive, particular, and critical concept and function in humanitarian action. Humanitarian diplomacy cannot be conceptualized through the framework of conventional—that is, bilateral and official—diplomacy. Further, while the MTD concept has provided a helpful basis for describing humanitarian diplomacy as a multi-dimensional and interconnected system, the practice has emerged in a particular pattern unique to the humanitarian domain quite separate from the MTD framework. When considering the evidence in literature, this research identified emerging themes and boundaries on which the practice of humanitarian diplomacy appears to depend. Humanitarians' diplomatic strategy is based on how they and their counterparts rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O). Once this has been established, humanitarians engage in diplomatic strategy with a preference for the consensus-based approaches (dialogue and negotiation) over the coercion-based (advocacy and persuasion). A definition of HMTD has emerged from these findings: HMTD is "a multidimensional approach to achieving humanitarian objectives through dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion." As this research moves to the

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<sup>620</sup> IFRC, "Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy," 2–3.

<sup>621</sup> "Persuasion in Sociology of Diplomacy."

next phase, namely designing and implementing a case study, the aim remains to answer the guiding research question: To what extent can conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD contribute to humanitarian effectiveness?

# Research Methodology

## 4.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter presented the researcher's contribution to the field, namely humanitarian multi-track diplomacy (HMTD). This explains the methodology applied to operationalize the HMTD concept. Firstly, the purpose of the study and the specific elements to be tested are presented. Secondly, the research methods, including the case study approach, case study selection, and research tools are detailed. Thirdly, the construction of the case study is outlined. Lastly, the researcher details how the case study was implemented and how the data were collected and analyzed.

## 4.2 PURPOSE

This research seeks to test the theory that resulted from the analysis of empirical findings. HMTD has emerged as a moderator in the relationship of humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian effectiveness. Therefore, it is important to return to the research question posed in the beginning of this research:

**To what extent can humanitarian effectiveness be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy?**

There are three hypotheses that will guide how the research question will be answered:

1. Humanitarian actors incorporate diplomatic function into their job

responsibilities during a humanitarian response in order to achieve humanitarian effectiveness.

2. Humanitarian actors adjust their diplomatic strategy depending on the proximity of parameters between them and their counterparts.
3. Humanitarian actors' preference to apply a consensus-based diplomatic strategy has a positive effect on humanitarian effectiveness.

To answer this question, several observations must be made in the study. Firstly, to what degree do actors, when they practice humanitarian diplomacy, instinctively categorize their decisions and behaviors? Does this classification emerge as a consistent pattern across a broad spectrum of an organization? With the increased attention on humanitarian diplomacy in the humanitarian community, it can be assumed that further research of this practice will commence in the near future. Therefore this research seeks to lay a foundation on which deeper analysis can follow.

#### 4.2.1 Parameters of Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy

The study seeks to understand how individual actors' perception of humanitarian diplomacy is reflected in their identification with the dichotomous descriptors of each classification (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Testing Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O)

Parameter	Element	Description
<b>D</b> omain	Humanitarian	Diplomacy is practiced in an environment focused on the humanitarian imperative (to address suffering wherever it is found). It is mainly coordinated (and depended on) by humanitarian actors, and is independent of political actors. Non-state actors avoid interaction with government officials.
	Political	Diplomacy takes place in political context in which political actors are key in securing agreements and supporting the humanitarian imperative. Non-state actors are dependent on state engagement, namely coordinating responses, providing assistance, and security. They routinely interact with state officials.
<b>I</b> ntity	Functional	Diplomacy is an implied tool rather than a stated job requirement. It is a shared responsibility of all humanitarian actors, and is practiced regularly and informally in ad hoc situations.



	Positional	Diplomacy is an official and specialized activity, limited to trained or experienced professionals and high-ranking officials. It is deliberate, follows protocol, and is mostly focused on a particular and major issue.
<b>P</b> ublicity	Public	Diplomacy is a highly collaborative, interactive, and transparent activity. Diplomatic tools are practiced to inform constituents, mobilize support, influence decisions and behaviors, and shame or confront violators. Diplomatic activities (i.e. negotiations) take place in public environments or the outcomes are made public to foster coordination, transparency, and accountability.
	Confidential	Diplomacy is a discreet or private activity in which confidentiality is paramount to stabilize relationships, limit escalation, and protect information. It is influenced-based and relies on back channels.
<b>L</b> ocalization	Contextualized	Diplomacy is customized depending on where multi-track activities take place (local, national, and global levels). Practitioners are prepared to adjust tools to respect culture, customs, and social considerations.
	Standardized	Diplomacy is a standardized, one-size-fits-all practice and its activities reflect the organization's culture and the practitioner's personality and background.
<b>O</b> bjective	Strategic	Diplomacy is incorporated into all aspects of the organization. It is practiced to communicate vision, mission and key messages. Diplomacy is practiced to manage global interagency relationships and is driven by leadership and policy (humanitarian diplomacy or strategic communication policy).
	Operational	Diplomacy is focused on particular operational situations, mostly ad hoc and in the field, operating theater. Activities include negotiating access, maintaining humanitarian space, implementing and monitoring programs, and addressing security issues.

*Note:* An objective of the case study is to understand how humanitarians rank parameters of HMTD (D-I-P-L-O), and if participants from a particular agency share the same framework.

#### 4.2.2 Diplomatic Strategy and Application of Diplomatic Tools

Further, the research seeks to understand when and how actors use the tools of humanitarian diplomacy. To what extent were these tools realized in a specific context? Further, did they improve or decrease humanitarian diplomacy? Did coercive tools (i.e. persuasion) lead to less or greater acceptance? The tool test would assist in identifying the role of these tools within diplomatic practice and determining whether humanitarian practitioners were intentional in selecting and utilizing specific tools. Further, it would help to reveal whether a need for specific training would emerge.

## 4.3 RESEARCH METHODS

### 4.3.1 Case Study Approach

The case study approach has been determined as the appropriate method for testing the HMTD theoretical framework. Study in the field, unlike a laboratory, gives the researcher the benefit of realism. To ensure a level of cohesion and replicability, the case study is designed on the basis of the classification and tools of humanitarian diplomacy. A case study allows the researcher to thoroughly investigate a single or small number of cases to understand the larger body of cases.<sup>622</sup> Firstly, a decision must be made whether to concentrate on one particular emergency or consider several emergencies. Secondly, the researcher must prioritize either breadth or depth., deciding whether to study the actions of one or of multiple actors in an emergency. Through consultations with the researcher's Ph.D. supervisor and other researchers, the decision was made to pursue a single case study approach for several reasons. Firstly, a single case study offered an effective and efficient starting point to test the new theoretical framework. Secondly, a single case study approach promised an in-depth empirical account of the practice of humanitarian diplomacy.

Despite misconceptions, a single case study can give rise to effective generalizations.<sup>623</sup> When using this approach, choosing the right case for the research is of great importance. Since this research is the first concentrated effort to study humanitarian diplomacy, the advantage of a single case study is that the first hypothesis can be quickly tested in a rough-and-ready way. In essence, this case study is best described as a pilot study, or an exploratory and theory-building activity.<sup>624</sup> The added benefit of a single case is that it enables the researcher to test the hypothesis and, if required, modify and retest the question.<sup>625</sup> Since the primary goal of the case study is to answer the research question, priority is placed

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<sup>622</sup> John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles And Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 20.

<sup>623</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," *Qualitative Inquiry* 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 12, doi:10.1177/1077800405284363.

<sup>624</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 39.

<sup>625</sup> *Ibid.*, 38.

on diving deeper on the issue—understanding the root of the problem and gaining a level of insight that has not yet existed.<sup>626</sup>

This type of information is best generated through typical and crucial case studies. These types of cases can confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis, and assist the researcher in reframing the research question consistent with the case results. A “crucial” case is one best suited for a single-case setting and most likely to confirm or disprove a theory.<sup>627</sup> It would, through gaining information, permit the following logical deduction: “If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.”<sup>628</sup> A “typical” case is representative of others, meaning it is best described as one that could serve as a classic exemplar with cross-case relationship potential.

#### **4.3.2 Criteria**

A case has to be representative of other cases (in this instance, other humanitarian emergencies) to be relevant and appropriate for consideration. For this research, the representativeness of the case is evaluated by the following criteria:

##### **Case Selection Criteria 1: Humanitarian Emergency Classification**

- Classified as humanitarian emergency
- Involvement, coordination, and interaction of:
  - International state actors
  - National state actors
  - IOs (UN and ICRC)
  - NGOs

##### **Case Selection Criteria 2: Humanitarian Diplomacy Classification and Tool**

###### **Checklist**

- 5 Classifications (Identity, Format, Goal, Environment, Context) had to be identifiable as framework conditions
- 4 Tools (Dialogue, Advocacy, Negotiation, Persuasion)

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<sup>626</sup> Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings,” 13.

<sup>627</sup> Gerring, *Case Study Research*, 89.

<sup>628</sup> Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings,” 34.

### **Case Selection Criteria 3: Practicality**

- Researcher has unconstrained field and headquarter access to the following:
  - Decision-makers
  - Managers
  - Practitioners
  - Volunteers
  - Beneficiaries
- Researcher can expand research to other emergencies if further research and/or comparison was required.
- Researcher can rely on other actors (IO, State actors for comparison)
- Researcher had either personal work experience in crisis or a general knowledge of context.

#### **4.3.3 Case Selection**

After research and consultation, the researcher decided to study Convoy of Hope's (COH) Haiti Earthquake Response in 2010. While at first hesitant to study his own organization, the arguments for doing so outweigh the concerns. First and foremost, the researcher can avoid concerns with access and transparency. The organization grants him unlimited access to all participants and relevant information. A second advantage to this case selection is that the researcher has the flexibility to either expand the cases or compare the test with other responses (e.g. 2015 Nepal earthquake response, 2008 Myanmar typhoon response).<sup>629</sup>

#### **4.3.4 Research Tools**

The case study will gather information through self-reporting exercises (i.e. interviews) and unobtrusive measures (i.e. internal memos and policies, public statements via news interviews, social media posts, and email campaigns).<sup>630</sup> The primary focus was to study the perceptions, decisions, and behaviors of those who were directly involved in, and had relevant knowledge of, the humanitarian

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<sup>629</sup> See addendum for more information about COH and its partner, MOH.

<sup>630</sup> The following assisted in designing the methodology's outline: David Brinberg, "Research Methods I: Analytical Thinking" (Lugano: University of Lugano, 2010).

response.

## **Interviews**

In the case study, personal interviews are the primary means to gather self-reporting information. Questionnaires become a part of the interview protocol rather than a stand-alone element of the case study. The first reason to incorporate questionnaires into the interviews is to limit the participants' burden of requirement, as many would have to be interviewed and participate in a questionnaire or survey. Secondly, given cultural and language barriers, it is helpful to thoroughly explain questions and guide participants.

To create a comfortable environment, every effort is made to conduct these sessions at the time and place of the respondents choosing (i.e. their office).

Interviews can be conducted:

- In person (field)
- In person (corporate offices)
- Phone
- Video conference

The interviews have three elements. Firstly, there are closed-ended questions that are given to all respondents. Secondly, several open-ended questions give the respondent opportunities to provide specific examples and to share their knowledge and perception of the practice of diplomacy in their own words. Thirdly, the personal interviews follow a specific protocol or agenda, regardless of medium used to conduct the interview. The research assistant or researcher are prepared, despite the structure, to follow different paths of the conversation; for example, when a participant's responses or comments indicate that he or she has vital information that will not be collected through the prearranged questions. The emphasis, however, must remain on the role of diplomacy in the particular emergency. The interviewers must take a neutral position. They will explain that their role in the case study is to gather the information but that they will not evaluate the responses.

## **4.4 CASE STUDY DESIGN**

#### 4.4.1 Limitations and Considerations

Since the researcher had worked closely with many of the people (either before, during, or after the response), it was determined that it would be best for a third-party to conduct the interviews. Since participants were aware that the information they provided was used for research, the researcher concluded prior to the study that there were three predominant limitations that could affect the outcome of the results. These limitations centered on the issue of reliability: the honesty of the responses, the ability of respondents to remember the accounts of the particular response, and the potential that social desirability could play a factor in respondents' answers.

It was also critical for the respondents to understand that they, as well as their organization(s), were not being evaluated, and instead that their responses contributed to research. Therefore, the respondents were presented twice (in the initial invitation to participate in the research and at the beginning of the interview or focus group session) with the following statement:

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I have been assigned to conduct this interview. You have been asked to participate in this survey due to your involvement with, and knowledge of, Convoy of Hope's 2010 earthquake disaster response in Haiti. Today you will be helping researchers to gain an understanding of the role that diplomacy plays in humanitarian emergencies.

Please note we are **NOT** conducting an **EVALUATION** of Convoy of Hope's emergency response, nor are we assessing your individual performance or your personal opinion on the response's effectiveness. Your answers will help test a theory. Your responses are confidential and will not be shared with your employer. Your name and title will not be published.

From the outset, the researcher identified several issues that required consideration. To address cultural and linguistic barriers (every participant had sufficient English proficiency to conduct their job), the interviewer was prepared to adequately and simply explain any question. In identifying participants, the researcher had to consider the high turnover that had taken place since 2010. This

posed a particular challenge in contacting those who had come to hold official positions and who were no longer employed by the organization.<sup>631</sup>

The researcher also decided not to rely on focus groups for several reasons. Firstly, the individuals who would have been helpful participants in the focus group sessions were located in several geographic locations. Secondly, given personality and cultural and language barriers, the focus group members would not have contributed equally. Thirdly, despite the perceived success of the emergency response, there are to this day several relational and professional tensions that had emerged and distracted from the case study target.

#### **4.4.2 Convoy of Hope Case Study Approval and Participation**

The researcher presented a research proposal to COH's Research Review Board (RRB) evaluating all internal and external research proposals.

COH's RRB approved the case study on October 31, 2016.<sup>632</sup>

The study was conducted in collaboration with COH's Program Effectiveness unit. That team is tasked to provide support and advice to program management staff and field-level technical staff while also making sure the organization's work is evidence-based and effective. The Program Effectiveness unit works closely with, but remains independent of, the other teams and is responsible for program design, monitoring, evaluation, research, reporting, knowledge management, and capacity building. Several team members with research background, academic publishing experience, and subject-matter expertise supported this project. After receiving approval from the organization's RRB, the researcher presented the research proposal and draft of the dissertation to the Program Effectiveness unit's management team. Together with the researcher they proceeded to develop the following:

- Case study strategy (target dates, etc.).
- Interview question design

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<sup>631</sup> The challenge related primarily to the project ending, funding constraints, or termination of employment.

<sup>632</sup> See addendum for the research proposal and other information pertaining to the approval process.

- Interview protocol
- Data collection, control, and analysis tools

#### 4.4.3 Case Study Participants

In collaboration with the Senior Director for Program Management and the Director of International Disaster Services, the researcher presented a tentative participant list to the RRB. After the research was approved by the organization, several department managers assisted in modifying the participant list. Table 4.2 lists all participants with their primary job locations and the interview dates. The first column lists the participant identification code (ID) assigned to each interviewee. This ID is comprised of the three-letter abbreviation of the person's organization, job type, and assigned number.

Table 4.2 Case study participants

ID	Primary Location	Interview date
COH-Support 1	Local (in the field)	13-Dec-16
COH-Support 2	Local (in the field)	7-Dec-16
COH-Support 3	Global (HQ)	7-Dec-16
COH-Support 4	Local (in the field)	9-Dec-16
COH-Support 5	Local (in the field)	13-Dec-16
COH-Support 6	Local (in the field)	16-Dec-16
COH-Management 1	Local (in the field)	7-Dec-16
COH-Management 2	Local (in the field)	7-Dec-16
COH-Management 3	Global (HQ)	7-Dec-16
COH-Management 4	Local (in the field)	12-Dec-16
COH-Management 5	Local (in the field)	14-Dec-16
COH-Management 6	Global (HQ)	22-Dec-16
COH-Executive 1	Global (HQ)	9-Dec-16
COH-Executive 2	Global (HQ)	13-Dec-16
COH-Executive 3	Global (HQ)	13-Dec-16
COH-Executive 4	Global (HQ)	14-Dec-16
COH-Executive 5	Global (HQ)	20-Dec-16
MOH-Management 1	Local (in the field)	6-Feb-17
MOH-Management 2	Local (in the field)	7-Feb-17
MOH-Management 3	Local (in the field)	8-Feb-17
MOH-Executive 1	Local (in the field)	23-Feb-17
MOH-Executive 2	Global (HQ)	27-Feb-17
MOH-Executive 3	Local (in the field)	1-Feb-17

*Note:* The case study involved 17 participants from COH and 6 participants from Mission of Hope (MOH). To keep the responses anonymous, after submitting the responses each respondent was assigned a unique ID consisting of the person's organization, job level (i.e. support, management and executive), and a number. The second column (Primary Location) shows the primary job location of the respondent. The third column (Interview Date) lists the date when the primary interview was conducted.

#### 4.5 CASE STUDY RESULTS



The researcher created a web-based survey through Google Forms. This enabled the research assistant to enter respondents' answers immediately into the database. Even though the survey database collected participants' names to ensure that all interviews were conducted, the researcher deleted names after assigning each person a unique identification code (i.e. COH-Support 4) and before beginning the analysis. All interviews were categorized into three job levels, namely executive, management, and support staff. This classification was based on job title in conjunction with human resource designations. Data were analyzed in Microsoft Excel.

#### **4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

Inasmuch as this research is concerned with determining to what extent conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD can improve aid effectiveness, the methodology presented in this chapter will ensure that the case study evidence is gathered, stored, processed, presented, and discussed accurately. This case study will engage a diverse set of humanitarian actors from an INGO and NGO who partnered together to respond to the humanitarian emergency caused by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The quality of this research will depend on the activities, decisions, and conversations that will take place between the completion of this chapter and the writing of the next, which will present the results of case studies. To that end, using this chapter as an outline, the researcher will present the case study to the respective organizations for research approval, identify the appropriate candidates, and begin the interview process.

## *Chapter 5*

# **Results: The Role of Diplomacy in a Humanitarian Emergency**

### **5.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

This research seeks to understand the extent to which humanitarian effectiveness can be improved when humanitarian diplomacy is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy. The previous chapter explained the methodology that was applied to test elements of the HMTD theoretical framework. This concept was informed by the aggregated findings from analyzing the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action, humanitarian effectiveness and MTD. This chapter presents the quantitative and qualitative results of the case study before data analysis and discussion is then offered in Chapter 6. The case study assessed the role that diplomacy played in a particular actor's response during a specific humanitarian emergency, namely COH's 2010 Haiti Earthquake response. The purpose of the case study, guided by the fifth sub-question, was to determine if evidence of the HMTD concept emerged in the implementation of diplomatic practice in humanitarian action, and; if so, then what extent it enhanced humanitarian effectiveness.

#### **5.1.1 Participants**

Seventeen of twenty-three COH staff involved in the response participated in

private interview sessions that lasted approximately sixty minutes each.<sup>633</sup> In several instances, participants were contacted a second time to provide clarification on an answer. In terms of job-level classification, interviews were conducted with:

- 5 Executives
- 6 Managers
- 6 Support staff

The seventeen COH interviews fit into the following job-type categories:

- 6 employees from administration (e.g. Communications, Finance, and executive office)
- 11 employees from various operations departments (e.g. Program Operations, Supply Chain and Logistics, and Disaster Services)

In terms of primary work location, there was a balanced representation of field and headquarters-based (HQ-based) employees:

- 9 Field staff
- 8 HQ-based staff (with frequent field trips)

Counterpart interviews were conducted with six Mission of Hope (MOH) employees who fit the interview criteria for the case study (e.g. still employed by MOH, and had interactions with COH personnel). The pool of available MOH participants was significantly smaller given the organizations comparatively smaller size and staff turnover. The researcher was given access to six employees who were directly involved in the disaster response in Haiti. The breakdown of participants' job-levels was:

- 3 Executives
- 3 Managers

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<sup>633</sup> Six staff members who were not a part of the case study were either unavailable or no longer employed by COH.

The breakdown of primary work location for these interviewees was:

- 5 Field staff
- 1 US-based staff

Given MOH’s organizational structure, the interviewees could not be categorized by job-type. It quickly became apparent that the response required every team member to wear multiple hats such as administration, fundraising, and operations.

### 5.1.2 Data Presentation

Table 5.1 explains how most responses are presented in tables throughout this chapter. Column “a” shows how many respondents selected option 1 (“Strongly Agree”), and Column “b” presents what percentage of total respondents selected that option. Column “c” indicates the most frequent response (“mode”) selected by all participants. In general, identifying the modal response is the most appropriate way to understand data produced from Likert Scale interviews.<sup>634</sup>

Table 5.1 Table explanation

	Strongly Agree (1)		Agree (2)		Neutral (3)		Disagree (4)		Strongly Disagree (5)		Mode
The effectiveness of the response depended on YOUR ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to dialogue, advocate, negotiate and/or persuade).	5	29%	6	35%	5	29%	0	0%	1	6%	2
	a	b									c

*Note:* Tables in this chapter present the findings of the case study interviews.

- Number responses (e.g. 5 respondents strongly agreed)
- Percentage responses (e.g. 29% strongly agreed)
- Most common response selected (the mode) (e.g. The most common response to this statement was “agree”)

## 5.2 PARAMETERS OF HUMANITARIAN MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY

### 5.2.1 Identity – Function versus Position

<sup>634</sup> Centre for Academic, Professional and Organizational Development, “Analysing Likert Scale/Type Data” (University of St. Andrews, n.d.), <https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/capod/students/mathssupport/Likert.pdf>.

The first set of questions attempted to determine if participants classified diplomacy as functional or positional. “Diplomatic Function” is everyday diplomacy practiced as a tool to meet a job objective rather than as a position or job requirement. Diplomacy is the shared responsibility of all humanitarian actors, and is practiced regularly and informally in ad hoc situations. “Diplomatic Position” characterizes diplomacy as an official and specialized activity, limited to trained or experienced professionals and high-ranking officials. Here, diplomacy is deliberate, follows protocol, and is mostly focused on a particular and major issue.

COH respondents unanimously viewed the role of diplomacy during the response as important (see Table 5.2), with 82% strongly agreeing and 18% agreeing with the statement. The practice of diplomacy as an organization-wide activity was crucial: 71% strongly agreed and 29% agreed that the effectiveness of the humanitarian response depended on COH’s institutional ability to practice diplomacy.

Table 5.2 Identity parameter (COH)

	<b>Strongly Agree (1)</b>		<b>Agree (2)</b>		<b>Neutral (3)</b>		<b>Disagree (4)</b>		<b>Strongly Disagree (5)</b>		<b>Mode</b>
Diplomacy played an important role in the response.	14	82%	3	18%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
The effectiveness of the response depended on your organization's ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to negotiate).	12	71%	5	29%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
The effectiveness of the response depended on YOUR ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to dialogue, advocate, negotiate and/or persuade).	5	29%	6	35%	5	29%	0	0%	1	6%	2
To be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.	12	71%	3	18%	1	6%	1	6%	0	0%	1
The practice of diplomacy was limited to senior managers and/or trained professionals.	1	6%	1	6%	3	18%	9	53%	3	18%	4
The practice of diplomacy was a shared responsibility across the organization (i.e. in different circumstances, different people were involved in some type of negotiations).	14	82%	1	6%	1	6%	1	6%	0	0%	1

*Note:* The most frequent response (the mode) indicated that COH respondents’ viewed diplomacy as a functional rather than positional practice.

Next, participants were asked to reflect on what role diplomacy played in

their personal execution of their job responsibilities during the disaster response. 29% strongly agreed and 35% agreed that their individual ability to practice diplomacy was essential to the response's effectiveness. The "tools of diplomacy" (i.e. dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion), according to a field-based relief operations coordinator, "describes everything you have to utilize to get everything done."<sup>635</sup> A field-based respondent observed that diplomacy, while very important, was only one aspect that ensured aid effectiveness. Diplomacy was a prerequisite to effectiveness, but managing efficient operations were equally as critical.<sup>636</sup> A manager observed that diplomacy is best understood as a system-wide activity because, as evident in the field, expatriate and local staff regularly found themselves in situations requiring diplomacy.<sup>637</sup> A headquarters-based executive agreed that his diplomatic activities were essential to the organization's success. These activities took place outside of Haiti, dealing with external parties (i.e. donors, state actors, and media) and internal stakeholders (i.e. board members, executives, management, and support staff).<sup>638</sup>

Operations staff was twice more likely to strongly agree with the statement that the response's effectiveness depended on their ability to practice diplomacy than administrators who most commonly agreed. The modal response, however, was "agree" (see Table 5.2). In all, 29% took a neutral stance to the statement that the response's effectiveness depended on individual diplomatic function. One participant, explaining his neutral response, noted that he was unsure how to answer the question because his behind-the-scenes operations role did not keep him in the field long.<sup>639</sup> Another neutral respondent found it difficult to conceptualize how his logistics job entailed diplomatic significance.<sup>640</sup> One person initially strongly disagreed with the statement; however, he changed his response at the end of the 60-minute interview, believing that most diplomacy during the

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<sup>635</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>636</sup> Interview with COH-Support 5, December 16, 2016.

<sup>637</sup> Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

<sup>638</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 2, December 13, 2016.

<sup>639</sup> Interview with COH-Management 7, December 7, 2016.

<sup>640</sup> Interview with COH-Support 2, December 7, 2016.

response in fact depended on him and his operations department colleagues in the field.<sup>641</sup> The researcher did not change the original response in the survey.

As Figure 5.1 highlights, HQ-based personnel appeared to place greater value on their personal diplomatic practice than field-based personnel. Of HQ-based staff, 75% either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, compared to 55% of field-based personnel either strongly agreeing or agreeing. Although discussed in more detail in section 7.3, it warrants brief mention in the present context that 50% of HQ-based personnel believed that most diplomatic interactions took place outside of Haiti, while 88% of field personnel viewed Haiti as the primary location of diplomatic activity.




Figure 5.1 Individual diplomatic function (COH). This graph compares the perceptions of COH field-based and headquarters-based staff as they relate to their individual practice of diplomacy and its contribution to aid effectiveness in the response. The responses overall tend to classify the identity parameter as functional rather than positional.

Of the total participants, 71% strongly agreed and 18% agreed with the statement, “to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat” (see Figure 5.2), while 89% of field-staff strongly agreed with the statement. One participant indicated that

<sup>641</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

regardless of job location (field or global HQ) or position (support staff, management, or executive), diplomatic tools were “absolutely required” to fulfill the humanitarian mandate.<sup>642</sup> One executive explained his neutral response to the statement by stressing that humanitarians often found themselves having to practice diplomacy, but rarely had the tools or experience to practice it properly.<sup>643</sup> Another participant, who strongly agreed with the statement, expounded that good humanitarians are diplomats, and good humanitarian diplomats are even better listeners.<sup>644</sup>




Figure 5.2 Humanitarians are diplomats (COH). Field-based personnel tend to strongly agree that to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat. Although the majority of headquarters-based staff identify with the statement, their responses are mostly split between strongly agree and agree.

Disagreeing with the statement that all humanitarians are diplomats, a field-based operations team member stressed that there are, in fact, different types of humanitarians. Not every humanitarian job required diplomacy. In his

<sup>642</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>643</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 1, December 9, 2016.

<sup>644</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.



estimation, everyone on the team had to be a humanitarian, but not necessarily a diplomat.<sup>645</sup> There were also instances when humanitarian diplomacy required tactless diplomacy. Whereas tact and soft skills were hallmarks of traditional diplomats, certain situations required humanitarians to be undiplomatic in order to achieve a humanitarian goal.<sup>646</sup>




Figure 5.3 Diplomacy in job descriptions (COH). The majority of job descriptions do not mention diplomatic function as part of the job responsibilities. This is an indicator that COH personnel view diplomacy as functional.

Less than 30% of job requirements listed any type of diplomatic responsibilities (see Figure 5.3). While most diplomacy took place in the field (according to 88% of interviewees), HQ-based personnel's job descriptions were

<sup>645</sup> Interview with COH-Support 5, December 16, 2016.

<sup>646</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

twice as likely to mention diplomacy. Although generally not a job requirement, diplomacy, according to 15 of the 17 of interviewees, was a shared responsibility (see Table 5.2). A manager noted “whenever you have a disaster at the scale of Haiti, it’s all hands on deck. Others get pulled in ...[diplomacy is] not isolated to departments.”<sup>647</sup> An operations support staff person thought executive leaders often opened diplomatic channels or facilitated dialogue, however, since most diplomatic function took place in the field, everyone on the team had to manage some aspects of diplomacy.<sup>648</sup> Despite the stress and natural miscommunication in a large-scale disaster, one participant noted that such a context often encouraged an environment of open communication. During a crisis, everyone within the organization was more empowered to directly engage in diplomatic efforts. This, according to the manager, proved to be effective in creating informal and official networks of communication that ensured healthy working relationships, smooth movement of goods, and the establishment of stronger networks with state and non-state actors in the affected communities.<sup>649</sup>




Figure 5.4 Exclusivity of diplomatic practice (COH). Most COH case study participants opposed the notion that diplomatic function was limited to those with seniority or expertise.

<sup>647</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>648</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>649</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

The majority of participants disagreed with the following statement: “The practice of diplomacy was limited to senior managers and/or trained professionals” (see Figure 5.4). To be successful, diplomacy had to be shared among all levels.<sup>650</sup>

Since many interactions in the emergency context required diplomacy, diplomatic activities transcended hierarchy.<sup>651</sup> One manager noted that “functioning diplomacy” had to be present on all organizational levels to ensure an effective response. He regularly observed executives and volunteers alike negotiating and persuading a variety of stakeholders in different contexts.<sup>652</sup> An individual who spent only a few weeks in the field was taken aback by the fact that field-based personnel, and not executives or HQ-based personnel, were responsible for most diplomatic activities.<sup>653</sup>

As diplomacy took place on different levels and was practiced by different actors within the organization, a recurring theme of the interview was the lack of training and organization of diplomacy. A HQ-based manager who made regular trips to the field stated,

We used volunteers in Haiti; whoever was around did whatever. We had to train them as we went along. We've gotten more proactive to make sure people were trained, but back then we didn't have time to train everyone on how diplomacy worked.<sup>654</sup>

Senior-level managers often remotely facilitated many diplomatic activities, but had to depend on support staff to facilitate relationships and negotiations. When staff and volunteers were directly engaged in the diplomatic process, they were given clear instructions for handling situations without arousing hostility. The manager further noted they “were aware that observing and constantly assessing volunteers and other staffers was necessary to ensure that [their] diplomatic efforts were not undone by hostile or exhausted individuals.”<sup>655</sup>

Of the respondents, 76% viewed COH’s diplomatic efforts as informal and

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<sup>650</sup> Interview with COH-Support 5, December 16, 2016.

<sup>651</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>652</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>653</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>654</sup> Interview with COH-Management 6, December 13, 2016.

<sup>655</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

improvised rather than official and planned. Two executives, one support staff, and one manager comprised the 24% of participants who viewed diplomacy as official and planned. Of these four, three were HQ-based personnel.

According to one manager, informal approaches often opened up official channels of diplomacy.<sup>656</sup> Another participant, citing the massive destruction and the fact that this was COH's largest response, explained "it's hard to say everything is fully planned. But we did plan as we went along."<sup>657</sup> Even diplomatic interactions with official actors appeared to be rather informal and unplanned. As one manager described,

The scale of the disaster and the unprecedented humanitarian response forced each of us to improvise. We had to negotiate informal agreements with military and NGOs from several different countries ... By persuading these independent groups that we could provide the best distribution network we were provided with the provisions, protection, and transportation (including helicopter transport) we needed to accomplish our goals of getting the proper supplies to the hardest hit locations. Having both the planned and improvised diplomatic response created an opportunity to prevent groups from setting up distribution points based on convenience rather than efficiency.<sup>658</sup>

Not only was diplomatic activity informal and improvised, it was also conducted mostly in the field, according to 88% of participants. As one executive noted, "COH places trust in senior field level managers [to practice diplomacy]." These interactions involved state and non-state actors and covered a broad range of strategic and operational issues. Where diplomacy was conducted depended on the person's responsibilities.<sup>659</sup>

### ***5.2.1.1 Comparison with MOH Responses***

MOH case study participants responded in similar fashion to most questions in this section (see Table 5.3). MOH personnel unanimously affirmed that diplomacy

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<sup>656</sup> Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

<sup>657</sup> Interview with COH-Management 6, December 13, 2016.

<sup>658</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>659</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

played an important role in the response (83% strongly agreed , 17% agreed). MOH personnel also believed that the effectiveness of the response depended on their organization's ability to practice diplomacy (66% strongly agreed, 34% agreed). Fifty percent strongly agreed (3 participants) and 16% (1 participant) agreed that to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat, while one administrative manager (16%) disagreed. A field-based executive (16%) took a neutral stance. The statement “to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat” reflected the manager’s ideal preference but such was not always the default. He noted,

I think you can be a diplomat- it's a heart and a skill issue. There are a lot of humanitarians who are not diplomats and diplomats who are not humanitarians. It's great when you find the balance of someone to be both a humanitarian and a diplomat.<sup>660</sup>

Table 5.3 Identity parameter (COH vs. MOH)

	COH		MOH	
Diplomacy played an important role in the response.	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree	1
The effectiveness of the response depended on YOUR organization's ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to negotiate).	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree	1
The effectiveness of the response depended on YOUR ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to dialogue, advocate, negotiate and/or persuade).	Agree	2	Strongly Agree	1
To be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree	1
The practice of diplomacy was limited to senior managers and/or trained professionals.	Disagree	4	Agree	2
The practice of diplomacy was a shared responsibility across the organization (i.e. in different circumstances, different people were involved in some type of negotiations).	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree	1

*Note:* Generally, COH and MOH classify the identity parameter as functional rather than positional, but there is a degree of variance between the organizational rankings. Their responses are color coded to indicate:

- a. Consensus (green)
- b. Harmony (orange)
- c. Divergence (red)

Whereas the majority of COH interviewees agreed that the effectiveness of the response depended on their personal ability to practice diplomacy, 100% of MOH staff strongly agreed. MOH staff, like their COH counterparts, strongly agreed that the practice of diplomacy was a shared responsibility across the organization. A striking difference in responses followed. While most COH staff

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<sup>660</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017.

disagreed that the practice of diplomacy was limited to senior manager and/or trained professionals, MOH staff agreed (see Table 5.3). When discussing this incongruence, different participants from MOH and COH alluded to the different internal structures of an INGO and an NGO. As a local NGO, most of MOH executives were based in Haiti, while 100% of COH executives were based in the US and only periodically visited the field.

While strongly agreeing that the practice of diplomacy was limited to senior managers or trained managers, one MOH executive added the caveat that there were a number of unofficial negotiations taking place that did not involve senior managers from MOH.<sup>661</sup> Further, MOH employed an executive whose primary function was to collaborate and coordinate with government officials and local and international NGOs.<sup>662</sup>




Figure 5.5 Diplomacy in job descriptions (COH vs. MOH). More than half of the MOH personnel job descriptions included diplomacy as a job requirement, compared to only one third of COH job descriptions.

Responses to another question shed light on the role of MOH senior managers in the practice of diplomacy. 66% of MOH employees' job descriptions listed diplomatic function as a requirement, compared with 29% of COH

<sup>661</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 2, February 27, 2017.

<sup>662</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 1, February 23, 2017.

interviewees. All MOH senior managers and executives were required by job description to practice diplomacy, but only 50% of COH executives and senior managers had the same requirement in their job descriptions.

### **5.2.2 Format of Diplomacy**

The next section sought to identify the format of humanitarian diplomacy during the disaster response in Haiti as public or confidential. Public humanitarian diplomacy is a highly collaborative, interactive, and transparent activity.

Diplomatic tools are practiced to inform constituents, mobilize support, influence decisions and behaviors, and shame or confront violators. Diplomatic activities (i.e. negotiations) take place in public environments or the outcomes are made public to foster coordination, transparency, and accountability. On the other hand, confidential humanitarian diplomacy is a discreet or private activity in which confidentiality is paramount in order to stabilize relationships, limit escalation, and protect information. This diplomacy is influenced-based and relies on back-channels.

Not only did most participants agree that diplomacy most commonly took place in the field, but to them, it was also conducted in public rather than in private spaces. Of all participants, 71% stated that diplomatic interactions took place in open venues, such as runways, checkpoints, churches, and distribution sites. 83% of managers supported this statement, followed by executives (60%) and support staff (67%). Personnel's primary job location appears to be a decisive factor; 88% of field-based staff identified public spaces as the primary place of diplomatic activity, compared to 50% of home-office-based personnel. A field-based manager explained his answer by pointing to the fact that he often had access to the type of decision-maker he needed in public spaces.<sup>663</sup> Another employee noted,

Although there were a few opportunities to coordinate in private spaces set up by some larger organizations, the most effective diplomatic efforts were made on the runway, at checkpoints, and at distribution sites where we could speak with decision makers to

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<sup>663</sup> Interview with COH-Support 2, December 7, 2016.

actually assess the supplies, personnel, security, damage, and number of affected peoples.<sup>664</sup>

When diplomacy was practiced in public spaces it followed more traditional norms. Three quarters of respondents believed (24% strongly agreed, 53% agreed) that confidentiality was essential to a successful negotiation (see Table 5.4). One third of managers (2 participants) strongly disagreed with the statement, but did not elaborate on their responses. In several interviews, it was suggested that confidentiality was somewhat of an indicator of trust. Going “outside of the circle” or prematurely engaging others required a top-level directive.<sup>665</sup> Others alluded to sensitivities relating to COH managing multiple partnerships; each partner organization having its own interests, and, at times, being in competition with other actors. Negotiating partner agreements, in particular, required discretion due to the “irrational sensitivity of some groups ‘feeling left out.’”<sup>666</sup>

Table 5.4 Format parameter (COH)

	<b>Strongly Agree (1)</b>		<b>Agree (2)</b>		<b>Neutral (3)</b>		<b>Disagree (4)</b>		<b>Strongly Disagree (5)</b>		<b>Mode</b>
A successful negotiation (i.e. securing a partnership agreement) depended on discretion and/or confidentiality.	4	24%	9	53%	2	12%	0	0%	2	12%	2
Persuading decision-makers to change behavior required a confidential and/or discreet approach.	5	29%	8	47%	0	0%	3	18%	1	6%	2
Publicly shaming actors who obstructed humanitarian operations (e.g. calling out corrupt government officials or ineffective partner organizations) was (or would have been) an effective diplomatic tool.	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	4	24%	13	76%	5

*Note:* The most common responses to the three statements indicate that COH personnel classify the format parameter as confidential rather than public. Every respondent opposed shaming as an effective diplomatic tool.

Much of the diplomatic interactions and relationships were managed organically and informally, depending on personal relationships rather than formal

<sup>664</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>665</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>666</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.



agreements. One manager assigned to air cargo operations became acquainted with US military personnel. He identified military personnel who were more inclined (without coercion or bribing) than others to assist COH in accessing and moving inbound cargo. Unspoken agreements “had to be confidential because the “commanders were concerned about setting precedent.”<sup>667</sup> When it came to dealing with a counterpart who represented a party with which COH had an existing relationship, COH’s approach was to keep interactions private. “A private meeting allowed the opportunity to fully present your thoughts and potentially change someone’s mind” without having to escalate matters.<sup>668</sup> A common concern was that such practice could “undermine long-term effectiveness.”<sup>669</sup>

There were times when COH had to persuade counterparts to change behavior. When pressure was applied during interactions, what role did confidentiality play, then? Seventy five percent of participants believed that persuasion required confidentiality and discretion (29% strongly agreed, 47% agreed). The most common reason centered on the issue of cultural awareness. In the context of Haiti, strong persuasive techniques, according to several participants, would have been inappropriate, offensive, and ultimately counterproductive. Challenging someone in front of the person’s peers or subordinates would not afford the opportunity to save face.<sup>670</sup> Even in matters of security, COH attempted to navigate conversations quietly and discreetly. When protection of beneficiaries, personnel, and assets (i.e. vehicles, goods) were at stake, several people in the field level discreetly addressed those matters with Haitian authorities as well as with US military commanders, but made no public calls or statements on the matter.<sup>671</sup>

What happened in Haiti when counterparts, corrupt governments officials, or ineffective organizations obstructed COH’s relief operation? Was publicly

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<sup>667</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>668</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>669</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>670</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>671</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

shaming actors an effective diplomatic tool? None of the participants believed that the Haitian context and COH's role warranted such action, with 76% strongly disagreeing and 24% disagreeing that shaming would have been effective. As one respondent noted, "there is rarely a good time when shaming would work."<sup>672</sup> A participant believed local actors had more freedom and knowledge to appropriately challenge obstruction and/or non-compliance through shaming, but as an IO, COH's global reputation was at risk.<sup>673</sup>

Others echoed the concern that shaming could possibly secure results in the short-term, but in the long-term decrease the organization's effectiveness.<sup>674</sup> Some proffered alternative practices, such as the following as described by one respondent: "At times we could face a wall or a stalemate when dealing with the United Nations or state actors. Publicly, we would remain quiet, but we would discreetly open up other channels either with partner organizations or decision-influencers in DC or New York who could indirectly put pressure on them."<sup>675</sup> While shaming in some instances might have been justified, a field-based supervisor believed there were more appropriate options available, such as quietly and indirectly advocating.<sup>676</sup> Others argued that the fast growing organization needed to harness its influence by developing mechanisms for advocacy in order to challenge non-compliance and obstruction of relief operations in the future.<sup>677</sup>

### **5.2.3 Comparison with Mission of Hope Responses**

While there generally appeared to be similar attitudes toward the format of diplomacy, MOH and COH responses were not entirely uniform (see Table 5.5). Respondents from both organizations were most likely to agree that persuading decision-makers to change behavior required a confidential or discreet approach. A MOH executive who remained neutral noted,

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<sup>672</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>673</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>674</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>675</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>676</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>677</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

That depends on the situation, and I think there were sometimes when it had to be very confidential and other times when it was a public and passionate discussion. [It] depends on the situation and who you are talking to.<sup>678</sup>

Table 5.5 Format parameter (COH vs. MOH)

	COH		MOH	
A successful negotiation (i.e. securing a partnership agreement) depended on discretion and/or confidentiality.	2	Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Persuading decision-makers to change behavior required a confidential and/or discreet approach.	2	Agree	2	Agree
Publicly shaming actors who obstructed humanitarian operations (e.g. calling out corrupt government officials or ineffective partner organizations) was (or would have been) an effective diplomatic tool.	5	Strongly Disagree	4	Disagree

*Note:* COH and MOH respondents harmoniously classify the format parameter to be confidential rather than public. Proximity coding:

- a. Consensus (green)
- b. Harmony (orange)
- c. Divergence (red)

Whereas COH personnel merely agreed that a successful negotiation depended on discretion or confidentiality, MOH staff strongly agreed with the assertion. Confidentiality was the backbone of MOH's approach to diplomacy, especially with government officials.<sup>679</sup> In Haiti's tumultuous political environment, MOH had to quietly negotiate with different state actors.<sup>680</sup> A manager who responded neutrally conveyed that there were times when a confidential approach did not necessarily require confidentiality. When pressed for a reason, he replied that it depended on the organization's size, efficiency, and reputation in the field. Organizations like MOH were well established in Haiti and, therefore, had the liberty to operate publicly.<sup>681</sup> Another MOH manager, who disagreed with the statement, did not believe discretion was an important aspect in negotiations.<sup>682</sup>

Most COH staff strongly disagreed that publicly shaming actors who obstructed humanitarian operations (e.g. calling out corrupt government officials or ineffective partner organizations) was (or would have been) an effective

<sup>678</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017.

<sup>679</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 1, February 23, 2017.

<sup>680</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017.

<sup>681</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017.

<sup>682</sup> Ibid.

diplomatic tool. MOH personnel disagreed (2 strongly disagreed, 2 disagreed). One manager who disagreed believed that there are many alternatives before having to resort to shaming.<sup>683</sup> Two managers who agreed that shaming could be an effective diplomatic tool believed that it depended on how such an approach was implemented and how arguments were worded.<sup>684</sup> A MOH manager noted that shaming occasionally took place and was often successful when it was used in a tactical fashion.<sup>685</sup>

#### **5.2.4 Objective of Diplomacy**

Did COH personnel practice mostly strategic or operational humanitarian diplomacy? The former, on the one hand, is incorporated into all aspects of the organization. It is practiced to communicate vision, mission, and key messages. Strategic diplomacy is practiced to manage global interagency relationships and is driven by leadership and policy (humanitarian diplomacy or strategic communication policy). On the other hand, the latter, operational humanitarian diplomacy is focused on particular operational situations, mostly ad hoc, and in the field or operating theater. Activities include negotiating access, maintaining humanitarian space, implementing and monitoring programs, and addressing security issues.

During the response, most of COH's diplomatic efforts addressed day-to-day issues, namely negotiating a shipping rate, securing access, and interacting with local communities (see Figure 5.6).

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<sup>683</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017.

<sup>684</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 3, February 8, 2017.

<sup>685</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 2, February 7, 2017.




Figure 5.6 Organizational objective (COH). The majority of respondents classified their organization's diplomatic practice as operational rather than strategic.




Figure 5.7 Personal objective (COH). More than half of COH case study participants classified their personal diplomatic practice as operational.

When given only two choices (operational versus strategic), 65% of participants indicated that operational objectives were the primary reason for practicing diplomacy (see Figure 5.7). While strongly agreeing that most diplomacy was

operations-focused, a manager stated that after the initial weeks of response, executive leadership became increasingly aware that the Haiti earthquake response had the potential to radically change COH's future. From that point on, many diplomatic activities across the organization "took on a much more strategic, future-oriented approach to diplomacy."<sup>686</sup> Another operations staff person observed that he sensed COH leadership gradually becoming more intentional and strategic given the reality that COH could establish itself long-term in Haiti.<sup>687</sup> A manager explained,

My main job was to address operational issues while the executives were looking towards the development of long-term goals. However, the long-term goals had an effect on my efforts to develop stronger relationships and partnerships with certain groups.<sup>688</sup>

Often, the wrong people were at the negotiating table. According to 100% of executives, they involved themselves in diplomatic interactions concerning operational matters. There was also consensus among the executive group that every time an agreement was negotiated on the executive level, operational details still had to be negotiated on the local level. Interestingly, support staff and managers moderated the response to this question. When considering all responses, 58% stated "always," 35% "sometimes," and 6% remained neutral. In general, most agreed that high-level agreements with partner organizations were drafted on the executive level. Subsequently, field-based team members would then have to operationalize the agreement with their counterparts, often resulting in further negotiations, or "hashing out the details."<sup>689</sup> A lesson that COH learned from this is that in the end "everything happens on a local level. We can't do anything unless we have local buy-in and [capacity]."<sup>690</sup>

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<sup>686</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>687</sup> Interview with COH-Management 6, December 13, 2016.

<sup>688</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>689</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 5, December 16, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>690</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

### 5.2.5 Comparison with Mission of Hope Responses

In what types of diplomatic interactions was MOH staff mostly involved? Like their COH counterparts, MOH interviewees' diplomacy goals were to address operational issues rather than achieve long-term, strategic goals (see Figure 5.9). Responsible for setting up MOH's supply chain, one manager believed his diplomatic focus was strategic.<sup>691</sup> A US-based executive who was hired in the aftermath of the disaster also believed that his work to build MOH's long-term capacity forced his diplomatic focus to be long-term and strategic.<sup>692</sup> When it came to their organizations' diplomatic efforts, COH and MOH again shared the attitude that their focus was on addressing day-to-day issues (see Figure 5.8).




Figure 5.8 Personal objectives (COH vs. MOH). Personnel from both organizations mostly viewed their personal practice of diplomacy as operational.

<sup>691</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017.

<sup>692</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 2, December 13, 2016.




Figure 5.9 Organizational objective (COH vs. MOH). Organization-wide, COH and MOH personnel ranked the diplomatic practice as operational.

### 5.2.6 Environment of Diplomacy

Next, the interview began to ascertain if the environment of humanitarian diplomacy was humanitarian-focused or politically-influenced. Humanitarian-focused diplomacy is practiced in an environment focused on the humanitarian imperative (to address suffering wherever it is found). It is mainly coordinated (and depended on) by humanitarian actors and is independent of political actors. Non-state actors avoid interaction with government officials. In contrast, those practicing politically-influenced humanitarian diplomacy are profoundly engaged in the political context, depending on political actors to secure agreements and support the humanitarian imperative. Non-state actors are dependent on state engagement, namely coordinating responses, and providing assistance and security. They routinely interact with state officials.

Of the respondents, 88% strongly agreed that political issues (i.e. security, corruption, lack of infrastructure or capacity) directly affected COH's response (see Table 5.6). A manager observed that "the poor state of the pre-disaster



infrastructure was compounded by the earthquake.”<sup>693</sup> Some attributed the poor infrastructure to corruption.<sup>694</sup> Where were these problems most noticeable?

Operations team members encountered regular challenges in dealing with customs officials, designing and managing the supply chain (transportation, road safety, road infrastructure), and grappling with burdensome bureaucracy and systemic corruption on local and national levels.<sup>695</sup>

Table 5.6 Domain parameter (COH)

	Strongly Agree (1)		Agree (2)		Neutral (3)		Disagree (4)		Strongly Disagree (5)		Mode
In diplomatic interactions (e.g. negotiations), the humanitarian imperative (addressing suffering) took priority over other interests (e.g. political, organizational, business interests.).	7	41%	8	47%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	2
You primarily practiced diplomacy with non-government actors.	11	65%	5	29%	0	0%	1	6%	0	0%	1
The effectiveness of your organization's response depended on communication with government actors.	2	12%	7	41%	4	24%	4	24%	0	0%	2
Political issues (i.e. security, corruption, lack of infrastructure or capacity) directly affected your response.	15	88%	0	0%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	1

*Note:* Respondents ranked the domain parameter as humanitarian rather than political, meaning that diplomatic interactions involved mostly non-state actors and focused on the humanitarian imperative.

Ninety-four percent of participants (65% strongly agree, 29% agreed) believed that COH primarily practiced diplomacy with non-state actors. Regular diplomatic exchanges, however, took place with officials on local, national, and international levels. HQ and field-based staff perceived the frequency of this interaction differently. Field staff was twice as likely as HQ staff to view such exchanges to have always taken place (see Figure 5.10).

<sup>693</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>694</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>695</sup> Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.




Figure 5.10 State actor interaction (COH). Field-based staff believed their organization regularly interacted with state actors.

Participants were most likely to agree to the statement that the effectiveness of the response depended on communication with state actors (see Table 5.7, Figure 5.12). What did this interaction look like? Those responding were quick to point to in-country supply chain activities that required custom clearances.<sup>696</sup>

When COH interacted with state actors (see Table 5.6), the humanitarian imperative took priority over other interests (41% strongly agreed, 47% agreed, 11% neutral). Fundamentally, the humanitarian imperative was the driving force behind COH’s diplomatic interactions.<sup>697</sup> Most, but certainly not all, conversations centered on this cornerstone.<sup>698</sup> One manager noted that although corruption was common, most challenges with state actors had to do with inefficiencies, misunderstandings, and the complete breakdown of administrative

<sup>696</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>697</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>698</sup> Ibid.

structures due to the massive destruction. Government officials did not respond well when NGOs immediately resorted to “moral authority” arguments instead of pragmatically dialoging with their counterparts to find a suitable solution.<sup>699</sup> Although the humanitarian imperative was the priority, local staff encountered instances in which other interests and dynamics were in play, especially involving non-program persons (i.e. fundraisers) who did not share the same priorities and philosophy as program staff.<sup>700</sup>

In total, 64% of participants believed that COH viewed a government agency (e.g. FEMA, USAID) as a partner during the response. Executives were more likely to agree (80%) than management (67%) and support staff (50%). Segmenting by primary job locations, presents an interesting perspective. Of HQ staff, 75% believed COH viewed a government agency as a partner compared with 56% of field staff.

### 5.2.7 Comparison with Mission of Hope Responses

MOH personnel strongly agreed that in diplomatic interactions the humanitarian imperative took priority over other interests (see Table 5.7).

Table 5.7 Domain parameter (COH vs. MOH)

	COH		MOH	
In diplomatic interactions (e.g. negotiations), the humanitarian imperative (addressing suffering) took priority over other interests (e.g. political, organizational, business interests.).	2	Agree	1	Strongly Agree
You primarily practiced diplomacy with non-government actors.	1	Strongly Agree	2	Agree
The effectiveness of your organization's response depended on communication with government actors.	2	Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Political issues (i.e. security, corruption, lack of infrastructure or capacity) directly affected your response.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree

*Note:* COH and MOH respondents harmoniously (see proximity ranking below) classify the domain parameter to be humanitarian rather than political.

- d. Consensus (green)
- e. Harmony (orange)
- f. Divergence (red)

Of MOH staff, 66% stated that their organization always interacted with state

<sup>699</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>700</sup> Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

actors; 34% believed that was sometimes the case (see Figure 5.11). Yet whereas 94% of COH strongly agreed that they primarily practiced diplomacy with non-government actors, MOH responses were more varied: One strongly agreed and three agreed that MOH primarily practiced diplomacy with non-state actors. A US-based executive strongly disagreed. A manager responsible for the logistics of medical teams also disagreed, indicating that his work required interaction with state and non-state actors.<sup>701</sup>




Figure 5.11 Frequency of interaction with state actors (COH vs. MOH). MOH personnel interacted more frequently with state actors. The interviewees indicated that COH relied on MOH as the local NGO to conduct most interactions with government actors.

Despite the regular interaction that state actors, only half of MOH respondents believed the effectiveness the response depended on communication with government actors (see Figure 5.12). An executive who disagreed argued that MOH was a very well-known NGO in the country and, therefore, did not encounter as much government red tape as other local and international NGOs.<sup>702</sup>

<sup>701</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 2, February 7, 2017.

<sup>702</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 1, February 23, 2017.




Figure 5.12 State actors and aid effectiveness (COH vs. MOH). Although MOH interacted with state actors more than COH, the responses from the local NGO and COH are fairly similar in that approximately half of the interviewees linked communication with state actors to aid effectiveness.

### 5.2.8 Context of Diplomacy

Customized humanitarian diplomacy is tailored depending on where multi-track activities take place (local, national, and global levels). Practitioners are prepared to adjust tools to respect culture, customs, and social considerations. Standardized humanitarian diplomacy, in contrast, is a uniform, one-size-fits-all practice and its activities reflect the organization's culture and the practitioner's personality and background.

Of the interviewees, 64% received at least some level of information or training on how to communicate in the local context and culture prior to their deployment. Almost all (94%) adapted their diplomacy style depending on the nationality of their counterpart (see Table 5.8). Explaining this consensus, a manager stressed that culture awareness in the field is a crucial element of the organization's DNA.<sup>703</sup> Agreeing, another manager believed that adjusting one's

<sup>703</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

diplomatic approach is vital to the success of a humanitarian emergency.<sup>704</sup> “One cannot practice diplomacy without taking into consideration the preferred culture of the counterpart,” an experienced aid professional stated. He continued, arguing “to neglect culture would be to prematurely fail in any negotiation.”<sup>705</sup> A respondent who did not adapt his diplomacy style to the local culture suggested he delegated such interactions to local partner staff that served as “somewhat of a filter.”<sup>706</sup> Did COH’s diplomacy look different depending on whether it took place on a global or field level? Seventy percent of COH participants strongly agreed and 24% agreed, while a respondent responsible for public communications disagreed (see Table 5.8). A theme emerged when participants were asked how diplomatic approaches were adapted. Styles could be different, but the overall message had to be consistent: COH’s focus on diplomacy through relationship had to be the common thread when practicing diplomacy on behalf of the organization.<sup>707</sup>

Table 5.8 Localization parameter (COH)

	Strongly Agree (1)		Agree (2)		Neutral (3)		Disagree (4)		Strongly Disagree (5)		Mode
You adapted your diplomacy style depending on the nationality of your counterpart (e.g. negotiating with a Haitian official).	14	82%	2	12%	0	0%	1	6%	0	0%	1
Your organization’s diplomacy looked different	12	70%	4	24%	0	0%	1	6%	0	0%	1

<sup>704</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>705</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

<sup>706</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>707</sup> Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 4, December 9, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

depending on whether it took place on a global or field level.											
Language barriers affected diplomatic interactions.	7	41%	7	41%	1	6%	2	12%	0	0%	1
A negotiator's appearance (e.g. dress, age, etc.) and position (title, status in organization) affected the outcome of diplomatic interactions.	7	41%	3	18%	3	18%	3	18%	1	6%	1

*Note:* The most common responses reveal a leaning toward classifying the localization parameter as contextualized rather than standardized.

Language barriers affected diplomatic interactions (41% strongly agreed, 41% agreed), but only a quarter of respondents believed that, because of this, agreements were sometimes not honored. One manager noted several instances in which “things were lost in translation.”<sup>708</sup> A field-based staffer noted that this was less likely to happen on the field level as locals were negotiating and implementing agreements. Language barriers were more common in communication between managers in Haiti and senior leaders in the US.<sup>709</sup> What is interesting to note is that despite the manager’s observation, the majority of US-based executives did not believe that linguistic misunderstandings or cultural differences caused agreements to be dishonored (see Figure 5.13).

<sup>708</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>709</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.




Figure 5.13 Localization dynamics (COH). One-third of field-based staff believed that linguistic misunderstandings and cultural differences could sometimes affect agreements, whereas over one third of headquarters-based personnel believed this never to be the case.

Did a negotiator's appearance (e.g. dress, age, etc.) and position (i.e. status in organization or title) affect the outcome of diplomatic interactions? In all, 41% strongly agreed and 18% agreed (see Table 5.8). Field-based personnel were more likely agree with this statement. Appearance could become barriers in building credibility and seeking support, according to a manager involved in many key negotiations. He continued,

Officials, who themselves often had lost everything in the earthquake, managed to be dressed professionally. Some were put off when our team would be poorly dressed. Other counterparts appeared almost offended when junior staff was sent to discuss or negotiate with them. They expected that [COH] would send a peer; someone equal in position or status.<sup>710</sup>

One of the interviewees recalled a senior manager from a partner organization insisting that he would not introduce COH personnel wearing shorts or T-shirts to Haitian officials. Later when a joint delegation from the Haitian

<sup>710</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.



government and US embassy came for a field visit, expatriates who were casually dressed were overlooked when introductions were made.<sup>711</sup> A manager experienced regularly that position and gender were problems during negotiations in the field. This was especially the case for junior staff who were often empowered to lead several negotiations with implementing agencies but were initially perceived to be too inexperienced by counterparts. Not only did staff have to be properly equipped to overcome these barriers, “earning respect was something that a supervisor had to do by reinforcing employees’ status in the organization through a variety of channels.”<sup>712</sup> Two executives shared similar thoughts, observing that position and title affected people’s ability to negotiate with external parties.<sup>713</sup>

### 5.2.9 Comparison with MOH Responses

The majority of MOH staff either strongly agreed or agreed that they adapted their diplomacy style depending on the nationality of their counterpart (see Table 5.9). Unlike their COH counterparts who strongly agreed, MOH staff only agreed that a negotiator’s appearance (e.g. dress, age, etc.) and position (title, status in organization) affected the outcome of diplomatic interactions.

Table 5.9 Localization parameter (COH vs. MOH)

	COH		MOH	
You adapted your diplomacy style depending on the nationality of your counterpart (e.g. negotiating with a Haitian official).	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Your organization’s diplomacy looked different depending if it took place on a global or field level.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Language barriers affected diplomatic interactions.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
A negotiator’s appearance (e.g. dress, age, etc.) and position (title, status in organization) affected the outcome of diplomatic interactions.	1	Strongly Agree	2	Agree

*Note:* There is consensus amongst COH and MOH respondents in viewing the localization parameter as contextualized rather than standardized.

This apparent discrepancy can be best explained by the fact that most of MOH’s

<sup>711</sup> Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>712</sup> Interview with COH-Management 3, December 7, 2016.

<sup>713</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 2, December 13, 2016; Interview with COH-Executive 4, December 14, 2016.

diplomatic interactions were managed by senior managers. One manager observed that, especially in Haiti, appearance affected diplomatic outcomes, saying “your age, the way you dress, and your position made a huge difference. You always send the person who can communicate well, and looks mature to negotiate.”<sup>714</sup> Another MOH manager noted that his organization was very intentional in selecting the best person for specific negotiations. Further, if COH wanted a decision-maker to sit at the table they too had to send the highest-ranking representative available.<sup>715</sup>

While MOH participants believed their organization was at an advantage because of the fact that most staff were multilingual, most strongly agreed that language barriers still affected diplomatic interactions (see Table 5.9). A manager who disagreed with the notion that language barriers impacted diplomatic interactions believed that MOH was proactive in preparing for upcoming negotiation.<sup>716</sup>

## **5.3 DIPLOMATIC TOOLS**

### **5.3.1 Tool Frequency**

Next, participants were asked to reflect on when and with whom they practiced the diplomatic tools (dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion). In this part of the interview, participants were presented with the four tools one at a time. Their responses confirmed the theory that humanitarians prefer to apply diplomatic tools on the consensus (dialogue and negotiation) to coercion continuum (advocacy and persuasion). There were two tests to this theory. Firstly, interviewees were asked about the frequency of tool usage (see Table 5.10). Secondly, participants were asked what tool was useful in interaction with the five primary groups of humanitarian diplomacy’s counterparts (partner organizations, donors or the public, beneficiaries, internal stakeholders, and government actors. COH participants ranked the utilization of tools in the following order: dialogue

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<sup>714</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017.

<sup>715</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 2, February 7, 2017.

<sup>716</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 3, February 8, 2017.

(29%), negotiation (27%), advocacy (23%), and persuasion (21%).

Table 5.10 Tool frequency (COH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)	
You <b>dialogued</b> in order to achieve an objective.	11	65%	6	35%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
You <b>advocated</b> in order to achieve an objective.	11	65%	2	12%	2	12%	1	6%	1	6%
You <b>negotiated</b> in order to achieve an objective.	9	53%	4	24%	3	18%	0	0%	1	6%
You <b>persuaded</b> in order to achieve an objective.	7	41%	4	24%	3	18%	3	18%	0	0%

*Note:* Case study participants utilized consensus-based tools (dialogue and negotiation) more frequently than coercion-based tools (advocacy and persuasion).

### 5.3.2 Tool Application

Analyzing the data also shed light on the instances in which the tools were most commonly practiced. An addition of all instances indicates that COH staff most commonly reached into their diplomatic toolboxes when interacting (in order of frequency) with partner organizations, internal stakeholders, government officials, beneficiaries, and donors or the public (see Figure 5.15).




Figure 5.14 Interactions with counterparts (COH). One-half of all diplomatic interactions involved partner organizations and internal stakeholders.

### 5.3.3 Diplomacy with Beneficiaries

While all field operations staff identified internal stakeholders as counterparts they dialogued with, only half of these respondents believed they or COH dialogued

with beneficiaries. To understand this perspective, it is helpful to consider reactions to a statement proffered earlier in the interview: diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with beneficiaries. Although no one disagreed, nearly one quarter of case study participants remained neutral.

One respondent indicated that diplomacy was conducted with community leaders, but COH personnel did not have to engage in diplomatic activities on the household level because other partners were conducting assessments and working on community relations, namely local churches and smaller partner NGOs.<sup>717</sup> There were a few instances when COH personnel negotiated local roadblocks, which were at times controlled by beneficiaries in gang-controlled territories.<sup>718</sup> A manager noted that COH and its partners were engaged in community health diplomacy.

#### 5.3.4 Dialogue

Of those interviewed, 65% always dialogued to achieve an objective. The remaining 35% practiced dialogue sometimes (see Table 5.11). The responses indicate that dialogue is the most common approach to diplomatic interaction.

Table 5.11 Dialogue (COH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)		Mode
You (or your organization) dialogued to achieve an objective.	11	65%	6	35%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Non-committal, informal interactions were the first step in starting diplomatic interactions (i.e. beginning partnership negotiations).	6	35%	6	35%	3	18%	2	12%	0	0%	1

*Note:* The majority of case study participants reached for the dialogue tool during the response.

Non-committal, informal interactions were always the first step in starting diplomatic interactions according to 35% of participants, and a further 35% indicated this was the case sometimes. “Informal interactions, such as dialogue, are a way for humanitarians in the field to gage the field of operations as well as the actors who are involved,” a person suggested. To this person, informal

<sup>717</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>718</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

diplomatic interactions created an environment that allowed one to get acquainted, and assess the capacity, skills, interests, and limitations without having to rush into making agreements.<sup>719</sup> One participant viewed dialogue as a tool employed most commonly by executives to address strategic but not operational issues.<sup>720</sup>

An executive, who generally agreed that dialogue could open up communication for negotiations, added, “it depends on how both parties come to the table. If they're already informed and have an objective then you can cut to the chase quicker.” Someone else thought that every interaction was different and there was no real order for applying the tools.<sup>721</sup> A field-based operations staffer suggested that his American colleagues probably viewed dialogue as informal, but Haitians viewed dialogue as an official first round of negotiations.<sup>722</sup>

Dialogue not only opened up channels of conversation, but also ensured that communication continued even when consensus was not reached or there was an impasse. The majority of participants believed (64% strongly agreed, 23% agreed) that dialogue kept the conversation moving forward, helped address concerns, and gave parties time to reassess their position (see Table 5.12).

Table 5.12 Dialogue and consensus (COH)

	Strongly Agree (1)		Agree (2)		Neutral (3)		Disagree (4)		Strongly Disagree (5)		Mode
When there was no consensus, keeping dialogue open helped to address concerns or give parties time to reassess their position.	11	65%	4	24%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Dialogue was most effective when there was consensus amongst counterparts (officials, partners).	10	59%	4	24%	2	12%	1	6%	0	0%	1

*Note:* Dialogue is a tool utilized in settings where consensus exists.

With whom did the participants (or COH) dialogue? The respondents identified the following counterparts: beneficiaries, donors or the public, government officials, internal stakeholders, and partner organizations. Across

<sup>719</sup> Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>720</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>721</sup> Interview with COH-Support 5, December 16, 2016.

<sup>722</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 9, 2016.

organizational levels all participants believed that dialogue took place with partner organizations (board members, peers, and superiors).

### **5.3.5 Advocacy**

As Table 5.13 shows, most participants advocated with decision-makers or decision-influencers to achieve an objective (65% always, 12% sometimes). The Haiti earthquake response, according to a high-level decision-maker, triggered an internal desire to integrate advocacy into the operational and strategic activities of COH's international relief and development efforts.<sup>723</sup> While this had taken place organically to date, as a direct result of this case study the organization formed a task force to develop an organization-wide advocacy strategy to be presented to the Board of Directors by the middle of 2017. The goal is to become a thought leader in COH's sphere of influence. During the Haiti response, advocacy often took place in the emergency medicine centers where partner organizations were engaged in "behavior change" campaigns, such as disease prevention and post-disaster self-care.<sup>724</sup>

Other advocacy efforts targeted external parties outside of Haiti to inform on the conditions that COH faced in providing humanitarian assistance to affected areas. COH also used its influence, especially amongst its faith-based partners, to advocate for needs-based programming. The concern was that churches in particular were presenting proposals that would either rebuild their places of worship or only serve church members. Through a variety of channels, COH field personnel ensured that all partners properly identified needs and developed appropriate community-based humanitarian responses rather than internal, interest-based activities.<sup>725</sup>

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<sup>723</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 6, December 12, 2016.

<sup>724</sup> Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>725</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

Table 5.13 Advocacy (COH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)		Mode
You advocated with decision-makers or decision-influencers in order to achieve an objective.	11	65%	2	12%	1	6%	0	0%	1	6%	1
Stressing the humanitarian imperative (i.e. to address human suffering) was an effective tool to achieve a goal.	13	76%	3	18%	1	6%	0	0%	0	0%	1
In order to address challenges or raise awareness of the emergency, your organization implemented public advocacy campaigns (e.g. news interviews, posts on social media platforms, etc.).	11	65%	5	29%	0	0%	1	6%	0	0%	1
Your organization relied on discreet, informal networks and "connections" to address specific issues, represent your interests or influence decisions.	8	47%	6	35%	3	18%	0	0%	0	0%	1

*Note:* Advocacy was identified as a critical and effective tool in the response, but most respondents reached for it less frequently.

Advocating or stressing the humanitarian imperative was an effective tool to achieve a goal (see Table 5.13). To address challenges or raise awareness of the emergency, COH implemented public advocacy campaigns including news interviews and posts on social media platforms (64% always, 29% sometimes). A field-based manager noted “advocacy and fundraising sometimes collide. Often social media use had overlapping purposes: advocacy and fundraising.”<sup>726</sup> In terms of relying on discreet, informal networks and connections, participants believed the organization used advocacy to represent the organization’s interests or to influence decisions (47% always, 35% sometimes, 17% neutral). Advocacy efforts targeted the following groups (by order of frequency): donors or the public, partner organizations, beneficiaries, government officials, and internal stakeholders.

### 5.3.6 Negotiation

Of the respondents, 77% personally negotiated during the Haiti Earthquake response in order to achieve an objective (see Table 5.14). This tool helped to address issues such as negotiating international and local transportation rates,

<sup>726</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

gaining access to airport, ports, and affected people, and discussing agreements with NGO partners, IOs, and state actors.<sup>727</sup>

Table 5.14 Negotiation (COH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)		Mode
You negotiated in order to achieve an objective.	9	53%	4	24%	3	18%	0	0%	1	6%	1
Successful negotiations required that both parties were willing to compromise.	9	53%	6	35%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Lack of overall consensus in the beginning of a negotiation led to ineffective or less-than-ideal outcomes.	6	35%	4	24%	5	29%	2	12%	0	0%	1

*Note:* According to the most common responses in this section of the interview, negotiation was a habitually used tool during the response.

Successful negotiations, however, required that both parties were willing to compromise (see Table 5.14). Lack of overall consensus in the beginning of a negotiation led to ineffective or less-than-ideal outcome according to 35% of participants who strongly agreed and 24% who agreed. Negotiations took place mostly with partner organizations, internal stakeholders, and beneficiaries. When asked about the role of negotiations in interactions with beneficiaries, several interviewees alluded to COH's model of ensuring that civil society members at the field level were included in decision-making and distribution planning.

### 5.3.7 Persuasion

The majority of participants indicated that they persuaded always (41%) or sometimes (23%) (see Table 5.15), while another 18% remained neutral and 18% stated that they rarely applied this tool to achieve an objective.

When was persuasion necessary? Persuasion was only necessary when there was little consensus between the parties, according to 47% who strongly agreed and 24% who agreed with the statement (see Table 5.15). "My team's persuasion efforts focused on dealing with issues of uncooperativeness," a manager explained. "These actors were often leaders from smaller partner

<sup>727</sup> Interview with COH-Management 6, December 13, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 1, December 7, 2016.



organizations who had their own motives ... then there were gangs, the US military, IOs, and local authorities who either limited or violated our right to fulfill our humanitarian mandate.”<sup>728</sup> Nearly a quarter of participants remained neutral when asked if they had persuaded. One of the respondents noted that persuasion was used when there was consensus, but COH had a need to reinforce or reiterate the importance or strong desire for a particular outcome.<sup>729</sup>

Table 5.15 Persuasion (COH)

	Strongly Agree (1)		Agree (2)		Neutral (3)		Disagree (4)		Strongly Disagree (5)		Mode
Persuasion during negotiations was only necessary when there was little consensus between parties.	4	24%	8	47%	4	24%	1	6%	0	0%	2
Your organization tended to have more power (i.e. leverage, options, money, power) than the counterparts during negotiations.	1	6%	9	53%	5	29%	2	12%	0	0%	2

*Note:* Persuasion was viewed as a last-resort measure when there existed no consensus between parties.

Persuasion was mostly practiced within the COH organization and with partner organizations; 88% of participants persuaded internal stakeholders and 82% persuaded partner organizations.

### 5.3.8 Comparison with Mission of Hope Responses

MOH personnel most frequently reached for negotiation as a diplomatic tool, with 83% stating that they always negotiated (see Table 5.16). Only 53% of COH staff always negotiated, on the other hand. And whereas 41% of COH always persuaded, 67% of MOH staff did so. Fifty percent of MOH staff always dialogued compared to 65% of COH personnel.

<sup>728</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>729</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

Table 5.16 Tool utilization (COH vs. MOH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)	
	COH	MOH	COH	MOH	COH	MOH	COH	MOH	COH	MOH
You <b>dialogued</b> in order to achieve an objective.	65%	50%	35%	50%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
You <b>advocated</b> in order to achieve an objective.	65%	67%	12%	33%	12%	0%	6%	0%	6%	0%
You <b>negotiated</b> in order to achieve an objective.	53%	83%	24%	17%	18%	0%	0	0%	6%	0%
You <b>persuaded</b> in order to achieve an objective.	41%	67%	24%	17%	18%	17%	18%	-0%	0	0%

*Note:* This table shows COH and MOH's tool utilization. There is a degree of variance between INGO and NGO utilization.

When comparing MOH's tool utilization with that of COH, the responses were nearly identical. MOH preferred dialogue and negotiation to advocacy and persuasion (see Figure 5.15). COH and MOH also interacted quite similarly in frequency with counterparts, as 24% of MOH's diplomatic interactions involved partner organizations compared to COH's 26%, The least frequent tool usage was diplomatic interaction with donors or the public (MOH 17%, COH 11%).



Figure 5.15 Tool utilization (COH vs. MOH). INGO and NGO staff utilized the tools with nearly identical frequency and shared a preference for consensus-based diplomatic tools.

When comparing COH and MOH responses, it is evident there is agreement in the tool utilization (see Table 5.17). There was one minor and one significant difference. Firstly, COH believed that it was always the case that non-committal, informal interactions were the first step in starting diplomatic interactions (i.e. beginning partnership negotiations); MOH believed this to be only sometimes the case.

Table 5.17 Diplomatic tools (COH vs. MOH)

			COH		MOH
Dialogue	You (or your organization) dialogued to achieve an objective.	1	Always	1	Always
	Non-committal, informal interactions were the first step in starting diplomatic interactions (i.e. beginning partnership negotiations).	1	Always	2	Sometimes
	When there was no consensus, keeping dialogue open, helped to address concerns or give parties time to reassess their position.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
	Dialogue was most effective when there was consensus amongst counterparts (officials, partners).	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Advocacy	You advocated with decision-makers or decision-influencers in order to achieve an objective.	1	Always	1	Always
	Stressing the humanitarian imperative (i.e. to address human suffering) was an effective tool to achieve a goal.	1	Always	1	Always
	In order to address challenges or raise awareness of the emergency, your organization implemented public advocacy campaigns (e.g. news interviews, posts on social media platforms, etc.).	1	Always	1	Always
	Your organization relied on discreet, informal networks and "connections" to address specific issues, represent your interests or influence decisions.	1	Always	1	Always
Negotiation	You negotiated in order to achieve an objective.	1	Always	1	Always
	Successful negotiations required that both parties were willing to compromise.	1	Always	1	Always
	Lack of overall consensus in the beginning of a negotiation led to ineffective or less-than-ideal outcomes.	1	Always	1	Always
Persuasion	You persuaded in order to achieve an objective.	1	Always	1	Always
	Persuasion during negotiations was only necessary when there was little consensus between parties.	2	Agree	4	Disagree

*Note:* Comparing rates of tool utilization, there is a general consensus among INGO and NGO staff; however, NGO staff were prepared to reach for persuasion even when consensus existed.

Secondly, and most strikingly, COH staff agreed that persuasion during negotiations was only necessary when there was little consensus between parties; however, MOH personnel disagreed. One executive noted that “even in agreement, there's an art of persuasion. We could agree on an outcome, but the persuasion is on how it will land.”<sup>730</sup> Another manager noted that persuasion was essential because during the response emotions were running high and MOH had to be very clear on its objectives. When asked about the long-term consequences of relying on persuasion, the participant conceded that diplomatic interactions

<sup>730</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017.

could have been more effective “had we dialed down.”<sup>731</sup>

## **5.4 PARTNERSHIPS & PERCEPTION OF POWER**

### **5.4.1 Partnerships**

Respondents believed (71% strongly agreed, 29 agreed) that diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with partner organizations. Given COH’s approach to empowering and resourcing partners, this appears to correspond with corporate identity. While, in hindsight, all interviewees believed (64% strongly agreed, 35% agreed) that negotiations with partner organizations resulted in a successful response, nearly all respondents identified partnership management as the key area where diplomacy was not only required but also often tested. According to one manager, privy to the ongoing negotiations with a partner organization, diplomatic activities took about four weeks to resolve tensions caused by challenges in implementing a pre-disaster working agreement.<sup>732</sup> While perhaps a few interpersonal relationships remain tense today, all inter-organizational issues were resolved. “We saw a lot of favorable results,” a manager reflected, “but you’re not going to bat a thousand.”<sup>733</sup>

One key element in partnership and aid effectiveness is the ability to quickly identify priorities, according to over 90% of the respondents (see Table 5.18). It appears that priorities help define parameters and expectations and bring focus to the conversation.<sup>734</sup> Narrowing down a focus also contributed to quickly identifying areas where “quick wins” could help cement the relationship and “create synergy.”<sup>735</sup> This alone, however, did not ensure that COH achieved its goal, according to an executive. A balance had to be struck between efficiency and the reality that partnerships are time-consuming and require relationship and

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<sup>731</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 2, February 7, 2017.

<sup>732</sup> Interview with COH-Support 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>733</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>734</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

<sup>735</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 1, December 9, 2016.

trust.<sup>736</sup> Besides identifying priorities, another element in partnership and aid effectiveness is the ability to quickly reach consensus, according to 82% of participants (see Table 5.19). Identifying the counterpart's priorities and non-negotiable items was also essential to developing a diplomatic strategy for a partnership negotiation.

Table 5.18 Partnership Perception I (COH)

	<b>Strongly Agree (1)</b>		<b>Agree (2)</b>		<b>Neutral (3)</b>		<b>Disagree (4)</b>		<b>Strongly Disagree (5)</b>		<b>Mode</b>
Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with partner organizations.	12	71%	5	29%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with state actors.	7	41%	8	47%	1	6%	1	6%	0	0%	2
Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with beneficiaries.	10	59%	3	18%	4	24%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in successful response implementation.	11	65%	6	35%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Diplomatic interactions during the response had long-term consequences on your relationship with your counterpart.	9	53%	6	35%	1	6%	0	0%	1	0%	1
Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in effective long-term working relationships (e.g. after 2 years, you were still partnering).	14	82%	3	18%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	1
The more you had in common with your counterpart (e.g. partner organization, government official), the less you had to rely on using power (i.e. moral authority, money, influence) to accomplish your objective.	10	59%	5	29%	1	6%	1	6%	0	0%	1

*Note:* COH staff believed that diplomacy with other partner organizations was critical. They shared confidence that their negotiations not only led to an effective response, but had positive long-term consequences on partner relationships.

When asked which party had more power during the negotiations, 53% of total participants believed the counterpart had more power, while 47% identified COH. As Figure 5.16 indicates, while every support staff interviewed believed their counterparts had the most power, 80% of executives and nearly 70% of managers believed that COH had the stronger position in negotiations.

Table 5.19 Partnership Perception II (COH)

<sup>736</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)		Mode
Quickly reaching consensus during a negotiation led to an effective partnership and response.	8	47%	6	35%	3	18%	0	0%	0	0%	1
Quickly identifying priorities during diplomatic interactions resulted in a desired outcome.	5	29%	11	65%	1	6%	0	0%	0	0%	2
Identifying your counterpart's priorities and "non-negotiables" was essential in developing your diplomatic strategy.	13	76%	2	12%	2	12%	0	0%	0	0%	1
At the end of a negotiation, all parties walked away satisfied.	0	0%	11	65%	5	29%	0	0%	1	6%	2

*Note:* The majority of case study participants believed that reaching consensus and identifying priorities early on led to effective results.

Those responsible to implement the response in the field indicated that COH had to depend on local infrastructure, and therefore yielded power to the partner. “We can only move at the speed of their [partner organization] infrastructure,” was one interviewee’s response summarizing his and his other colleague’s attitude on the power balance. He continued, saying “in the end, they were in power because we relied on their relationships, vehicles, communications, networks, and logistics capabilities.”<sup>737</sup> It is interesting to note that local field staff did not portray power imbalance as a negative or as “powerlessness;” rather, it was viewed as taking a principled approach to empowerment. Accepting the local power of partners was COH’s principle at work—“our goal is to support the local partner and empower them to serve their community.”<sup>738</sup>

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<sup>737</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>738</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.




Figure 5.16 Power perception (COH). Support staff unanimously believed that their counterparts had more power, whereas administrators were more likely to believe that their own organization had more power.

Support staff recognized that COH’s financial resources gave the organization a level of power, but that due to cultural and philosophical reasons, they “had to continuously yield [their] power” in order to make sure the local partner was empowered to run operations.<sup>739</sup> “Sure, we had the finances, knowledge and expertise,” one manager answered when asked if there were other options COH could have considered. “I think we could have found another partner, but we were committed to working through our local, pre-vetted partner, MOH. In the end, we adjusted to their interests, priorities, and ability.”<sup>740</sup> Another participant believed that the financial capabilities gave COH a strong voice in the field.<sup>741</sup> One executive noted that money was the ultimate indicator of who had power in a negotiation.<sup>742</sup> Another noted that which party had the most power had to be determined in each case separately. While he believed that MOH in Haiti

<sup>739</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

<sup>740</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>741</sup> Interview with COH-Management 3, December 7, 2016.

<sup>742</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 5, December 20, 2016.

served as an example of a partner having more power, the balance of power could still shift from negotiation to negotiation.<sup>743</sup> This sentiment was shared by three of the five COH executives.




Figure 5.17 Consequences (COH). Of the respondents, 88% believed that diplomatic interactions had long-term consequences; every manager affirmed this statement.

The majority of interviewees strongly agreed that diplomatic interactions had long-term consequences on COH's relationship with its counterpart (see Figure 5.17). Further, all participants believed that negotiations with partner organizations resulted in effective long-term working relationships (82% strongly agreed, 18% agreed). A field-based operations support staff person indicated that although the negotiations resulted in positive outcomes, there were also negative outcomes of these interactions.<sup>744</sup> Agreeing with the reality of mixed outcomes, one manager identified several areas that could have, in hindsight, been handled differently and better.<sup>745</sup> Several respondents believed that the response

<sup>743</sup> Interview with COH-Executive 1, December 9, 2016.

<sup>744</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>745</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.



strengthened COH's partnerships, especially with MOH.<sup>746</sup> "It would be unrealistic to say that there weren't any negative consequences from our negotiations with MOH," a field-based manager offered, "but when considering the total system of interactions, it's safe to say that, yes, our negotiations resulted in an effective, long-term partnership."<sup>747</sup> When asked to elaborate what were the reasons for success, he continued,

When I compare Haiti to our other large-scale responses, the key element was that we had healthy working relationships prior to the disaster. We had already been sharing communication, resources, responsibilities, and decisions. All these things prepared us for this very large response.<sup>748</sup>

Since the outcome of diplomatic interactions was positive, what were the long-term consequences? Ongoing conversations, according to several interviewees, became easier and more predictable. Because of these interactions, the partners designed emergency preparedness initiatives, began pre-positioning supplies, developing training initiatives, and establishing processes for communication, approvals, joint appeals, and funding campaigns.<sup>749</sup> The dialogue and negotiations associated with these issues, explains a support staff member, laid the groundwork to approach the response as a multi-year and far-reaching partnership initiative.<sup>750</sup>

COH's objectives were achieved through consensus-based approaches rather than coercion because the organization had enough in common with most of its counterparts (i.e. partners, agencies, officials), according to 88% of participants (59% strongly agreed and 29% agreed). COH, according to a manager who was responsible for several partner and agency relationships in the field, places significant emphasis on selecting partner organizations that share the same values.

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<sup>746</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016; Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

<sup>747</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>748</sup> Ibid.

<sup>749</sup> Interview with COH-Management 4, December 12, 2016.

<sup>750</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

In that regard, there was a sense of “togetherness” across the hierarchy.<sup>751</sup>

Did all parties walk away satisfied after a negotiation? While no one considered this to always be the case, 65% agreed that sometimes all parties were satisfied. An additional 29% remained neutral, while 5% believed it rarely occurred. A field-based support staff member indicated that there existed a healthy balance of “give and take” resulting in both parties working to find mutually satisfactory solutions.<sup>752</sup> A person who witnessed several negotiations firsthand believed that, generally speaking, all parties expressed satisfaction with the outcomes.<sup>753</sup> At the same time, someone responsible for operationalizing negotiation outcomes in the field did not believe that “party satisfaction” was the best benchmark to gauge negotiations, humanitarian effectiveness, or successful partnerships.<sup>754</sup>

COH tended to have more power (leverage, options, money) than its counterparts, 53% agreed and 6% strongly agreed. A manager who remained neutral believed that power was shared equally. While COH had more resources and expertise, its partner had the local infrastructure to implement COH’s programs.<sup>755</sup> Another respondent affirmed the statement of his colleague. To him, COH had more resources but lacked the options in the field that partner organizations enjoyed.<sup>756</sup> Executives were more likely to believe that their organization had more power during negotiations, with 60% of executives agreeing and 20% strongly agreeing.

The majority of respondents did not believe that Convoy applied coercive techniques (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks) while negotiating with other parties (see Table 5.20). A field-based manager who believed coercion took place early on in the response stated, “Some of our country staff did so in the beginning, and it hurt our long-term response, even to this day as we respond to

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<sup>751</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016.

<sup>752</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

<sup>753</sup> Interview with COH-Support 4, December 13, 2016.

<sup>754</sup> Interview with COH-Support 6, December 22, 2016.

<sup>755</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>756</sup> Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

Hurricane Matthew [2016 response].”<sup>757</sup> Asked if the other parties applied coercive techniques, 41% of participants answered “sometimes,” while 24% remained neutral. A further 18% indicated rarely and 18% believed it never was the case.

Table 5.20 Coercive strategy (COH)

	Always (1)		Sometimes (2)		Neutral (3)		Rarely (4)		Never (5)		Mode
Your organization applied coercive techniques when negotiating with other parties (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks).	0	0%	1	6%	3	18%	6	35%	7	41%	5
The other party(ies) applied coercive techniques when negotiating with your organization (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks).	0	0%	7	41%	4	24%	3	18%	3	18%	2

*Note:* The most common responses indicate COH personnel’s perception that they never applied coercive techniques even though their counterparts did so occasionally.

Managers perceived some of their counterparts’ actions as coercive. One manager, reflecting on his past experience, noted that this type of hard diplomacy was a cultural reality in Haiti.<sup>758</sup> Several managers noted that partner counterparts used their status as a legally registered NGO in Haiti as leverage (something COH lacked). To some in the organization, it appeared as a veiled threat that the local partner could walk away and choose to partner with another INGO.<sup>759</sup> One manager remembered, “‘we will have to end partnership *if* ...’ was often a phrase used [to remind us that we had little option but to continue this partnership].”<sup>760</sup>

The majority of participants did not view coercion techniques as useful tools to modify a party’s decision or behavior (see Figure 5.18). The responses from operations personnel indicated a greater comfort level with coercion-based approaches than administration or communication team members; 67% strongly disagreeing and 17% disagreeing that such techniques changed behavior or influenced decisions. A field-based staff member noted that coercion could at

<sup>757</sup> Ibid.

<sup>758</sup> Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>759</sup> Interview with COH-Management 1, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 2, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 3, December 7, 2016; Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

<sup>760</sup> Interview with COH-Management 5, December 13, 2016.

times be an effective way to achieve a goal, such as setting up a distribution site. When coercion was used, for instance, in forcing the establishment of a field site, COH rarely succeeded in getting everything it was demanding, but it ensured manageable results nonetheless. Working with IOs such as the United Nations, coercion and power were prerequisites.<sup>761</sup> Disagreeing with the efficacy of coercion, a participant noted that especially in the context of local culture coercion was not a preferred method.<sup>762</sup>




Figure 5.18 Effectiveness of coercion strategy (COH). Administrators shared the opinion that coercive techniques were ineffective.

The majority of respondents considered coercive approaches ineffective in changing decisions and/or behaviors (see Figure 5.18). Further, 58% of participants believed unpleasant or aggressive negotiations had a negative impact on the disaster response. Of field-based personnel, 67% strongly agreed that aggressive approaches impacted the response. Further, 59% believed that unpleasant or aggressive negotiations had a negative impact on long-term partnership (47% strongly agreed, 12% agreed). Operations staff had a stronger attitude about the long-term effects of harsh negotiations (see Figure 5.19).

<sup>761</sup> Interview with COH-Support 2, December 7, 2016.

<sup>762</sup> Interview with COH-Support 3, December 9, 2016.

Unpleasant and/or aggressive negotiations had a negative impact on long-term partnerships




Figure 5.19 Negative impact of negotiations (COH). Operations staff was the most likely group to believe that negotiations could result in negative long-term consequences.

## 5.4.2 Comparison with Mission of Hope Responses

Many of MOH personnel's attitudes on partnership, and the role and outcome of diplomacy in maintaining relationships, were similar to those of their COH counterparts (see Table 5.21). Nonetheless, there were differences. COH believed that quickly reaching consensus always led to effective partnerships and responses, while MOH staff believed this to be the case only sometimes. MOH placed greater importance on identifying priorities during diplomatic interactions. According to COH staff, all parties sometimes walked away satisfied at the end of a negotiation. MOH responses were mostly neutral. One executive explained that it was the organization's desire to reach consensus on all matters, but it was not realistic to assume this to be the case in all instances.<sup>763</sup>

Table 5.21 Partnership (COH vs. MOH)

<sup>763</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017.

	COH		MOH	
Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with partner organizations.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with beneficiaries.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in successful response implementation.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Diplomatic interactions during the response had long-term consequences on your relationship with your counterpart.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in effective long-term working relationships (e.g. after 2 years, you were still partnering).	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
The more you had in common with your counterpart (e.g. partner organization, government official), the less you had to rely on using power (i.e. moral authority, money, influence) to accomplish your objective.	1	Strongly Agree	1	Strongly Agree
Quickly reaching consensus during a negotiation led to an effective partnership and response.	1	Always	2	Sometimes
Quickly identifying priorities during diplomatic interactions resulted in a desired outcome.	2	Sometimes	1	Always
Identifying your counterpart's priorities and "non-negotiables" were essential in developing your diplomatic strategy.	1	Always	1	Always
At the end of a negotiation, all parties walked away satisfied.	2	Sometimes	3	Neutral
Your organization applied coercive techniques when negotiating with other parties (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks).	5	Never	5	Never
The other party(ies) applied coercive techniques when negotiating with your organization (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks).	2	Sometimes	3	Neutral

*Note:* The majority of responses indicate a consensus on views of the partnership.

While MOH and COH participants agreed that their own organizations never used coercive techniques, COH staff believed that their counterparts sometimes resorted to coercion. MOH interviewees did not necessarily view coercive techniques as negative. Even when counterparts applied coercive techniques, MOH found ways to work with their counterparts.<sup>764</sup> An executive believed that large INGOs and state actors were more likely to resort to coercion in diplomatic interactions.<sup>765</sup>

Interestingly, both organizations shared similar views on which party had more power during negotiations. MOH staff who believed their organization had more power each emphasized the fact that while their INGO counterparts had more resources, they had less power in the field because they relied on a local

<sup>764</sup> Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017.

<sup>765</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 1, February 23, 2017.

partner's infrastructure and relationships.<sup>766</sup>

## **5.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

This chapter presented the quantitative results and qualitative findings of 38 hours of personal interviews comprising this case study. Although no participant had received any formal training in diplomacy, each provided the researcher with insights on the role of diplomatic function in humanitarian emergencies. MOH and COH respondents shared similar attitudes and decisions relating to diplomacy. As to be discussed in the next chapter, their effective joint disaster response can be explained by the fact that both organizations had similar views on the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy. Because of this, both organizations relied on a consensus-building diplomatic strategy. These findings, along with implications, conceptualizations, and recommendations for the future will be discussed in the next chapter.

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<sup>766</sup> Interview with MOH-Executive 3, February 1, 2017; Interview with MOH-Management 1, February 6, 2017; Interview with MOH-Management 3, February 8, 2017.

## *Chapter 6*

# **Discussion: Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy**

### **6.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Humanitarian action leaves behind a trail of diplomatic practice. Sometimes the evidence is found in the details; in other instances, it is obvious. This research has sought to understand how humanitarian diplomacy is best theorized, beginning with a question: To what extent can humanitarian effectiveness be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as HMTD?

The first chapters of this research presented relevant facts on the topics of humanitarian effectiveness, humanitarian diplomacy, and MTD. From this study, a new theoretical framework was developed in Chapter 3: HMTD. The previous chapter summarized the data resulting from testing that theory. The case study encountered a diverse group of humanitarians. Along with trained professionals there were volunteers who simply wanted to serve suffering people. There were executives and support staff, expatriate, and local employees. Together, they successfully staged a massive, multi-year humanitarian operation. At the core of their success was HMTD applied in action. These men and women attributed the effectiveness of their response to their ability to share diplomatic space and utilize diplomacy. The evidence revealed that diplomatic function is woven into the



fabric of humanitarian practice. Aggregating the evidence from the literature and case study research, it should not come as a surprise that humanitarians embrace the statement “to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.”

The answer to the research question based on those results is that humanitarian diplomacy can, to a large extent, be categorized as HMTD to contribute to humanitarian effectiveness. In short form, aid is more effective when actors in the humanitarian community engage in specific diplomatic practice. This chapter builds on the foundation of previous research and the case study findings to theorize the significant role of HMTD in assisting humanitarian efforts.

This chapter aims to draw meaning from the evidence base of this research. It will explain how the research arrived at the conclusions drawn, and simultaneously assess the implications for operationalizing the HMTD concept. The chapter begins by explaining how the hypotheses were confirmed and the HMTD definition was adopted. Five takeaways from this research are then discussed. These key findings explain why and how the HMTD concept can largely contribute to humanitarian effectiveness.

1. Humanitarians incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities.
2. Diplomatic function is critical to humanitarian effectiveness.
3. Humanitarians practice a particular type of diplomacy.
4. Humanitarians consistently rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and adjust their strategy based on their counterparts' rankings.
5. Humanitarians prefer a consensus-based diplomatic strategy.

## **6.2 CONFIRMATION OF HYPOTHESIS**

This section will provide a cursory outline of the hypotheses confirmation (see Table 6.1). When discussing the five key takeaways, attention will be brought to specific contributing factors. The following table lists the hypotheses, their indicators, and the research question and answer.

The first hypothesis was that Humanitarian actors incorporate diplomatic function (HMTD) into their job responsibilities during a humanitarian response in order to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. To confirm this hypothesis, evidence had to clearly identify the definitive, critical, and particular function of diplomacy. This benchmark was satisfactorily met. The idea that humanitarian diplomacy is definitively present in humanitarian action emerged in the findings from literature and the case study. The chronology of humanitarian diplomacy's development since the institutionalization of humanitarianism sheds light on the consistent link between humanitarian action and diplomacy. In recent years there has been a significant increase in literature discussing the topic of diplomacy in the humanitarian sector. Humanitarians who participated in the case study identified diplomacy as something their organizations practiced. Their responses indicated that diplomacy is part of the humanitarian DNA; in fact, humanitarians nearly uniformly agree that to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat. This sentiment is confirmed by looking at humanitarians' consistent utilization of the diplomatic tools.

Table 6.1 Confirmation of Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Confirmed?	Indicators
Humanitarian actors incorporate diplomatic function [HMTD] into their job responsibilities during a humanitarian response in order to achieve humanitarian effectiveness.	✓	Evidence clearly linked the <u>definitive</u> , <u>critical</u> and <u>particular</u> function of diplomacy in humanitarian action.
Humanitarian actors adjust their diplomatic strategy depending on the proximity of parameters between them and their counterparts.	✓	Humanitarians ranked the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and consistently and uniformly rank them in accordance with their colleagues and counterparts.
Humanitarian actors' preference for applying a consensus-based diplomatic strategy has a positive effect on humanitarian effectiveness (Coercion-centered diplomatic strategy has a negative effect on humanitarian effectiveness).	✓	Humanitarians prefer to utilize consensus-based diplomatic tools.
<b>Research Question:</b>	To what extent can humanitarian effectiveness be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy?	
<b>Answer:</b>	HMTD can largely contribute to humanitarian effectiveness.	

Humanitarian actors also link diplomacy with humanitarian effectiveness. Interviewees viewed the role of diplomacy as imperative to humanitarian effectiveness. Discussion in literature also centers on the practice of diplomacy in order to achieve humanitarian objectives. Lastly, confirming the first hypothesis, humanitarians indeed practice particular types of diplomacy consistently. The pattern repeatedly emerged in this research's evidence base. Organizations and researchers believe that humanitarian diplomacy must be defined by a multi-track approach. Further, it must be integrated across the humanitarian system and across institutional levels. The existence of the shared system of diplomacy becomes evident when interacting with humanitarians from the case study. Here, regardless of job type, level and geographical location, humanitarians engaged in a humanitarian multi-track diplomacy.

The second hypothesis stated that humanitarian actors adjust their diplomatic strategies depending on the proximity of parameters between them and their counterparts. To confirm this hypothesis, humanitarian actors had to clearly identify the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and consistently and uniformly rank them in accordance with their colleagues and counterparts. Whereas the quantitative text analysis informed the theory of the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy, humanitarians confirmed the idea in the case study. Just as in multi-track diplomacy, humanitarians lack options that are typically available to conventional diplomats, namely power (the carrot and sticks). The identity of the humanitarian diplomat is grounded in function rather than position; that is, diplomacy is practiced out of the necessity to fulfill individual and organizational mandate to achieve humanitarian effectiveness.

Humanitarians prefer confidential rather than public diplomacy because they believe discretion, not shaming; trust, not power plays; and options, not threats, are essential to reaching desired outcomes. HMTD is also operational rather than strategic in the pursuit of goals. This means that most humanitarian diplomacy, being ad hoc, improvisational, and short-term, seeks to improve effectiveness by addressing issues such as aid delivery, acceptance, and access. Instead of practicing a standardized, formal diplomacy, humanitarians adapt their diplomatic style to each counterpart and operational setting. Lastly, humanitarians

believe that the practice of diplomacy takes places in a purely humanitarian, not political, context. For this reason, when they have to interface with state actors they insist that a humanitarian focus guide the interaction.

The third hypothesis stated that humanitarian actors prefer to apply a consensus-based diplomatic strategy and that this has a positive effect on humanitarian effectiveness. Humanitarian actors confirmed this hypothesis by indicating a preference to utilize consensus-based rather than coercion-based tools. Research is conclusive that consensus is imperative in achieving most humanitarian diplomatic interactions. Localization and collaboration, both elements of humanitarian effectiveness, must play key parts in any diplomatic exchange. To that end, the evidence from the literature and the case study consistently reveals that humanitarians prefer dialogue and negotiation to advocacy and persuasion.

### **6.2.1 Definition of Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy**

The evidence of this research and confirmation of the three hypotheses is the basis for defining HMTD as a multidimensional approach to achieving humanitarian objectives through dialogue, advocacy, negotiation, and persuasion. Because the overall results of this research are positively conclusive, the term “Humanitarian Multi-Track Diplomacy” may be used to refer to the practice of diplomacy in the humanitarian context. To refer to diplomatic practice as HMTD, the following criteria, observed in the research, were required to be met:

- **Multi-lateral Practice:** To meet this criterion, 51% of actors had to incorporate diplomatic function in their day-to-day work. Although this benchmark was reached through a variety of corresponding responses, one crucial indicator was that every humanitarian practiced diplomacy (e.g. 89% utilized all four tools, the remaining 11% practiced three tools).
- **Diplomatic Function:** To meet this criterion, 50% of case study participants had to identify diplomacy as a functional aspect of their duties, not as a positional mandate. This criterion was satisfactorily met because 89% agreed that humanitarians are also diplomats, 65% did not have

diplomacy as part of their job descriptions and 65% believed that humanitarian diplomacy had mostly an operational focus.

- **System-wide Tool Utilization:** To meet this criterion, 51% of humanitarians had to recognize that diplomacy is a shared responsibility and demonstrate that it was practiced in a variety of settings. Of the respondents, 88% viewed it as a shared responsibility, 100% used at least three of the four tools diplomacy, and their efforts targeted all major counterpart parties in a diplomatic exchange (e.g. government actors, beneficiaries, donors, the public, internal stakeholders).
- **Effectiveness:** To meet this criterion, 51% had to identify the critical role of diplomacy in achieving humanitarian effectiveness. The case study participants unanimously affirmed this.

An editorial statement must precede a discussion of the research findings. Continuing in this chapter, diplomatic practice will be often referred to as HMTD. This is deliberate and based on evidence that is clear: looking at the role of diplomacy in the humanitarian system, there is no better way to theorize the practice. But this researcher is neither dogmatic nor hung up on terminology. In actuality, the proper way to scientifically conceptualize what is practiced in humanitarian action is HMTD. Yet this work lives not in a laboratory, but in the real world. Insofar as this researcher steadily failed to repeat “humanitarian multi-track diplomacy” ten times in a row, he is quite satisfied to refer to the practice of diplomacy in short form: “humanitarian diplomacy,” “diplomatic function,” or, simply, “diplomacy” suffice quite nicely. These terms satisfactorily imply what humanitarians practice when they attempt to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. It is not the term, but the way the practice is viewed and understood in a system, that is important. With this understanding, it is appropriate to consider the confirmation of the first hypothesis and the significance to be drawn from these findings.

## **6.3 FIVE KEY FINDINGS**

### **6.3.1 Humanitarians Incorporate Diplomatic Function into their Job**

#### **Responsibilities**

Humanitarian diplomacy is part of the humanitarian identity and definitively present in humanitarian action because humanitarians consistently and broadly practice it. Humanitarians view diplomacy as critical to achieving humanitarian effectiveness (see Table 5.2, p. 172). In this research, the practice of humanitarian diplomacy has intentionally been referred to as “diplomatic function” from time to time. This researcher makes no claim to having coined the term, but it succinctly encapsulates the tension that exists as, despite receiving no mandate to practice diplomacy (see Figure 5.3, p. 176), humanitarians view themselves as diplomats (see Figure 5.2, p. 175). They practice it because they must to achieve their purpose. In this way, it is a matter of function, which is defined as “the natural action or intended purpose of a person or thing in a specific role.”<sup>767</sup>

The research’s evidence confirmed the first hypothesis: Humanitarian actors incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities during a humanitarian response in order to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. Humanitarians’ practice of HMTD in literature and the case study was demonstrated as definite, particular, and critical. Firstly, diplomacy was definitive because humanitarians incorporated diplomacy into their day-to-day job function (see Section 5.2.4, p. 187). Secondly, it was critical since the humanitarians interviewed regarded their relationships to diplomacy as essential in achieving their organization’s mission, namely an effective humanitarian response (see Table 5.3, p. 180). Thirdly, they practiced a particular type of diplomacy, one that is very different from traditional diplomacy. For example, it was multi-lateral,

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<sup>775</sup> Collins English Dictionary Online, s.v. “function,” accessed July 3, 2017, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/function>.

shared across the system, across geographic and hierarchical spaces, and it was purely humanitarian (see Table 5.2, p.172).

Simply put, HMTD is definitively present in humanitarian action because one can put one's finger on it. Elements of the HMTD theory were simultaneously present in literature and case study interviews. Diplomatic function was present in all of INGOs hierarchical and geographic spaces, from the president at headquarters to the volunteers in the field. Collectively, the conclusive evidence warrants unconditional use of the absolute term "definitive" when referring to diplomatic function in the humanitarian system.

The inevitable practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action has been exposed in the literature as well as the case studies. The quantitative text analysis results revealed the depth and breadth with which HMTD has been integrated into humanitarian action over the past 100 years. From negotiating access to promoting protection and ensuring efficient assistance, diplomacy is practiced to meet the needs of affected communities (see Table 5.6, p.192).<sup>768</sup>

The individual case study participants exposed not only a matter-of-fact association with diplomacy, but also a desire to reflect on and learn from particular instances during the responses when diplomacy was especially important to executing their duties. There is a sense that when humanitarian professionals and volunteers enter the humanitarian theater, they can seamlessly adapt to the role of the diplomat when the situation so requires. Certainly, several of those interviewed reflected on what they or their colleagues could have done differently. There were, for example, a few instances when rather undiplomatic actions were taken, but even these could often be seen as calculated decisions to escalate a particular situation or call someone on a bluff. Although in the real world of humanitarian action a rematch is rarely permitted, humanitarians generally believed that their practice of diplomacy resulted in reaching the desired outcomes (see Table 5.18, p. 212). It is noteworthy that these men and women showed deliberate and restrained professionalism under highly physically and emotionally challenging conditions.

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<sup>768</sup> Veuthey, "Saving It," 11.

The evidence of this research presents a system in which humanitarians from all backgrounds, experience levels, and, perhaps most notably, job functions, have a high familiarity with the practice of diplomacy (for example, see 5.4, p. 211). Whereas Minear and Smith speculated in their groundbreaking work on humanitarian diplomacy that most humanitarians would not see themselves as diplomats, the overwhelming majority of participants in this research strongly associated with the role of a diplomat. Humanitarians embraced the idea that humanitarians were also diplomats (Table 5.3, p. 180). It should be noted that when the case study interview was conducted with a comparison group consisting of 9 aid professionals who responded to the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and the ongoing Middle East refugee crisis, responses were nearly identical (78% strongly agreed, 22% agreed). Yet, it would be impetuous to simply disregard Minear and Smith's assumption without considering the context of their assertion. Later, the section discussing the particular type of diplomacy practiced will assist in this exercise. Suffice to say for now, others have described Smith and Minear's view of humanitarian diplomacy as traditional and state-focused.<sup>769</sup>

Past researchers have linked the heightened role of diplomacy in humanitarian action to the beginning of institutionalized humanitarian action (for example, see section 2.4.1 Early Foundations (1820-1864), p. 59). And since that time period the practice can definitely be recognized. This finding is only sufficiently appreciated when considered in light of what is absent: mandate.

On the macro level, there are only a few instances in which humanitarian diplomacy policies are published. When they are made public, whether by state or non-state actors, they are only skin deep, taking the form of position papers or brief executive summaries. Despite the fact that the ICRC has a history of practicing diplomacy since its inception, it is not known for its humanitarian diplomacy.<sup>770</sup>

In general, organizations do not clearly articulate what humanitarian diplomacy means to them, and how it translates across their organizations.

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<sup>769</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 4.

<sup>770</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 1–16.



Strikingly, this lack of mandate does not seem to affect the individual practitioner—on the micro level—where diplomatic function is operationalized. Even though it emerged in the case study that only three out of ten job descriptions mentioned diplomatic function as a requirement, all humanitarians practiced it consistently. They comfortably associated with the concept and practice of diplomacy, and connected the dots between the idea of diplomacy and its practice in their routines. From a higher vantage point they were able to zoom out and see the role that diplomacy played across their organization. Humanitarians' relationship with diplomacy raises an important question: why do humanitarians, despite the lack of mandate and irrespective of job level, type, and location, practice diplomacy? The answer is this: because they view it as mission critical.

### **6.3.2 Diplomatic Function is Critical to Humanitarian Effectiveness**

Evidence is conclusive that there is a link between diplomatic function and humanitarian effectiveness. Case study participants viewed their personal practice of diplomacy as essential to humanitarian effectiveness. This substantiates claims made by others in literature that the unique realities and challenges of the humanitarian sector require diplomacy as an “indispensable forte.”<sup>771</sup> Since diplomacy is indispensable, diplomatic function is not a choice, but a responsibility.<sup>772</sup> HMTD emerges as the “X” factor—the key ingredient—to humanitarian effectiveness. Where there are threats to humanitarian effectiveness, diplomacy is present. Diplomatic function addressed major challenges, such as acceptance and protection, but also minute operational issues in aid delivery and communications with local communities (see Section 5.2.4, p. 187). Regardless of the type of threat, the participants believed that diplomacy played a critical role in ensuring a positive outcome in face of these challenges (see Table 5.21, p. 220).

The utilization of dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion were regularly practiced in order to achieve an objective (see Section 5.3, p. 201). The

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<sup>771</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 263.

<sup>772</sup> Chatterjee, “Relief to Sustainable Development.”

tools were the means to begin deliberations and to gather intelligence. Dialogue opened channels of communication, and when there was no consensus during a negotiation, the tool propelled the conversation (see Section 5.3.4, p. 203). Negotiation, as a wide-ranging utility, was used to reach agreement on how programs were to be implemented and evaluated (see Section 5.3.6, p. 206). Advocacy raised awareness through discreet networks when decision-makers had to be influenced (see Section 5.3.5, p. 205). When there were clear violations of norms or agreements, humanitarians could employ the last-resort tool, persuasion (see Section 6.3.5.4, p. 257). In all of these applications, diplomatic function assisted in meeting individual objectives, and together made up the sum: humanitarian effectiveness. Yet, it is not just any kind of diplomacy that these and other humanitarians incorporate into their work. The practice of humanitarian diplomacy is particular in type as it is definitive in practice and critical to humanitarian effectiveness.

### **6.3.3 Humanitarians Practice a Particular Type of Diplomacy**

Just as diplomacy is present in humanitarian action and critical to humanitarian effectiveness, it is also particular. One of the reasons why this research could identify diplomatic function as definitively present was because under the microscope it materializes in a distinct fashion. HMTD is more than a modified version of traditional diplomacy. It is asymmetric from traditional diplomacy and particular in type, its essence described by five distinct parameters (Domain, Identity, Publicity, Localization, and Objective). In general, these findings are best summarized by Régnier's reflections on the developing concept of humanitarian diplomacy: "A new diplomatic language (global and sector diplomacy) is rapidly spreading around the globe."<sup>773</sup> And, indeed, humanitarians practice a very distinct type of diplomacy that sets it apart from conventional diplomacy.

The US diplomat, Straus, who coined the term "humanitarian diplomacy" sought to differentiate this type of practice from other diplomacy when he

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<sup>773</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1211–37.

described President Harrison's approach to dealing with persecution in Russia as "such a clear and convincing recognition of humanitarian diplomacy."<sup>774</sup> The line was drawn between conventional diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy. Subsequently, it would not be entirely accurate to say that diplomacy is a prerequisite to humanitarian effectiveness; rather, humanitarian effectiveness depends on a particular type of diplomacy—one that is informal, field-driven, operations-focused, multi-dimensional, and is best conceptualized as HMTD. The insertion of the adjective "particular" modifies beyond a mere subtlety the meaning of "diplomacy." This distinction is imperative because the function of diplomacy is all too often associated with foreign policy "of which it is in fact an instrument."<sup>775</sup>

In the grand arena of international relations states do, indeed, dominate the practice, but the utility of diplomacy is shared.<sup>776</sup> Even though there have been those who view diplomacy, including humanitarian diplomacy, as the specialized practice of trained professionals, humanitarian diplomacy emerged in the case study as a definitive, system-wide practice that was a shared responsibility not limited to executives and professional diplomats.

There are also those, such as Minear and Smith, who contrarily speculate that humanitarians do not easily associate with being diplomats. Similarly, Régnier concludes humanitarians "feel uncomfortable with the pompous title of 'humanitarian diplomat.'"<sup>777</sup> Yet context is important. Acuto notes that Smith and Minear's approach to humanitarian diplomacy is "tied to a 'traditional' view of diplomacy that is state-based and exclusionary, and which is perhaps less and less representative of the multitude of entities" that practice humanitarian diplomacy.<sup>778</sup> At the core of Minear and Smith's argument is the fact that while most humanitarians may practice a form of diplomacy everyday, they want to

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<sup>774</sup> Straus, *Under Four Administrations*, 59.

<sup>775</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1214.

<sup>776</sup> Picco, "A New International System?," 32.

<sup>777</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1217.

<sup>778</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 4.

clearly separate themselves and their practice from the activities of states.<sup>779</sup> Yet in the case study there was no apprehension to associate with diplomacy. This research concludes that humanitarians have a contented familiarity with both the term and practice of diplomacy, because they view its practice as part of their function and something they make their own (see Table 5.9, p. 200).

Case study interview questions for this research targeted the role that diplomacy played in the specific practitioner's work respective organization's response. Accordingly, humanitarians interviewed showed no need to differentiate between their diplomacy and conventional diplomacy. When humanitarians describe the role of HMTD in their work, it clearly is different from state activities (see Section 5.2.6, p. 191). The case study participants spoke of diplomacy very particularly and as unique to the humanitarian domain. They believed that most diplomatic activities were practiced by and with non-state actors. And, when they practiced diplomacy with state actors, they did not modify their diplomatic approach.

Free from the perceived pressure to compare or contrast their actions with state diplomacy, the respondents agreed that to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat. One participant added the caveat that good humanitarians were diplomats, while another stated that it did not matter what a humanitarian's job was—being a diplomat was absolutely essential. Still another noted that being a humanitarian and diplomat was a balancing act, requiring heart and skill.

What distinguishes HMTD from traditional diplomacy? In addition to the five differentiating parameters, there are several characteristics separating the two. Humanitarian diplomacy is set apart from conventional diplomacy in that it is informal, instantaneous, and improvised. A pattern of utilitarianism emerged when analyzing the literature and case study; diplomacy often took the shape of organic and rugged interactions. Considering all of the actors practicing diplomacy, HMTD is multi-lateral, and given the simultaneous interactions and activities taking place in a variety of settings, it is multi-track. The degree of shared ownership of diplomacy and the interconnectedness of diplomatic activities taking

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<sup>779</sup> Smith, "Theory and Practice," 8.

place simultaneously are further indicative of MTD.

Regardless of rank or job position, the case study participants received no specific training to practice diplomacy on behalf of their organizations (see Section 5.2.1, p. 171). This finding is consistent with Régnier's view that the changing nature and needs of the humanitarian context require humanitarian diplomacy to be improvisational.<sup>780</sup> In the Haiti response, diplomacy was operational within hours of the disaster. Actors advocated for decision-makers to act immediately and release funds. Humanitarians negotiated access despite initial closure of air space. They outlined an informal partnership protocol with their counterparts while waiting for their flight in the US airport. The case study participants practiced ad-hoc diplomacy, viewing it as a tool in their toolbox to be deployed when and wherever necessary to further their organizations' missions. These interactions were not planned or scheduled in advance.

HMTD is also multi-faceted. Humanitarians in the study viewed humanitarian diplomacy as a system-wide activity. This aligns with the theory of MTD that views diplomacy as a "boundary-spreading activity" in which the peace process must be viewed as a "living system."<sup>781</sup> Further, there is much agreement that diplomacy, broadly speaking, requires multi-lateral interaction to be effective.<sup>782</sup> Conflict resolution must be approached in a similarly multi-dimensional manner.<sup>783</sup> The move toward viewing diplomacy as a system of HMTD can be seen in the ICRC shifting its diplomatic approach to a "network of close bilateral or multilateral, official or informal relations" with all relevant actors.<sup>784</sup> To the ICRC, humanitarian diplomacy is in fact multi-track diplomacy.<sup>785</sup> These multi-faceted activities, best conceptualized as HMTD, are the linchpin type of diplomacy in humanitarian effectiveness.

HMTD is as multi-track as it is interdependent. The MTD concept

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<sup>780</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1211–37.

<sup>781</sup> Diamond and McDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, 12.

<sup>782</sup> Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 363; Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 2; Hewko, "Olive Branch."

<sup>783</sup> Bercovitch and Jackson, *Conflict Resolution*, 10.

<sup>784</sup> Harroff-Tavel, "Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC," 5.

<sup>785</sup> Régnier, "Emerging Concept," 1211–37.

emphasizes that every track is equal in importance and significance to achieving the end result.<sup>786</sup> A key observation in the study was that according to the interviewees, everyone shared in the responsibility of diplomatic function (see Table 5.3, p.180). Further, negative diplomatic interactions could not only contribute to negative outcomes in the current response, but also in the future. This became evident when participants were asked to compare their experience during the 2010 earthquake response in Haiti and their subsequent 2016 hurricane response in Haiti (see Figure 5.17, p. 215).

Since collaboration is a key to humanitarian effectiveness, the HMTD approach can be described as collaborative, because diplomatic activities were not only consensus-based, but also inclusive. Irrespective of their job status, responsibility, or location, participants felt empowered to practice diplomacy to ensure collaboration with partners, civil society leaders, beneficiaries, and state actors. As they depended on strong partnerships with other organizations, they viewed diplomacy as essential in creating healthy working conditions (see Table 5.18, p. 212). This was evident when there was a lack of consensus amongst the partner organizations. Everyone agreed that diplomacy ensured the channels of communication remained open in order to come to a conclusion at a later time (see Table 5.12, p. 204).

Another quality particular to humanitarian diplomacy is the reason why diplomacy is practiced in the first place. Actors involved in multi-track diplomacy in the peace process work together aiming at a common goal.<sup>787</sup> While the goal of conflict resolution is peace, humanitarians practiced diplomacy to achieve humanitarian effectiveness (see Section 5.2.4, p. 187). This is in line with other observations; traditional diplomacy seeks to achieve peace and manage relations through communication, whereas humanitarian diplomacy, as evidenced in literature, seeks to achieve a humanitarian goal.<sup>788</sup> For this reason there are those who have referred to the practice as “access diplomacy,” hinting at its operational

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<sup>786</sup> “What Is Multi-Track Diplomacy?”

<sup>787</sup> Ibid.

<sup>788</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10.

nature, which was also present in the case study evidence. The humanitarians interviewed primarily practiced diplomacy to achieve operational goals, often related to ensuring acceptance, access, ease, and efficient delivery of aid (see Section 5.2.4, p. 187). Diplomacy was employed to ensure that strong partnerships were built and then maintained (see Table 5.18, p. 212)

#### **6.3.4 Humanitarians Consistently Rank the Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy and Adjust their Strategy Based on their Counterparts' Rankings**

The practice of HMTD has definitely emerged and is viewed as critical to achieving humanitarian effectiveness. Further, not only do humanitarians practice a particular type of diplomacy, but they also fundamentally share a framework of HMTD. This framework informs their preferred strategy, meaning that they have a clear understanding of the diplomatic system in which they operate and, further, consider their next moves in diplomatic exchanges based on how they and their counterparts view the system. The research's evidence confirms this hypothesis in that humanitarian actors clearly identify the five parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and consistently and uniformly rank them according to their colleagues and counterparts (see Figure 6.1). By confirming the second hypothesis, the results of the research show that humanitarians view diplomacy as a dynamic, multi-faceted system.




Figure 6.1 COH & MOH D-I-P-L-O Rankings. The close proximity between COH and MOH’s rankings of the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy suggests that a consensus-based diplomatic strategy is appropriate.

#### 6.3.4.1 Identity: Functional, not Positional

As already noted in the previous section, HMTD is functional, not positional. The interviewed humanitarians did not practice diplomacy because their job descriptions required it; in fact, less than 30% of job descriptions had any mention of diplomatic practice. Neither did hierarchical position determine who practiced diplomacy, nor did the job type, from program to operations to administration. Humanitarians identified diplomacy as a function, as something they did, because they were humanitarians. This intrinsic use might be best called “diplomatic function.” Régnier’s referring to humanitarian diplomacy as an instrument supports this idea that humanitarian diplomacy is functional and utilitarian, something different from traditional diplomacy wherein diplomatic practice is based on the virtues of representing a state.

Humanitarians not only identified the critical role of diplomacy generally,



but also that both the personal and organizational practice of diplomacy was critical to achieving humanitarian effectiveness (see Table 5.2, p. 172). They practiced diplomacy to achieve effectiveness. Because of this they did not view diplomacy as limited to senior managers or trained professionals, but as a collective responsibility across the organization, irrespective of geographic location or status (see Table 5.2, p. 172). Since humanitarians must practice diplomacy, HMTD is functional and not positional.

#### **6.3.4.2 *Format: Confidential, not Public***

Effective HMTD requires confidentiality. Humanitarians interviewed strongly believed that outcomes from diplomatic activity depended on honoring confidentiality (see Table 5.4, p.183). Trust and discretion are paramount in reaching agreements in humanitarian work. Interestingly, although the format of diplomacy is confidential, the space in which it is practiced is primarily public, according to the case study. The need for confidentiality has little to do with issues of transparency but of prudence. The ICRC views confidentiality vital to diplomacy, a key reason for this being that negotiations are multi-track in nature, meaning they involve simultaneous conversations with a variety of parties. Multi-lateral discussions with different actors require confidentiality to perpetuate dialogue, keep options on the table, and maintain the proper and timely flow of information.<sup>789</sup> Humanitarian actors are less worried about the public “witnessing” interactions than they are that outcomes are prematurely announced. In this context, the research confirms that approaching negotiations in a discreet and private fashion, emphasizing confidentiality, can stabilize relationships, limit escalation, and protect information. When dialogue is confidential, it also allows actors to exercise indirect pressure, focusing on discreetly using influence through informal (back-channel) approaches (see Table 5.17, p. 210).

In the cases when diplomatic strategy moved from consensus-based diplomatic tools to coercive tools (i.e. persuasion), confidentiality appears to

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<sup>789</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC, 19.

become even more imperative (see Table 5.4, p. 183). To persuade counterparts to change behavior, discreet environments, regardless of the tactics employed, were ideal. The ability to have a private conversation with a customs official, instead in a room full of associates can lead to better outcomes. When partner discussions escalate, opening up back channels, sometimes even during a coffee break, can reduce pressure, make way for new perspectives, and invite new actors into the negotiation (see Section 5.3.4, p. 203). The humanitarian community must ask to what extent will the public accept the need for confidentiality, especially in highly publicized settings. Conventional diplomacy is facing increased scrutiny from some critics for its regular dependence on confidential channels. Donor-dependent humanitarian organizations find the balance between being discreet in dealing with counterparts and remaining accountable to the public at the same time.

Shaming, in most settings, is ineffective and counterproductive and should be considered only as a last resort (see Table 5.4, p. 183). There was a sense in the case study that discretion, not escalation, even when negotiations were at a stalemate, had the best chance of securing an agreeable outcome (see Table 5.5, p. 186). This aligns with other research. Previous studies involved MSF, for example, which had a history of not speaking up, but to “keep[ing] a low profile” to honor negotiations with other actors. This “mean[t] being willing to adjust its own plans and ambitions.”<sup>790</sup> The present case study participants believed that graciously disregarding off-the-cuff remarks and threats by their counterparts was the best strategy, because, in the end they not only shared the same goal, but preferred consensus and confidentiality.

#### ***6.3.4.3 Context: Customized, not Standardized***

As consistent and standard as HMTD is in practice, its operationalization is far from generic. In terms of context, humanitarians in the case study believed that diplomatic function was something that was adapted, not standardized. Local dynamics called for diplomacy, and therefore the practice also had to be adapted

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<sup>790</sup> Magone, Neuman, and Weissman, eds., *Humanitarian Negotiations*, 6–7.

to meet the needs in the field (see Section 5.2.8, p. 196). This is consistent with previous findings that humanitarian diplomacy is field-driven and context-specific.<sup>791</sup>

Humanitarian diplomacy does not and, indeed, cannot come in a one-size-fits-all box set. In any diplomatic exchange, the culture, language, and nationality of counterparts as well as the particulars of the situation in the field must be considered in order to develop an effective diplomatic strategy. Humanitarians in the study believed that the personal practice of humanitarian diplomacy looked different in each international context (see Table 5.8, p. 197). This substantiates the notion that in today's changing global landscape, humanitarian diplomats must contextualize their approach to fit the setting in which they work and the needs they are trying to meet.<sup>792</sup> Localization, as a key element of humanitarian effectiveness, certainly includes diplomatic strategy and impacts even the finest detail, such as personal appearance. Humanitarian diplomats believed that the nature of a person's outward appearance, including clothing, gender, and age, had to be considered and accounted for in preparations for diplomatic interactions (see Table 5.8, p. 197).

The picture of a very pragmatic approach to humanitarian diplomacy emerges here. While most lacked any formal training in diplomatic function, six out of ten humanitarians received cultural training and briefing before deploying to the humanitarian response. Contextualization is essential in managing partnerships. Whereas conventional diplomacy relies heavily on procedure, protocol, and tradition, humanitarians operationalize diplomacy in the most suitable fashion, whatever that is under the circumstances. In this way, HMTD bears a connection to MTD, which recognizes the role that local culture and customs of civil society plays in sustainable peacebuilding. A reason aid is most effective when localized is that decisions and operational practices are adapted to be acceptable in the particular context.

Culturally-sensitive humanitarian diplomacy is of equal importance. A

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<sup>791</sup> Veuthey, "Saving It," 4; Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 270.

<sup>792</sup> Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 268.

contextualized diplomatic approach ensures that all actors respect the values of inclusive partnership.<sup>793</sup> This mindset ensures that decisions are shared, needs defined more accurately, and local ownership is affirmed.<sup>794</sup> As one counterpart executive noted during the 2010 earthquake response, “if you want to negotiate in Haiti, negotiate like a Haitian.”

#### **6.3.4.4 *Environment: Humanitarian, not Political***

There is a well-defined setting in which HMTD should be practiced. The historical precedent, now seen as best practice, is that humanitarian diplomacy lives in the humanitarian and not the political context. States that practice humanitarian diplomacy must clearly separate such from other diplomatic activities. Straus, who first adopted the term in the 1890’s, believed that humanitarian diplomacy needed to be set apart from politics and “free from the suspicion of self-interest.”<sup>795</sup> This standard or distinction is even more important for non-state humanitarian actors to uphold. To the ICRC that means humanitarian diplomacy must remain in the humanitarian domain.<sup>796</sup> As previously noted, the ICRC has a far-reaching historical relationship to diplomatic function in humanitarian action.

It is helpful to draw a connection to multi-track diplomacy. Non-state actors complement the activities of states in ensuring peace and acceptance. They can serve as influence brokers on the grass roots level, lend their credibility and neutrality to the peace efforts and create alternative and safe environments for participatory dialogue.<sup>797</sup> Participants in the case study shared the view that humanitarians played an essential diplomatic role in interactions with state and non-state actors alike (see Figure 5.10, p. 193).

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<sup>793</sup> For inclusive partnership, see Zyck and Krebs, “Localising Humanitarianism,” 6.

<sup>794</sup> START Network, “Donor Requirements,” 1.

<sup>795</sup> Straus et al., “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the United States,” 47.

<sup>796</sup> Harroff-Tavel, “Humanitarian Diplomacy of the ICRC,” 1.

<sup>797</sup> Labonte, *Human Rights*, 56-57; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, eds., *Herding Cats*, 145.

Humanitarian actors must own the responsibility to clearly and consistently define the environment in which HMTD is practiced. In the case study, when engaging with state actors, humanitarian actors clearly set the ground rules and framed their interactions as humanitarian discussions. While the humanitarian imperative took priority during negotiation, some participants believed the “rules of engagement” had to repeatedly be emphasized, as the concepts of neutrality, independence, and impartiality were not always understood by national as well as international state actors involved in the humanitarian response (see Section 5.2.6, p. 191).

Evidence is conclusive in that humanitarians regularly interact with state actors because political issues affect a humanitarian response. This research concludes that close proximity to the field and frequent interaction with state actors impact humanitarians’ perception of these relations. Those furthest from the field, namely executives and those working in administrative positions, viewed these interactions to be less frequent but more essential. In contrast, field-based personnel viewed interaction with state actors as a continuous activity, but associated them less with effectiveness. The closer humanitarians are to the field, the more they find it essential to reiterate the humanitarian imperative; that is, to define why and for whom diplomacy is practiced (see Figure 5.10, p. 193).

This parameter is one of the key reasons why the humanitarian community must collectively embrace HMTD as distinct from conventional diplomacy. As each actor will have a unique type of diplomacy tailored to the dynamics in the field, a general agreed-upon framework is imperative to clearly delineate the practice. For the reason that states use the term “humanitarian diplomacy,” the humanitarian sector must ensure that all stakeholders understand what sets this diplomacy apart from others. Whereas official actors primarily represent the interests of their states even in humanitarian contexts, the humanitarian community practices diplomacy primarily not for its own agenda but for each beneficiary it is so committed to serving. This motivation must be clearly defined.

#### ***6.3.4.5 Objective: Operational, not Strategic***

The goals of humanitarian diplomacy are operational rather than strategic. Since

diplomacy can be witnessed taking place in community centers, at checkpoints, at customs offices, and at partner organization warehouses, humanitarian diplomacy differs from conventional diplomacy in that it is operational, rugged, and improvised. Diplomacy addresses issues pertaining to the here and now and ensuring that aid is effectively implemented (see Section 5.2.4, p. 187).

Humanitarians most commonly practice diplomacy to address short-term, day-to-day, operational issues (see Figure 5.6, p. 188). Instead of aiming for one grandiose goal, humanitarians attempt to overcome the individual hurdles in the way of achieving their primary objective of effectiveness. In the fast-moving, ever-changing operations environment of a major humanitarian emergency, the tyranny of the urgent demands operational diplomacy to take precedent. In light of the complex, insecure operating environments, humanitarian agencies are consumed with negotiating access, gaining acceptance, and securing humanitarian space to implement their operations. Diplomacy is often the opening act in a humanitarian response, because in today's global landscape humanitarian space is no longer taken for granted. Once access is negotiated, humanitarians continue to spend enormous diplomatic energy on maintaining humanitarian space, implementing and/or renegotiating agreements, and addressing new issues as they arise (see p. 189). In the case study, for example, support staff, managers, and executives alike could not initially disengage long enough from the day-to-day operational activities to consider long-term outcomes that their diplomatic activities were producing. This is less of an indictment than recognition of the challenges of a dynamic humanitarian response.

HMTD is fast-paced. As priorities change, new challenges emerge, and diplomacy must be improvisational. In the case study, respondents revealed that multiple conversations were taking place on several levels during the response. They dialogued with the partner organization on how best to begin the relief operations. They negotiated at checkpoints, advocated with customs officials for the release of medical supplies, and persuaded community leaders to allow them to conduct a needs-based, community-focused assessment.

The demands on the field during a disaster response require humanitarians to practice operations-focused diplomatic function. In addressing day-to-day

challenges, however, humanitarians must recognize two important factors. Firstly, ad-hoc problems or challenges are rarely created in a day; pre-disaster complexities or root issues often compound a problem in the field. Secondly, today's brokered agreement can create challenges for tomorrow. The overall evidence of this research concludes that effective humanitarian diplomats address the challenges of the present but always keep the future in mind. HMTD might be most evident in the operational theater, but it must also be intentionally deployed to address strategic issues in order not to be reactionary. The case study revealed that it took the organization several weeks to incorporate strategic considerations into their operational diplomatic function.

In the area of strategic communications, there is potential to develop approaches that synthesize the “saying and doing” of an organization on a system-wide level. As conventional diplomacy is becoming less static, predictable and insular, humanitarian actors, due to the free-flow of information during a major response, must ensure that all those who participate in diplomatic activities are consistent in communicating the same values and messages. In light of multi-faceted diplomatic activities, organizations must consider the role of policy and governance play in ensuring their diplomats' activities and messages are aligned across context and objective.

#### ***6.3.4.6 Observations on the Parameters of Humanitarian Diplomacy***

Individuals from a particular institution share a view of the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy, and this framework informs their diplomatic strategy. This became evident when analyzing texts from different authors who represented their institutions (e.g. ICRC, US government). In the case study, the individual participants from the INGO ranked the parameters similarly to their colleagues. The proximity between the INGO and NGO rankings of the parameters was close, meaning both organizations agreed on the HMTD framework. The close proximity informed each organization's diplomatic strategy: both organizations preferred a consensus-based diplomatic strategy to achieve humanitarian effectiveness (see Figure 5.15, p. 209).

When considering how humanitarians generally rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy, a pattern emerges. As a function, they believe humanitarian diplomacy to be linked to their identity as humanitarians, not to their job descriptions. To succeed in negotiations, humanitarians believe that confidentiality is an imperative element in securing desired outcomes. They adapt their style to the setting and counterpart they are facing. The type of diplomacy they practice is unique and quite distinct from political diplomacy. As the primary goal of humanitarian diplomacy is to ensure effective aid operations, diplomatic function often addresses day-to-day challenges rather than strategic issues.

Humanitarians' shared view on the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy sheds light on the fact that humanitarian diplomacy is a living system. It is, in fact, a far more established practice than one would give credit. Much of previous discussion has been on the unofficial and improvisational nature of humanitarian diplomacy, but now it is clear there is order to the unofficial nature, and method to the improvisational approach.

To some degree organizations should be able to take a deep breath of relief. As remote and far removed as their teams may be from the organization's administrative office, and as insecure and unpredictable as the situation they might face might be, humanitarians' practice of diplomacy is predictable, consistent, and non-controversial. In the case studies and literature there is no question that humanitarians view diplomatic function as a tool to strengthen the humanitarian mission. In the interviews, the role of diplomacy to represent the humanitarian principles was a common topic. In fact, nearly all participants agreed that in all diplomatic interactions the humanitarian imperative took priority over all other interests. That result alone is incredibly telling. While actors practiced diplomacy in the performance of their daily duties, even those as mundane as securing a favorable rate or procurement of product, their priority was not job success, but rather the humanitarian imperative.

#### **6.3.5 Humanitarians Prefer a Consensus-based Diplomatic Strategy**

They make diplomacy their own. Since humanitarians in the case study viewed



diplomacy as a shared responsibility, they incorporated it into their job function (see 5.2.1, p. 171). As a part of diplomatic function, they viewed all diplomatic activities through a particular lens. Intuitively, their humanitarian diplomacy took on the shape of a specific system. Gasser described humanitarian diplomacy as an art and, indeed, the ability to apply the tools of diplomacy and adapt to the context sets HMTD apart from conventional diplomacy.<sup>798</sup> With their high aptitude, humanitarians also know their own weaknesses, including, in this case, a clear lack of bargaining power in negotiations. When their counterparts shared their view on the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy, they could rely on deploying a consensus-based strategy (see Table 5.18, p. 212). Given their preference for consensus-based strategy, humanitarians reach, in order of frequency, for the following diplomatic tools: dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion (see Figure 5.15, p. 209).

These research findings conclusively confirmed the third hypothesis: Humanitarian actors' preference to apply a consensus-based diplomatic strategy has a positive effect on humanitarian effectiveness (coercion-centered diplomatic strategy has a negative effect on humanitarian effectiveness) (see Figure 6.2). As in other instances, such as how humanitarians contextualize diplomacy, the pragmatic approach to humanitarian action is observed here. Given the fact that humanitarians lack the power (i.e. the carrots and sticks available in traditional diplomacy), they prefer consensus-based approaches. A way to compensate for the lack of power is to form collations with like-minded agencies. This approach builds the critical mass necessary to build credibility and exert influence.

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<sup>798</sup> Gasser, "Humanitarian Diplomacy," 10.




Figure 6.2 Diplomatic strategy. The case study results corroborate the text analysis finding that humanitarian prefer consensus-based tools (dialogue and negotiation), but substantively changed the numeric results in that coercion techniques (advocacy and persuasion) play a consequential role in humanitarian diplomacy.

Even in the instances in which they had more power, participants still gravitated towards mutually agreeable goals. Harmony as a byproduct of HMTD approaches cannot be understated. In fact, evidence suggests that negative behavior during one negotiation could have negative consequences not only during later negotiations in a particular humanitarian response, but also in future disaster responses. Interestingly, the decision to deploy coercion-based strategies is not based on how much power one has. Humanitarians reach for these tools based on their conviction to address grave violations or threats to humanitarian effectiveness.

One of the key elements to humanitarian effectiveness is collaboration. It requires that all actors find ways to engage, relate, and partner to achieve a humanitarian goal. Although humanitarian diplomacy is viewed by humanitarians in the case study as informal, just as in their consistent view of the parameter of diplomacy, they consistently followed the same order of tool preference. Dialogue and negotiation, as the consensus-based tools, were the primary means to open conversations, discuss plans, or even resolve conflicts. Advocacy and persuasion,

while still common goals, were slightly less utilized.

#### **6.3.5.1 Dialogue**

Dialogue is the humanitarian's preferred diplomatic tool, the one that humanitarians say they always use (see Section 5.3.4, p. 203). Dialogue emerged as a versatile tool that could address a variety of issues when interacting with government officials, beneficiaries, donors, internal stakeholders, or the general public. Dialogue is the key way to gather and share information. Dialogue projects a conversational, considerate, non-committal tone. It is a way to gather intelligence on the context and the involved parties.<sup>799</sup>

The primary purpose of dialogue is not to convince a counterpart or come to an agreement. It is the proverbial meeting before the meeting. Dialogue might not immediately result in a decision, but it sets a non-committal and non-threatening way to initiate sustainable talks. It can open a door to serious negotiations, or it can be used, often in a back-channel approach, to ease the tensions caused by an intense negotiation. From a contextual standpoint, dialogue is the primary tool in many cultures in which indirect approaches guide negotiations and conflict management.

Dialogue is also a healthy approach when an organization values localization. Instead of an INGO immediately naming its demands, dialogue can serve as an informal, non-threatening way to arrive at a desired conclusion. Those who are faced with situations in which they are noticeably the counterpart with the least power, dialogue can be a powerful tool to disarm and de-escalate situations. The driver approaching the roadblock, even if faced with the inevitable lack of acceptance, is often served well to engage in dialogue firstly, rather than insisting on the right of access. A humanitarian uncomfortable with having to interact with a state actor may discover that dialogue is a safe means to engage because it is, at its core, an opportunity to exchange ideas to identify shared interests.<sup>800</sup> Dialogue

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<sup>799</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>800</sup> See "Glossary: Dialogue."

is also a way to prevent problems before they surface, a critical strategy in managing relations with partner organizations and other parties requiring ongoing interaction.

Since it is not task or agenda-driven, humanitarian dialogue looks more like a forum rather than a hard power, high-stakes negotiation. Humanitarians should intentionally seek out opportunities to engage their counterparts through workshops or forums where practitioners and academics alike discuss research and best practices.<sup>801</sup> Such settings turn diplomatic dialogue into an opportunity for consultation. A helpful example of peacebuilding is the approach of faith-based diplomacy, one of the tracks of MTD in which faith communities provide an opportunity for people with opposing views to exchange ideas and thoughts without the unrealistic expectation that one meeting will bring immediate resolution. If positioned properly, NGOs and other humanitarian actors can utilize forums for dialogue as a platform to indirectly exercise their influence and to gauge the environment before directly engaging their counterparts. In the case study, UN field-level cluster meetings during the emergency response phase were used to interact with potential partners prior to opening up direct channels of communication for the explicit purpose of partnerships.

Dialogue is also a way to keep conversation going when negotiations have otherwise stalled (see Table 5.12, p. 204). When there are tensions, humanitarian diplomats must find ways to either continue conversations or open up new channels of communication. They can, for example, draw on best practices from MTD. The key in the Peacebuilding domain is to keep dialoguing because it often takes just one positive interaction between counterparts to re-energize the peace process. This shows the unique role of multi-lateral diplomacy in the humanitarian sector. Since multiple actors from a variety of hierarchical levels are simultaneously engaging, it can increase the chances of getting the message across.

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<sup>801</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 7, 10.

### 6.3.5.2 *Negotiation*

Humanitarian negotiation is not an event, but an iterative journey. The high-powered executive brokering a real estate deal from the corner office of a Manhattan skyscraper is far from humanitarian reality. The case study revealed, for example, the location of a pivotal negotiation to be just outside of a men's restroom in a small airport. That negotiation, involving INGO officials, a pilot, air traffic controllers, and military officials, enabled first responders to arrive at the scene within mere hours of the earthquake. Negotiation falls into the consensus end of the continuum because its success does not depend on power, but rather on consensus and credibility.<sup>802</sup> This explains the care that most humanitarians take in ensuring that all parties to a negotiation walk away satisfied (see Table 5.21, p. 220). It is important to note that keeping negotiations, if possible, on a “dialogue level” sets the tone for a consensus-oriented interaction (see Section 5.3.6, p. 206).

Those who most commonly practice humanitarian negotiation work in the operational theater. Evidence from literature and the case study show just how occupied humanitarians are by the tyranny of the urgent (details of access, delivery, efficiency, and managing communication with multiple actors). They regularly negotiate while engaging new partners, designing projects, monitoring outcomes, and reaching agreements.<sup>803</sup> Most notably, managers and support staff have to consistently renegotiate with their counterparts in the aftermath of closed-door meetings held by executives (see p. 189). To operationalize senior level agreements, terms have to be renegotiated by field staff. A possible reason for this could be power perception. Executives in the case study were more likely to believe that their organization had more power (see 5.4, p. 211). While managers were more measured in their assessment (and field staff viewed their organization almost powerless compared to their counterparts). Despite the fact that there is value in closed-door negotiations, for every such interaction there are still countless informal negotiations taking place.

Humanitarian officials must learn the same lessons that conventional

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<sup>802</sup> For more on credibility, see Acuto, *Negotiating Relief*, 252.

<sup>803</sup> Veuthey, “Saving It,” 1.

diplomats are learning as they look around the table and realize they are no longer simply negotiating with their political peers. The MTD concept proves that the involvement of non-state actors is pivotal to securing and maintaining peace. Likewise, humanitarian organizations must continue to accept the complementary role that other actors, including staff from all ranks within, can play in humanitarian negotiations. In follow-up conversations to the case study with executive and managers, a common phrase when discussing the increased varied contact and shared diplomatic space was, “We need to learn to get the right people together” during negotiations.

Humanitarians place much value on the ability to negotiate. In their estimation, the ability to successfully negotiate could lead to humanitarian effectiveness. Even though they are rarely trained in negotiations, humanitarians are fairly confident and successful in utilizing this vital tool. They believed that the effectiveness of the large-scale response was a direct result of their ability to successfully negotiate with counterparts.

The case study unearthed a few important lessons. Firstly, managers showed resigned contentment with the fact that executives were engaged in conversations that, as lower-ranking leaders, they were excluded from but to which had otherwise positively contributed. Likewise, executives assumed and encouraged managers to be engaging in simultaneous interactions with their peers on the same topic (of the executive-level conversations). Secondly, in viewing a negotiation as multi-track, humanitarians believe they must build rapport and strong connections with their counterparts to keep dialogue open, and learn to “read” the other side. Thirdly, tough negotiators who posture and draw a line in the sand will likely fail in humanitarian negotiations. Humanitarians believed that the ability to quickly reach consensus and identify shared priorities resulted in desired outcome (see Table 5.19, p. 212).

Power plays, threats, and other manipulative approaches were rarely appropriate and never affective. In fact, lack of overall consensus in the beginning of a negotiation led to ineffective or less-than-ideal outcomes (see Table 5.19, p. 212). So, when a humanitarian negotiation appears to lack stable footing in the beginning, the negotiators are wiser to plan a tactical retreat than to try and force

the issue. Rather than approaching the counterpart with a list of “non-negotiables,” it is more advantageous to find ways of understanding the other party’s hard line. In the end, harmony appears to trump desired outcomes, and the ability to limit escalation while remaining consistently committed to confidentiality is a key ingredient.

What does this mean to the humanitarian community? Humanitarians believe negotiations should result in effective aid delivery. Yet the tool of humanitarian negotiation is rarely taught, but primarily acquired through experience in the field. Given the organizations’ reliance on the effective, system-wide practice of negotiation, humanitarian leaders must ask themselves whether they are comfortable with this lack of training and coordination. Further, humanitarian officials must realize that exclusive high-level negotiations in the absence of managers are ineffective in terms of outcomes and creating platforms for the training of future leaders. Because multi-party, multi-track approaches play a key role in creating trust in peacebuilding, approaching humanitarian negotiations as a system-wide activity involving many iterations and actors on variety of levels is most likely to succeed. In order to effectively fulfill the humanitarian mandate, humanitarians who prefer a consensus-based approach must find common ground with their counterparts and, at times, accept the occasional compromise.

#### **6.3.5.3 Advocacy**

Whereas dialogue and negotiation as humanitarian diplomatic tools are consensus-based, advocacy and persuasion are more coercive-based approaches. Although less frequently utilized, humanitarians believe that advocacy and persuasion are necessary and effective when properly used. To the UN, advocacy is essential in humanitarian diplomacy.<sup>804</sup> To the humanitarian community at large, advocacy is a responsibility.<sup>805</sup> This becomes clear in the ICRC’s

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<sup>804</sup> Kelly-Kate Pease and Kelly McBride, “Human Rights.”

<sup>805</sup> CHS Alliance, Sphere Project, and Groupe URD, “CHS Guidance,” 2, 9.

*humanitarian diplomacy* policy that emphasizes representing the “interests of vulnerable people.”<sup>806</sup>

When humanitarians can safely assume that they will find common ground, they pull dialogue and negotiation out of their toolboxes. When such confidence is lacking, humanitarians have to decide whether to raise the stakes and reach for coercive-based tools such as advocacy. Reaching to the coercion end of the continuum, humanitarians appear to understand that they must weigh their options carefully. Whereas it is quite rare for humanitarians to explicitly use threats, advocacy most commonly takes the shape of an urgent appeal (see Section 5.3.2, p.202).

Humanitarians advocate most commonly in three instances (see Section 5.3.5, p. 205). Firstly, the counterpart is vital to the success of a humanitarian operation but not interested in engaging in diplomatic exchange. Secondly, the other party is open to engagement but does not share the same goals or has conflicting interests. Thirdly, the target audience appear to lack the awareness, motivation, or information to act in the interest of the organization or beneficiaries who are being served.

All but one humanitarian interviewee regularly advocated with decision-makers and decision-influencers. Yet, not only was this tool used slightly less often than dialogue and negotiation, but the decision to deploy it was more calculated and weighed carefully. Advocating could come at a cost. When practicing advocacy, the organization or its representative was drawing the proverbial line in the sand and taking a stand for an important issue. In the humanitarian domain, advocacy enabled actors to point to a standard beyond themselves and the other parties: the humanitarian imperative. By stressing the humanitarian imperative through advocacy, humanitarians believed they were more likely to achieve humanitarian effectiveness.

When faced with inaction or violations (e.g. code of conduct), humanitarians reach for advocacy believing that they will not be able to reach their goal without deploying it. When faced with challenges, differences, or all-out

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<sup>806</sup> IFRC, “Humanitarian Diplomacy Policy,” 1.



violations, even organizations that tend to be very cautious in public statements believe that they have a right to advocate to raise awareness. Interestingly, humanitarians try to privately, informally, and discreetly advocate before escalating to a public advocacy strategy (see Section 5.3.5, p. 205).

Humanitarians most commonly advocate with two major groups: the general public and partner organizations. In targeting the public, organizations can expand their reach by exercising their voice in influence and education campaigns. By focusing on the duty to address human suffering, actors can become known for what they believe in rather than just what they operationally do. This can build local and global support bases. Further, strategic advocacy campaigns are an effective way to inform and educate decision-makers and donors on essential matters. Communications team members who were interviewed believed advocacy was an approach to overcome barriers preventing the public from acting and donors from giving in the interest of the response efforts (i.e. conflicting opinions, competing news events and/or oversaturation caused by the 24/7 news cycle).

By advocating with partner organizations, humanitarians can build effective coalitions. In the aftermath of the earthquake, COH experienced a significant leap in donor support, requiring it to identify, vet, and engage partner organizations that could assist in implementing the response. Advocacy became a primary way to say “This is what we stand for. Do we have enough in common to work together?” Advocacy becomes a way for organizations to put aside their legitimate needs for self-preservation and unite for a cause bigger than them.

Whether advocating with the public or partners, most advocacy utilization begins with discreet, informal networks and indirect messaging. Only slowly and after much discussion should public advocacy campaigns be launched. Public advocacy is commonly used to raise awareness about an organization. Humanitarians rely on credibility, legitimacy, and reputation. A strategic advocacy message can target a larger audience and reach the public in an effective way. By doing so, the organization has an opportunity to change the attitudes of its target audience.

As public as advocacy can be, it can also be effective as a tool when engaging an internal stakeholder within an institution. Humanitarians consistently find themselves advocating with their colleagues and supervisors. Field personnel take on the role as the primary advocates for the beneficiaries and the challenges they face. Field leaders advocate for their teams to receive more support, and ensure the challenges they face daily are sufficiently appreciated by remote HQ leadership. Representing these interests, field-based humanitarians find themselves also having to resist fundraisers from driving program design activities. In the case study, program staff internally advocated that field-based personnel were empowered to make relevant decisions locally. This is key, as 80% of humanitarian NGO and individuals are local, but most major decisions are made remotely. Therefore, advocacy is an internal tool to challenge organization policies and practices when necessary.

#### **6.3.5.4 Persuasion**

When humanitarians reach for the persuasion tool, they view the choice as their last resort. In fact, although humanitarians regularly practiced dialogue, negotiation, and advocacy, and could comfortably share examples and lessons learned in their practice, one out of three could not recall an instance during the disaster response when they practiced or witnessed persuasion (see Section 5.3.7, p. 207). In the HMTD context, persuasion at the most extreme end of the coercion continuum is manifest in vocally exercising influential pressure, but, given the lack of power and options, falls short of any attempts to apply force to change opinion or behavior.

To the ICRC this means that, while persuasion is in the arsenal as part of its *humanitarian diplomacy* policy, persuading through shaming a violating actor is not only the last resort, but the least effective. This fundamentally confirms what is accepted even in the humanitarian diplomacy of states. Straus, who coined the term and developed his state's concept of humanitarian diplomacy, did not consider persuasion per se as a viable option. He leapt from advocating, that is, appealing to another state's sense of morality, directly to the use of force.

Persuasion in the humanitarian response case study was utilized to address uncooperative actors who seriously impeded humanitarian effectiveness, mostly by violating the most basic norms of humanitarian action (see Section 5.3.7, p. 207).. To these and other humanitarians, persuasion has very clear baselines or prerequisites: Firstly, a complete lack of consensus and, secondly, the willingness of another actor to disregard stated objectives or standards and act against the interests of beneficiaries.

In considering literature and hours of interviews studying the role of persuasion in humanitarian action, it becomes apparent that persuasion is an attempt to convince through argument, not through force. In fact, when persuasion is mentioned in literature it consistently refers to efforts to convince parties to conflict to end hostilities. Despite hesitance to reach for this tool, humanitarians believe the practice of persuasion is their right and their obligation when all other options have been unsuccessfully deployed and humanitarian effectiveness could be served through such persuasive techniques.

A powerful state, or a coalition of many, might be able to force another actor into submission and to change behavior, but even so, it would rarely be able to change attitudes. Drawing on the lessons from MTD, peacebuilding exercises focus just as much on behavior as on attitude change. This is a sensitive issue for humanitarians because at the core of humanitarian space is a common reason to practice HTMD: the important element of acceptance. Forced acceptance rarely holds, just as forced peace accords are superficial and volatile. What this means to the theory of HMTD is that persuasion, as a last resort, is a measure in which a humanitarian actor considers any possible motivations or incentives its counterpart might have to change its behavior or attitude.

One reason persuasion is utilized less frequently is that when humanitarians take stock of power they find themselves lacking enough muscle and voice to effectively deploy the tool. Humanitarians in the study stated that they preferred not to use coercive techniques, such as giving ultimatums, making hostile remarks, or preempting confrontation, because they did not see this as conducive to the end goal of humanitarian effectiveness. Even when their counterparts regularly utilized coercive techniques, humanitarians believed

showing restraint and returning to dialogue was the best way forward. To them, failed attempts to persuade would negatively affect long-term outcomes.

#### **6.4 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

Evidence that confirmed the three hypotheses leads to the conclusion that conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD can largely contribute to humanitarian effectiveness. When considering how humanitarians have practiced humanitarian diplomacy since the early days of institutionalized humanitarian action, it becomes evident that humanitarians incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities. Humanitarians believe the practice of diplomatic function is linked to humanitarian effectiveness. The diplomacy that humanitarians practice is distinct from that of conventional diplomacy; notably in that they consistently rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and adjust their strategy based on their counterparts' rankings. In developing their diplomatic strategy, humanitarians tend to prefer consensus-based as opposed to coercion-based approaches. When considering these key findings, HMTD is best defined as a multidimensional incorporation of diplomatic function to achieve humanitarian objectives through dialogue, advocacy, negotiation, and persuasion.

# **Conclusion**

## **7.1 CHAPTER INTRODUCTION**

Humanitarians have something in common. Regardless of their role and context of their work, they practice diplomacy in order to deliver effective aid. Since the early years of institutionalized humanitarian action, humanitarians have adapted the practice of diplomacy into an intricate, unique, and system-wide function. While mostly absent from their job descriptions, diplomatic function plays an important part the humanitarian's day-to-day responsibilities. Despite the prevalent practice of humanitarian diplomacy—and critical role in achieving humanitarian effectiveness, empirical research and a robust conceptualization specific to the humanitarian context—the foundation to operationalize an effective and replicable framework of humanitarian diplomacy, has not existed; until now.

The overriding purpose of this research has been to examine the role of diplomacy in humanitarian action. It specifically focused on how conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD might contribute to humanitarian effectiveness. The primary finding of this study is that humanitarians identify diplomatic function as a critical utility in achieving humanitarian effectiveness. How humanitarians practice diplomacy is influenced by how they rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O), and the proximity between their rankings and those of their counterparts. As humanitarians prefer consensus-based rather than coercion-based diplomatic strategies, they most commonly reach for the diplomatic tools of dialogue and negotiation if the parameters indicate general consensus.

The previous chapter discussed the aggregated evidence base of this research. The following key findings were presented and explained:

1. Humanitarians incorporate diplomatic function into their job responsibilities.
2. Diplomatic function is critical to humanitarian effectiveness.
3. Humanitarians practice a particular type of diplomacy.
4. Humanitarians consistently rank the parameters of humanitarian diplomacy and adjust their strategy based on their counterparts' rankings.
5. Humanitarians prefer a consensus-based diplomatic strategy.

The purpose of this chapter is to reflect on the significance of the study in the context of the five key findings. Firstly, an overview of the project is provided. Secondly, several implications of this research are presented, followed by recommendations for research, policy, and practice. Then, before providing concluding remarks, this chapter considers the limitations and original contributions of this research.

## **7.2 PROJECT OVERVIEW**

This research presented three research variables—humanitarian effectiveness, humanitarian diplomacy, and multi-track diplomacy—as the theoretical building blocks critical to answering the research question: To what extent can conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD contribute to humanitarian effectiveness? Understanding the individual qualities of each variable, as well as the interconnected relationships between humanitarian diplomacy and MTD, formed the basis of the HMTD theory.

Chapter 2 began by exploring aid effectiveness, the context of this research. The system of humanitarian action has expanded dramatically and faces new dynamic challenges in ensuring that aid is not only delivered, but that it is delivered effectively. Although there are several definitions for humanitarian effectiveness (and different criteria and philosophies for how to measure it), there is a particular environment that is conducive to aid effectiveness. Three relevant elements influencing this environment emerged from this research on humanitarian diplomacy: localization, collaboration, and diplomatic function. Localization recognizes that effective aid and development work depends on local engagement. Collaboration recognizes the complementary role that all actors play

in ensuring humanitarian effectiveness. Diplomacy is the moderator that supports localized and collaborative aid programming through communications activities.

Having established the link between diplomacy and effective aid delivery, Chapter 2 then presented and analyzed the existing knowledge of humanitarian diplomacy. Insomuch that humanitarian action seeks to save lives, alleviate suffering, reduce risks, and ensure the respect of human rights, humanitarian diplomacy encompasses the communications methods employed by humanitarian actors to achieve such objectives. Considering the early years of humanitarian diplomacy and action, 19<sup>th</sup> century humanitarianism was practiced by one particular actor (i.e. ICRC), in one particular context (i.e. war), and with only one type of parties to conflict (i.e. states). In this comparatively one-dimensional environment, the intrinsic link between humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian action was already observable.

When direct references to humanitarian diplomacy in this time period are isolated, it is evident humanitarian action was practiced by non-state actors (namely the ICRC). Yet states were the only actors who were said to have explicitly practiced humanitarian diplomacy or any type of diplomacy in this period, for that matter. In other words, there are explicit references to state-directed humanitarian diplomacy, but only implicit references to non-state actors' role in humanitarian diplomacy. With a second glance, however, it becomes evident that humanitarian diplomacy is often the intersection where, and the tool through which, state and non-state actors have always cooperated. Hosting diplomatic conferences with state actors and commissioning delegates were in fact clear indications that diplomacy paved the way for humanitarian action. These early decisions eventually led not only to the ICRC enjoying a privileged, internationally-recognized mandate to engage in diplomacy on the international stage, but also led to their forming the basis of diplomacy in all expressions of institutional humanitarianism.

While non-state actors such as the ICRC were challenging the culture of exclusive diplomacy from the outside, an official diplomat pushed the boundaries of diplomacy from the inside. Oscar Straus, the US diplomat who introduced the term "humanitarian diplomacy," regularly broke with convention by influencing a

variety of non-traditional actors, such as civic organizations, banks, newspapers, and religious groups, to engage in humanitarian diplomacy when traditional tracks of diplomacy were ineffective. Early on, Straus believed a state's humanitarian diplomacy was not shaped by political interests, but the responsibility to protect humanity.

As humanitarian action has evolved over time into a complex, multi-dimensional system, the link between humanitarian effectiveness and diplomacy has grown stronger. Non-state actor's practice of humanitarian diplomacy has become more observable. In light of progress in the area of international humanitarian law, the motivation—and the mandate—to practice diplomacy has changed from a moral to a legal basis. In the historical one-dimensional context, humanitarian diplomacy was practiced to alleviate suffering (i.e. urging another state to stop targeting civilians). Today, humanitarian diplomacy is often necessary to initiate humanitarian action. This involves conversations on matters of protection, access, and assistance. Once aid is implemented, humanitarian diplomacy focuses on addressing operational issues and maintaining an environment conducive to aid effectiveness.

The evidence describes the diplomacy used to achieve humanitarian effectiveness as something very different from conventional diplomacy. To the extent humanitarian diplomacy is described as multi-dimensional in practice, involving different actors from different hierarchical and geographical levels, Chapter 3 began by exploring the development of conventional diplomacy and the emerging concept of multi-track diplomacy (MTD). As official diplomacy was traditionally a bilateral affair and limited to state actors, the 19<sup>th</sup> century activities of non-state actors such as the ICRC were indicative of, albeit not explicitly labeled as, diplomacy. It is therefore no surprise that a state actor introduced the term “humanitarian diplomacy” close to 1891.

The trends that influenced humanitarian action (e.g. globalization, democratization of diplomacy, changes in conflict) were also contributing factors to the development of diplomacy. With growing recognition that unofficial actors played a role in the peace process, diplomacy was initially divided by two tracks: Track I (official) and Track II (unofficial). Today, diplomacy is viewed multi-



dimensionally. The MTD theory conceptualizes nine complementary tracks that work interdependently towards sustainable peace.

MTD's inclusion of a diverse cast of local, national, and global, informal and official actors sharing diplomatic space became the foundation for the humanitarian multi-track diplomacy (HMTD) theory presented in Chapter 3. Evidence of this research converged into a distinctive pattern. Humanitarian diplomacy, for the sake of ensuring effective aid, is practiced in dynamic environments. Diplomacy takes places on multiple tracks that, even if not always visibly interdependent, regularly intersect with one another.

In summary, humanitarian diplomacy was definitely present in humanitarian action, but its practice—and the limited policy and research considering it—had yet to be conceptualized, coordinated, and evaluated. Analysis of the variables' qualities and their interconnected relationships led to introducing HMTD as the modifier to improve humanitarian effectiveness. After presenting the HMTD theory, the methodology of the case study to test this theory was explained in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 presented the results of the case study interviews.

The diversity of case study participants (i.e. HQ and field-based, INGO and NGO support staff, managers, and executives) provided helpful insights. Reviewing literature on the topics of humanitarian diplomacy, MTD, and humanitarian effectiveness, as well as systematic text analysis of key texts on humanitarian diplomacy, narrowed down the research focus. This was accomplished by identifying a set of factors, now called “parameters of humanitarian diplomacy,” that are critical to understanding how a particular humanitarian actor and his or her organization will develop either a consensus-based or coercion-based diplomatic strategy. Favoring a consensus-based strategy when possible, humanitarians utilize, in order of preference and frequency, dialogue, negotiation, advocacy and persuasion. While this research confirmed much and provided a strong basis for future research, one of the most striking findings was that, in contrast to previous scholarship on the topic of humanitarian diplomacy, humanitarians not only intrinsically practice diplomacy, but they are comfortable with associating with diplomacy, as, in their opinion, to be a

humanitarian is to be a diplomat.

### **7.3 IMPLICATIONS**

There are several implications that can be drawn from this research's evidence. These findings change the perception of humanitarian diplomacy. Research shows that interconnected actors and their activities are engaged in a system of diplomatic function to achieve humanitarian effectiveness. The HMTD concept is significant because this framework recognizes the imperative notion that diplomatic function is a shared responsibility in humanitarian action. To that end, support staff, managers, and executives identify with the role of the diplomat. What the evidence further reveals is that HMTD is unique not only in shared diplomatic function, but in that it is often field-based and operations-focused. Previous assertions that localization is an essential element of aid effectiveness—that what happens in the field during a humanitarian response is actually of critical importance—are confirmed. This requires that the humanitarian community continue to empower discussions and decisions to take place on the local level, involving aid workers and program participants alike.

With diplomacy taking place on the field level to achieve operational goals, the high volume of information traveling back and forth in a dynamic environment raises questions about coordination. Because collaboration is key to effective aid delivery, local diplomatic function requires a level of collaboration or coordination that does not yet exist. Therefore, there is potential to internally coordinate organization-wide diplomatic activities. There must follow a word of caution: Shared responsibility of diplomatic function is critical to effective outcomes; therefore, limiting the practice of humanitarian diplomacy, as suggested by some, to a small group of experienced and trained diplomats within one organization, is counterproductive and a regressive step. While humanitarians describe their practice of diplomatic function as informal and improvised, the system-wide utilization indicates an unintended pattern.

Humanitarians' preference for consensus-based strategies causes them to utilize the diplomatic tools of dialogue and negotiation most frequently. They

prefer these tools because they believe consensus-based approaches form the most likely path to effective outcomes. Since INGO and NGO counterparts share this approach, partner negotiations will follow somewhat of a standard protocol during which the first few moments are essential as both parties seek to determine if the D-I-P-L-O parameters of humanitarian diplomacy indicate common ground and shared values. If there exists a sense of resistance, keeping the conversation open through dialogue is more effective than forcing an issue, especially early on in the negotiations.

#### **7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE**

Extrapolating from the previous discussion on possible implications of the research, there are several recommendations for research, policy, and practice. This research could be extended into several directions. Firstly, future research comparing the role of HMTD in conflict and post-conflict settings to this study's findings in a post-disaster context would be helpful to ascertain the universal role of HMTD across the humanitarian sector. Secondly, research could be concentrated on the matter of how diplomacy in humanitarian action is best coordinated. This would, thirdly, provide another angle of study, namely how to best train humanitarians in diplomatic function.

Although HMTD is present in practice, it is rarely governed by robust policies, with the exception of very few unrefined and organization-specific examples. Humanitarians cannot be held accountable for the outcomes of their diplomatic activities if a robust framework, including expectations, tools, and strategies, does not exist. As this research provides a foundation for understanding the role of humanitarian diplomacy, policy makers can now consider how to develop an organization-wide approach to operationalizing HMTD. This also extends to state actors who must continually learn to recognize the imperative role that non-traditional diplomats play in the humanitarian sector.

Furthermore, individual humanitarian organizations cannot outsource or delegate humanitarian diplomacy to a particular actor. Despite the important role of the ICRC, given its unique mandate and access to the political arena, it should

and cannot be the ambassador for the humanitarian community tasked with addressing all strategic and operational issues. Rather, all non-state actors must ensure that they are locally, nationally, and globally engaged in diplomacy on official and informal stages.

The omission in job descriptions offers an opportunity for improvement. Organizations might consider placing a value on diplomatic function by incorporating this component into the job expectations and performance evaluation process for their staff. Humanitarians must reconcile the demands of their specific roles with the reality that, by virtue of being a humanitarian, diplomatic function must influence how they fulfill their job duties.

Practitioners' intrinsic use of diplomatic function should be affirmed. Equally, the humanitarian system must fund research that can inform policy and practice of humanitarian diplomacy. Senior leaders must recognize the imperative role that their teams play in diplomatic function; therefore, they must find opportunities to model and observe the type of diplomacy they want implemented in their organizations. The perception that to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat should also elevate individual humanitarians' awareness that they, regardless of their duties, are representatives not only of their organizations but the entire humanitarian community. Inasmuch as negative experiences during negotiations have long-lasting consequences, approaching every discussion with a long-term, consensus-oriented view will ensure sustainable partnership and effective aid delivery.

## **7.5 LIMITATIONS**

This study was subject to a number of limitations. While it is the researcher's opinion that no limitation adversely impacted the quality of the research, nor influenced the author's ability to properly answer the research question, they are, nevertheless, important to mention. One of the first limitations is the relatively small sample size of the case study. The interviews with the 24 primary participants produced meaningful and actionable information, but the sample size did not lend itself to statistical analysis. Representation of the data is limited also

by the fact that a single case study was conducted. Nonetheless, the results, especially answers to the open-ended questions, do tell a narrative that is consistent with what was discovered in literature and further provides a helpful insider's perspective on the role of diplomatic function.

A second limitation that must be noted is that the case study considered the role of diplomacy in response to rapid onset disaster, namely the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Understanding the role of diplomacy in disasters is increasingly of interest to the international community; but it must be stated that this study, therefore, naturally did not take into consideration dynamics that could have emerged by considering the role of diplomacy in a conflict or post-conflict setting. The research, however, studied over seventy examples of humanitarian diplomacy in literature and found many principles, practices, and priorities that are shared across various contexts in which diplomacy is practiced.

A further limitation to this research is the fact that the case study only considered the role of diplomacy as it related to one particular humanitarian action. There would have been value in considering the responses of humanitarians working for other agencies. Every organization has a particular approach to humanitarian implementation and has different comfort levels with diplomatic engagement. The organization considered in this case study is risk-adverse when it comes to public statements and interactions with state actors. This researcher did conduct interviews with six Mission of Hope staff as well as six humanitarians from other organizations whose responses aligned with the responses included in this research.

Relying on self-reporting was an unavoidable limitation of this research. Participants were asked to depend on their memory from 2010. To a humanitarian, six years can seem like an eternity and many of these actors have worked in a dozen other contexts since the response in 2010. This limitation is closely tied to another: bias could have influenced this research and the researcher who worked closely with participants during the response. While the researcher did not conduct the primary interviews during the case study, he did conduct several follow-up interviews with participants to seek clarity or gain additional insights. Lastly, a personal limitation that could have impacted this research must be noted. This

researcher balanced his full-time work in the humanitarian sector with part-time research.

## **7.6 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO RESEARCH**

Any original contributions of this research must be viewed in light of the fact that it was inspired, informed, and guided by previous scholarship and advice from two research supervisors. This should not be viewed as false humility, but as a recognition that this research builds on previous foundations.

Firstly, this research proved that humanitarians identify with the role of the diplomat and practice diplomatic function because it is critical to aid effectiveness. Humanitarian diplomacy is uniquely informal, improvised, field-driven, and operations-focused. Secondly, while this researcher was not the first to indicate that humanitarian diplomacy shares characteristics with MTD, this research analyzed and then conceptualized the practice as HMTD. This theory does not emphasize tracks (e.g. actors and activities), but views them as a pre-existing fact. Thus, HMTD introduces two original components: parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O) and the diplomatic strategy on the consensus (Dialogue and Negotiation) to coercion (Advocacy and Persuasion) continuum.

Also, while not unique or creative in terminology, this researcher offers “diplomatic function” as a useful way to describe the practice of HMTD because it emphasizes the utilitarian purpose of humanitarian diplomacy and downplays the positional identity of conventional diplomacy. Lastly, this research filled a gap in the humanitarian sector’s understanding of humanitarian diplomacy. The literature review and text analysis are helpful in providing a glimpse into the history of humanitarian diplomacy as well as understanding today’s practice.

## **7.7 CHAPTER CONCLUSION**

Chapter 1 of this thesis opened with three short illustrations of humanitarian diplomacy (see textbox 1.1). In the first example, a driver had to renegotiate

access at a checkpoint. In the second illustration, INGO first responders were discussing a joint disaster response with a local NGO partner. And then, a volunteer, at the last mile of aid assistance, was engaging with local villagers to ensure children were protected during a disease outbreak.

Everyday humanitarians practice diplomatic function, because it is critical to aid effectiveness. Since the responsibility for humanitarian diplomacy is shared, every diplomatic activity, as unique and disconnected as it might appear at first glance, takes place in a dynamic, interconnected system. This system is best conceptualized as HMTD.

Operationalizing humanitarian diplomacy as HMTD improves humanitarian effectiveness, because it guides the humanitarian through the diplomatic process. The parameters of humanitarian diplomacy (D-I-P-L-O) assist in determining either a consensus-based or coercion-based diplomatic strategy. As a result, when the diplomatic tools (D-N-A-P) are utilized properly, dialogue with a partner, negotiating access, advocating a human rights issue, and persuading decision-makers to act in a crisis will ultimately result in more effectively meeting the needs of vulnerable populations.

Humanitarian diplomacy has always played a critical role in humanitarian action. This research has filled a theoretical gap by conceptualizing this definitive type of diplomacy. Behind the HMTD theory lies the appreciation that every humanitarian must practice diplomatic function in order to ensure effective aid delivery. At the conclusion of this research, the statement that appeared bold in Chapter 1 is now undeniable: to be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.

# Addendum

## 8.1 CONVOY OF HOPE AND MISSION OF HOPE<sup>807</sup>

Convoy of Hope (COH) is a faith-based, 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation founded in 1994 and headquartered in Springfield, Missouri, USA. COH's mission is "To feed the world through children's feeding initiatives, community outreaches, and disaster responses." Since its inception, COH has served more than 80 million people. COH has provided food and supplies to victims of disasters all over the world—including the United States, Central and South America, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Programs include disaster response and development with initiatives in nutrition, agriculture, "WASH" (water access, sanitation, and hygiene), and micro-enterprise. There are over 160,000 children enrolled globally in the Children's Feeding Initiative, which spans eleven different countries. In 2016, COH's revenue was \$139 million and the agency served 8 million people.

COH and its partners have been feeding children in Haiti since 2007. The agency works in cooperation with national and local governments and through community organizations and churches located throughout Haiti, as well as its primary implementing partner, Mission of Hope (MOH). MOH is a faith-based nonprofit organization that has been working in Haiti since 1972. MOH currently operates in Haiti as *Fondation Mission de l'Espoir* (FOME), a licensed NGO and franchised foundation with the Government of Haiti. Formally incorporated as a US 501(c)(3) non-profit organization in 1998 and headquartered in the USA, MOH is motivated by Christian compassion. MOH works to meet physical and

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<sup>807</sup> Organization Descriptions printed with permission from COH Program Effectiveness Unit.



spiritual needs throughout Haiti through a range of outreach, educational, development, disaster relief, and community empowerment activities.

### **8.1.1 Institutional Research Proposal**

<b><u>Research Purpose:</u></b>	To test a theory related to Humanitarian Diplomacy (This is not an evaluation of Convoy of Hope)
<b><u>Research Approach:</u></b>	Case Study: Convoy of Hope's disaster response to the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti
<b><u>Researcher:</u></b>	Mike Clark, MAS HLM Senior Director, International Program Convoy of Hope
<b><u>University:</u></b>	University of Groningen (Netherlands)
<b><u>Primary Supervisor:</u></b>	Professor Dr. Andrej Zwitter Head of Department, Political Science
<b><u>Secondary Supervisor:</u></b>	Professor Dr. Joost Herman Director, Globalization Studies Groningen (GSG) President, NOHA (Network on Humanitarian Action)
<b><u>Research Field:</u></b>	Humanitarian Diplomacy
<b><u>Degree:</u></b>	PhD
<b><u>Research Outputs:</u></b>	Dissertation (possible book & Journal publication(s))
<b><u>Confidentiality:</u></b>	All individual responses are confidential (see details below)
<b><u>Anonymity:</u></b>	Convoy of Hope may have its name removed from the study

## **8.2 RESEARCH SUMMARY**

To be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat. Without diplomatic function, humanitarian action could not exist. Much of humanitarian effectiveness depends

on humanitarian diplomacy. Over its 125-year history, this particular type of diplomacy has evolved into a complex system of official and informal interaction on local, national, and global levels. This research seeks to test whether conceptualizing humanitarian diplomacy as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy can improve humanitarian effectiveness. Empirical findings suggest that there is a relationship between humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian effectiveness. The research is guided by the following research question:

To what extent can humanitarian effectiveness be improved when the practice of diplomacy in humanitarian action is conceptualized and operationalized as humanitarian multi-track diplomacy?

The researcher's theoretical construct introduces a moderator, namely humanitarian multi-track diplomacy. The next step in the research is to test this theory through a case study approach. The researcher has identified four primary tools of humanitarian diplomacy: dialogue, negotiation, advocacy, and persuasion. The case study seeks to understand when and how actors practice these tools. Further, the researcher seeks to ascertain how humanitarian actors balance the following dichotomies of humanitarian diplomacy:

- Identity (Position or Function)
- Format (Public or Confidential)
- Goal (Strategic or Operational)
- Environment (Humanitarian or Political)
- Context (Customized or Standardized)

### **8.3 CONVOY OF HOPE'S ROLE**

COH would be helping the researcher gain an understanding of the role that diplomacy plays in humanitarian emergencies.

The case study:

- Is **NOT** an evaluation of Convoy of Hope's emergency response
- Is **NOT** an employee performance assessment
- Is **NOT** soliciting participants' opinions, attitudes, and perceptions of Convoy of Hope's effectiveness

### **8.4 RESEARCH METHODS**

The case study would primarily gather information through self-reporting exercises (i.e. interviews). The researcher or the research assistant would conduct approximately thirty 60-minute interviews with staff from COH and MOH.<sup>808</sup> The interviews can be conducted in person or via phone call or videoconference. The interviews would be with individuals who were directly involved in (or had relevant knowledge of) the disaster response. See addendum for a tentative list of participants (subject to review). COH would assist in recommending additional participants.

## **8.5 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

Please note that participants should not see the list of questions prior to the scheduled interview.<sup>809</sup>

## **8.6 CASE STUDY BUDGET**

There are no direct costs to COH (e.g. travel, compensation).

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<sup>808</sup> Pending approval, Program Effectiveness would contact MOH and submit a separate research proposal.

<sup>809</sup> Exception: Randy Rich and Kirk Noonan as members of the RRB.

## 8.7 NEXT STEPS

The researcher recommends the following steps, should the RRB approve the request.

Table 8.1 Case study timeline

Tentative Timeline	Action	Detail
September 30	Approval, clarification, or denial of research request	<b>Email scanned letter to researcher at mclark@rug.nl</b>
September 30	Participant List	Researcher and Randy Rich compile list of interview participants
November 30	Case Study Announcement	Keith Boucher (COO) emails participants (see addendum)
December 1-4	Interview Scheduling	Research assistant contacts participants to schedule interviews
December 10 – January 15	Interviews (HQ, Field, and Virtual)	Researcher and research assistant
January 16 – March 1	Data collection and analysis	Researcher and research assistant
June 1, 2017	Results Presentation	Researcher presents COH's RRB with findings of case study  Review board decides if COH name will be published or withheld in publications <b>(Email scanned letter to researcher at mclark@rug.nl)</b>

### 8.7.1 Case Study Announcement

After the RRB approved the request, COH's Chief Operations Officer emailed potential respondents the following email on November 29:

Dear \_\_\_\_\_,

Convoy of Hope has been given an exciting opportunity to assist researchers from a European University gain an understanding of the role that *diplomacy* plays in humanitarian emergencies. Convoy of Hope's Research Review Board has reviewed and approved this case study and will be involved throughout the process.

Due to your involvement with, and knowledge of, Convoy of Hope's 2010 earthquake disaster response in Haiti, I would like to ask you to participate in a 45-minute one-on-one interview. In the coming days you will be contacted to set up a time and format (in-person, phone, or video conference) that is most convenient for you.

This is **NOT** an EVALUATION of the response or an assessment of your performance. Your responses are confidential. Your name and title will not be published.

Thank you for your support in this worthwhile effort!

Keith Boucher  
*Senior Vice President — Chief Operations Officer*

## **8.7.2 Research Assistant Training Manual**

### **Purpose of Manual**

This manual will serve as a reference for research assistants conducting case study interviews.<sup>810</sup> It is important that data be collected as carefully and completely as possible. Information collected on the questionnaires will be coded and entered into a database where it will be analyzed to summarize findings from the survey. Carefully collected and reported information will avoid biases and errors in the later data tabulation and analysis. If research assistants have any questions about the information in this manual or instructions on the questionnaire they should consult the Senior Policy Director.

### **Responsibilities of Research Assistant**

As a research assistant, you will:

- Be given the names and contact information of those being interviewed. Each respondent has volunteered to participate in the interview and is expecting your contact.
- Schedule each interview, giving the respondent the opportunity to select preferred times and places to meet.
- Manage funds for the costs of conducting the interviews.
- Communicate with the researcher on any problems or questions that may arise with regard to field data collection.
- Ensure all questionnaires are encoded into MS Excel.
- Ensure that all stories, examples, and clarifications provided by participants are coded, transcribed and formatted in MS Word.

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<sup>810</sup> Taken and modified with permission from COH's household survey manual. See Nathan Mallonee and Roshani Schaefer, "CFI: Nepal Household Survey Manual," (Convoy of Hope, Springfield, Missouri, 2016).

- Become acquainted with the 2010 Haiti Earthquake as well as Convoy of Hope's response.
- Read and become familiar with the researcher's methodology and conceptualization of humanitarian multi-track diplomacy.
- Keep a journal or log documenting each day's activities.
- Not share any information provided by respondent with others. The questionnaire is confidential.
- Not change any of the responses or information provided by respondent.
- Not provide any promises of assistance to respondent.
- Not bring any others besides those conducting the survey with them to the respondent household.

The questionnaire should be pre-tested with 3 volunteers prior to launch. These should not be counted toward the survey results.

## 8.8 CASE STUDY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

This section lists the interview guide and interview questions. Questions were based on the classification of humanitarian diplomacy and tools of diplomacy frameworks that comprise the conceptualization of humanitarian multi-track diplomacy.

My name is \_\_\_\_\_ and I have been assigned to conduct this interview. You have been asked to participate in this survey due to your involvement with, and knowledge of, Convoy of Hope's 2010 earthquake disaster response in Haiti. Today you will be helping researchers to gain an understanding of the role that *diplomacy* plays in humanitarian emergencies.

Please note we are **NOT** conducting an **EVALUATION** of Convoy of Hope's emergency response, nor are we assessing your individual performance or your personal opinion on the response's effectiveness. Your answers will help test a theory. Your responses are confidential and will not be shared with your employer. Your name and title will not be published.

Not all questions will be relevant to your job. Since this survey is interested in

your practice, knowledge, and perception of diplomacy, please answer each question to the best of your ability. After answering a question, you are free to explain or clarify your answer, and provide specific examples that are useful.

## **8.9 CASE STUDY IMPLEMENTATION**

### **8.9.1 Case Study Planning**

In December 2016, the research assistant contacted the individual participants and scheduled the interviews. Due to health and schedule conflicts, two of those contacted were not able to participate in the case study. None of the case study participants were directly compensated by the research team, but both organizations allowed their employees to be interviewed during normal working hours. The research assistant was compensated \$1,031.40 for 36 hours of interviews.

### **8.9.2 Interview Preparation**

When interviewing, it is important to look professional at all times. Your dress should be appropriate and comfortable. Do not necessarily wear your best clothes, or clothes that would make you stand out (such as a business suit). Do not wear expensive jewelry that may make you appear to be much richer than the people that you are interviewing. Such considerations are important, and have been found to influence how comfortable people feel about being interviewed. Before leaving for the field, check to make sure you have adequate supplies for the day's work.

These supplies include:

- A sufficient supply of questionnaires (bring extras)
- This Field Survey Interviewer's Manual
- Identification documents and credentials
- Cards with contact information to provide respondents
- A clipboard
- Journal or log
- Blue ballpoint pens
- A briefcase or bag to carry the questionnaires
- Map of local area

- Any personal items you will need to be comfortable

Find a Good Interview Location. Try to conduct the interview in a location that is private and where there are not many distractions. It is important that the respondent is listening carefully during the interview; so if you cannot find a suitable location to conduct the interview, try to set up a time in the future. Also, other colleagues or community members should not be present during the interview.

Remember to build rapport with respondents. At the beginning of an interview, you and the respondent are strangers to each other. The respondent's first impression of you will influence his or her willingness to cooperate with the survey. Be sure that your manner is always friendly.

Make a good first impression. When first approaching the respondent, do your best to make him or her feel at ease. Open the interview with a smile and greeting such as "Good Afternoon" and then proceed with introducing yourself and the purpose of your visit.

Always have a positive approach. Never adopt an apologetic manner, and do NOT use words such as "Are you too busy?", "Would you spare a few minutes?" or "Would you mind answering some questions?" Such questions invite refusal before you start.

Stress confidentiality of responses when necessary. If the respondent is hesitant about responding to the interview or asks what the data will be used for, explain that the information you collect will remain confidential, no individual names will be used for any purpose, and that all information will be grouped together to write a report. Never mention other interviews or show completed questionnaires to other interviewers or supervisors in front of a respondent or any other person. Request honesty and openness.

Give the respondent the opportunity to ask questions before continuing



with the interview. Before agreeing to be interviewed, the respondent may ask you some questions about the survey or how he or she was selected to be interviewed. Be direct and pleasant when you answer. Answer any questions from the respondent frankly.

Explain the purpose of the survey and research. The purpose is to better understand the communities in which COH works and to measure possible impact. Indicate that a copy of the final report can be sent to them.

Indicate that the interview should take no more than 40 minutes. Ask if the respondent has that much time available. If not, indicate your willingness to return at another time if it is inconvenient for her to answer questions at that time.

Be neutral throughout the interview. Most people are polite and will tend to give answers that they think you want to hear. It is therefore very important that you remain absolutely neutral as you ask the questions. Never, either by the expression on your face or by the tone of your voice, allow the respondent to think that he has given the "right" or "wrong" answer to the question. Never appear to approve or disapprove of any of the respondent's replies.

If the respondent gives an ambiguous answer, try to probe in a neutral way. Ask questions such as:

“Can you explain a little more?”

“I did not quite hear you, could you please tell me again?”

“There is no hurry. Take a moment to think about it.”

Never suggest answers to the respondent. If a respondent's answer is not relevant to a question, do not prompt him by saying something like "I suppose you mean that... Is that right?" Rather, you should probe in such a manner that the respondent comes up with the relevant answer.

Do not change the wording or sequence of questions. The wording of the

questions and their sequence in the questionnaire were carefully chosen for a reason. If the respondent has misunderstood the question, you should repeat the question slowly and clearly. If he or she still does not understand, you may reword the question, being careful not to alter the meaning of the original question. Provide only the minimum information required to obtain an appropriate response.

Handle hesitant respondents tactfully. If the respondent is reluctant or unwilling to answer a question, try to overcome his or her reluctance by explaining that the same question is being asked of other respondents. If he or she still refuses, simply write "REFUSED" next to the question and proceed as if nothing had happened. If you have successfully completed the interview, you may try to obtain the missing information at the end but the respondent should not be forced to give an answer.

Do not make assumptions. You should also be careful not to jump to conclusions based on previous information. Do not assume the answer to any question based on your previous experience with the way people behave or think.

Do not skip asking any questions. Do not skip a question even when you think the answer is obvious.

Do not hurry the interview. Ask the questions slowly to ensure the respondent understands what is being asked. After you have asked a question, pause and give time for the respondent to think. If the respondent feels hurried or is not allowed to formulate his or her own opinions he or she may respond with "I don't know" or give an inaccurate answer. If you feel the respondent is answering without thinking just to speed up the interview, say to the respondent, "There is no hurry. Your opinion is very important so consider your answers carefully."

Do not show the questionnaire to anyone, including the respondent. You must not show the questionnaire to anyone, unless otherwise told to by your supervisor. For example, sometimes a respondent may want to complete the questionnaire or

to read a question. It is important that you do not show the document to the respondent. If respondent does request this, be polite but firm in your refusal.

If you are ever unsure, write out all of the respondent's reply on the questionnaire. Anything out of the ordinary can also be noted on the front page or in the margins directly on the survey.

Write legibly. It is important that those who will be entering the data from your survey can decipher what you have marked. Checks should be clearly within one box and not another. If you are circling an item, be sure not to circle other items nearby.

## **8.10 CASE STUDY INTERVIEW FORM**

### **8.10.1 Introduction**

**You have been selected to participate in this survey based on your experience during (or knowledge of) the Haiti earthquake response.**

- Your responses are confidential. Your name will not be shared with your employer and will not appear in publications.
- This is not an evaluation of your organization's response.
- This is not an evaluation of your performance.

### **8.10.2 Research Purpose**

- We are trying to establish the extent to which diplomacy impacts humanitarian effectiveness. By completing this survey, you are helping researchers understand the role of diplomacy in humanitarian emergencies.
- For this survey's purposes, we define humanitarian diplomacy as "a multidimensional approach to achieving humanitarian objectives through dialogue, advocacy, negotiation and persuasion."
- Try to answer each question with this definition in mind and in the context of the 2010 earthquake response in Haiti.

## 8.11 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Table 8.2 Case study questions

Participant Information		
01	Your organization	01 Convoy of Hope 02 Mission of Hope 03 Other: _____
02	Your name	
Function		
03	What category best describes your role during the response?	01 Operations/Logistics 02 Resource Mobilization (i.e. Fundraising, Procurement) 03 Communications 04 Administration
04	Job Title during response:	
05	Your primary job location during the response was:	01 Global (HQ) 02 Local (Field)
06	Additional Information	
The Practice of Diplomacy		
07	The effectiveness of the response depended on YOUR ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to dialogue, advocate, negotiate and/or persuade).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
08	Additional Information	
09	The practice of diplomacy was limited to senior managers and/or trained professionals.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
10	Additional Information	
11	The practice of diplomacy was a shared responsibility across the organization (i.e. in different circumstances, different people were involved in some type of negotiations).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
12	Additional Information	
13	During the response, your organization's diplomatic efforts were mostly:	01 Information & Improvised 02 Official & Planned
14	Examples	
15	Your job description stated that diplomatic responsibilities (i.e. negotiation, persuasion, advocacy, dialogue) were part of your role.	01 Yes 02 No 03 Not sure
16	Additional Information	
Format of Diplomacy		
17	Where did the most diplomatic interactions take place?	01 Global level 02 (HQ) National level (country offices) 03 Field level (project sites)
18	Additional Information	
19	Where were most diplomatic interactions conducted?	01 Private spaces (e.g. offices, conference rooms, phone)

		02 Public spaces (e.g. runway, checkpoint, church, distribution site)
20	Additional Information	
21	A successful negotiation (i.e. securing a partnership agreement) depended on discretion and/or confidentiality.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
22	Additional Information	
23	Persuading decision-makers to change behavior required a confidential and/or discreet approach.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
24	Additional Information	
25	Publicly shaming actors who obstructed humanitarian operations (e.g. calling out corrupt government officials or ineffective partner organizations) was (or would have been) an effective diplomatic tool.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
26	Additional Information	
<b>Objectives of Diplomacy</b>		
27	During the response, most of your organization's diplomatic efforts addressed day-to-day issues (e.g. negotiating a shipping rate, securing access, interacting with local communities).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
28	Additional information	
29	When an agreement (e.g. with a partner) was negotiated on the executive level, operational details had to be negotiated on the local level.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
30	Additional information	
31	You mostly practiced diplomacy in order to:	01 Achieve long-term goals 02 Address an operational issue
32	Additional information	
<b>Partnerships</b>		
33	Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with partner organizations.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
34	Additional Information	
35	Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with state actors.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
36	Additional Information	
37	Diplomacy was essential to managing relationships with beneficiaries.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
38	Additional Information	

39	Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in successful response implementation.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
40	Additional Information	
41	Quickly reaching consensus during a negotiation led to an effective partnership and response.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
42	Additional Information	
43	Quickly identifying priorities during diplomatic interactions resulted in a desired outcome.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
44	Additional Information	
45	Identifying your counterpart's priorities and "non-negotiables" were essential in developing your diplomatic strategy.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
46	Additional Information	
47	Who had most power during negotiations?	01 Your Counterparts 02 Your Organization
48	Additional Information	
49	Diplomatic interactions during the response had long-term consequences on your relationship with your counterpart.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
50	Additional Information	
51	Negotiations with partner organizations resulted in effective long-term working relationships (e.g. after 2 years, you were still partnering).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
52	Additional Information	
53	The more you had in common with your counterpart (e.g. partner organization, government official), the less you had to rely on using power (i.e. moral authority, money, influence) to accomplish your objective.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
54	Additional Information	
55	At the end of a negotiation, all parties walked away satisfied.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
56	Additional Information	
<b>Environment of Diplomacy</b>		
57	In diplomatic interactions (e.g. negotiations), the humanitarian imperative (addressing suffering) took priority over other interests (e.g. political, organizational, business interests.).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
58	Additional Information	
59	You primarily practiced diplomacy with	01 Strongly Agree

	non-government actors.	02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
60	Additional Information	
61	Your organization interacted with government officials on local, national or international levels.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
62	Additional Information	
63	The effectiveness of your organization's response depended on communication with government actors.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
64	Additional Information	
65	Your organization viewed a government agency (e.g. FEMA, USAID) as a partner during the response.	01 Yes 02 No
66	Additional Information	
67	Political issues (i.e. security, corruption, lack of infrastructure or capacity) directly affected your response?	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
68	Additional Information	
<b>Context of Diplomacy</b>		
69	You received information and/or training on how to communicate in the local context and culture.	01 Yes 02 No
70	Additional Information	
71	You adapted your diplomacy style depending on the nationality of your counterpart (e.g. negotiating with a Haitian official)?	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
72	Additional Information	
73	Your organization's diplomacy looked different depending if it took place on a global or field level.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
74	Additional Information	
75	Language barriers affected diplomatic interactions.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
76	Additional Information	
77	A negotiator's appearance (e.g. dress, age, etc.) and position (title, status in organization) affected the outcome of diplomatic interactions.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
78	Additional Information	
79	Agreements were not honored due to linguistic misunderstandings or cultural differences.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never

80	Additional Information	
<b>Tools of Diplomacy</b>		
The common tools of humanitarian diplomacy are dialogue, negotiation, advocacy and persuasion. In this section you will receive a definition and example of the tool. Then you will be asked about the use of these tools.		
<b>Dialogue</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Definition: A discussion between individuals or groups</li> <li>Example: The NGO partners are dialoguing how best to work together.</li> </ul>		
81	You (or your organization) dialogued to achieve an objective.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
82	Additional Information	
83	Non-committal, informal interactions were the first step in starting diplomatic interactions (i.e. beginning partnership negotiations).	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
84	Additional Information	
85	When there was no consensus, keeping dialogue open helped to address concerns or give parties time to reassess their position.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
86	Additional Information	
87	With whom did you (or your organization) dialogue?	01 Beneficiaries 02 Internal Stakeholders (i.e. superiors, peers, board members) 03 Donors/Public Government 04 Officials 05 Partner Organizations
88	Additional Information	
89	Dialogue was most effective when there was consensus amongst counterparts (officials, partners).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
90	Additional Information	
<b>Advocacy</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Definition: Appealing for support or recommending action</li> <li>Example: The NGO is advocating for greater protection of refugee children.</li> </ul>		
91	You advocated with decision-makers or decision-influencers in order to achieve an objective.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
92	Additional Information	
93	Stressing the humanitarian imperative (i.e. to address human suffering) was an effective tool to achieve a goal.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely



		05 Never
94	Additional Information	
95	Your (or your organization's) advocacy efforts targeted:	01 Beneficiaries 02 Internal Stakeholders (i.e. superiors, peers, board members) 03 Donors/Public Government 04 Officials 05 Partner Organizations
96	Additional Information	
97	In order to address challenges or raise awareness of the emergency, your organization implemented public advocacy campaigns (e.g. news interviews, posts on social media platforms, etc.).	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
98	Additional Information	
99	Your organization relied on discreet, informal networks and "connections" to address specific issues, represent your interests or influence decisions.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
100	Additional Information	
<b>Negotiation</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Definition: Coming to an agreement or settling a conflict</li> <li>Example: The NGOs are negotiating the partner agreement.</li> </ul>		
101	You negotiated in order to achieve an objective.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
102	Additional Information	
103	Your (or your organization's) negotiation efforts targeted:	01 Beneficiaries 02 Internal Stakeholders (i.e. superiors, peers, board members) 03 Donors/Public Government 04 Officials 05 Partner Organizations
104	Additional Information	
105	Successful negotiations required that both parties were willing to compromise.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
106	Additional Information	
107	Lack of overall consensus in the beginning of a negotiation led to ineffective or less-than-ideal outcomes.	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
108	Additional Information	
<b>Persuasion</b>		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Definition: To strongly advise or convince</li> <li>Example: The NGO used its influence to persuade the local partner to honor the agreement.</li> </ul>	
109	You persuaded in order to achieve an objective	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
110	Additional Information	
111	You (or your organization) attempted to persuade:	01 Beneficiaries 02 Internal Stakeholders (i.e. superiors, peers, board members) 03 Donors/Public Government 04 Officials 05 Partner Organizations
112	Additional Information	
113	Persuasion during negotiations was only necessary when there was little consensus between parties.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
114	Additional Information	
115	Your organization tended to have more power (i.e. leverage, options, money, power) than the counterparts during negotiations.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
116	Additional Information	
117	Your organization applied coercive techniques when negotiating with other parties (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks).	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
118	Additional Information	
119	The other party(ies) applied coercive techniques when negotiating with your organization. (e.g. ultimatums, confrontation, hostile remarks)	01 Always 02 Sometimes 03 Neutral 04 Rarely 05 Never
120	Additional Information	
121	Coercion techniques were useful tools to modify a party's decision or behavior.	01 Strongly Agree 06 Agree 07 Neutral 08 Disagree 09 Strongly Disagree
122	Additional Information	
123	Unpleasant and/or aggressive negotiations had a negative impact on the disaster response.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
124	Additional Information	
125	Unpleasant and/or aggressive negotiations had a negative impact on long-term partnerships.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree

126	Additional Information	
<b>Summary Questions</b>		
127	Diplomacy played an important role in the response.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
128	Additional Information	
129	The effectiveness of the response depended on your organization's ability to practice diplomacy (i.e. to negotiate).	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
130	Additional Information	
131	To be a humanitarian is to be a diplomat.	01 Strongly Agree 02 Agree 03 Neutral 04 Disagree 05 Strongly Disagree
132	Additional Information	

## Chapter 9

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